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ABSTRACT 
 
The three decades before the First World War were a period of intense 
militarism, and in the United Kingdom this meant navalism.  By the late Edwardian 
period the navalist movement had captured Britain’s attention – a movement that 
paradoxically claimed the Royal Navy was weaker than at any point in its history while 
presiding over a total revolution in British naval technology and a concurrent 
unprecedented rise in naval budgets.  This dissertation explores the creation, 
propagation, success and failure of directed navalism between 1884 and 1914.  Directed 
navalism, for the purposes of this project, refers to the cooperation between and support 
of navalism among three elite national groups: serving naval officers at the level of 
captain and above (professionals), naval correspondents and editors working for large-
circulation national newspapers and periodicals (press), and members of Parliament in 
both houses, from backbenchers to high Cabinet-level officials, who dealt with navalist 
issues during the course of their public service careers (politicians). 
 Directed navalism was the bedrock upon which the more popular and ultimately 
more successful ‘soft’ navalism – penny dreadfuls, the Navy League, fundraising drives, 
fleet reviews – was built.  The three groups of professionals, press and (to a lesser extent, 
particularly before 1900) politicians purposefully created and fostered the navalist 
movement.  Navalism meant different things to each of the three, obtainable via different 
methods, but from 1884 onward they were able to put aside their differences in service 
to a broader movement.  This unofficial partnership remained effective through the 
 iii 
 
majority of the Edwardian period, but after the twin upheavals of Liberal electoral 
victory and First Sea Lord Sir John (Jacky) Fisher’s naval reforms in 1906 it began to be 
overtaken by partisanship, factionalism, and a general radicalization of both public and 
parliamentary navalism.  The rise and fall of directed navalism – the backroom deals, 
surreptitious leaks and midnight meetings that laid the foundation for a national 
movement – is the story of this dissertation.  Though directed navalism collapsed before 
the First World War, it was extraordinarily successful in its time, and it was a necessary 
precursor for the creation of a national discourse in which ‘soft’ navalism could thrive. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 The three decades before the First World War were a period of intense 
militarism, and in the United Kingdom – with all due apologies to the National Service 
League – this meant navalism.  That one single word has been used to explain a vast 
social, political, journalistic, and professional movement that had been sweeping both 
the nation and the navy for years.  In 1884 First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Northbrook 
– the political head of the Royal Navy – confidently declared in Parliament that if the 
navy’s budget were increased he would not know how to spend it.1  Twenty-five years 
later the novelist James Blyth, in his mass-market cautionary tale about the German 
menace The Swoop of the Vulture, offered the following advice to the nation: “Ward off 
war by overwhelming power.  Give up all, education (a useless incubus to 50% of the 
children), poor rates, old age pensions, what you will, give up all to the preservation of a 
navy which can terrorise the world.”2 
 What had changed?  How had such fears of naval disaster overtaken a nation that 
prided itself on its hearts of oak?  The navalist movement had captured Britain’s 
attention – a movement that paradoxically claimed the Royal Navy was weaker than at 
any point in its history while presiding over a total revolution in British naval technology 
                                                 
1 Roger Parkinson, The Late Victorian Navy: The Pre-Dreadnought Era and the Origins of the First World 
War (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2008), 92. 
 
2 Johan A Höglund, Mobilising the Novel: The Literature of Imperialism and The First World War 
(Uppsala, Sweden: Reklam & Katalogtryck AB, 1997), 148. 
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and a concurrent unprecedented rise in naval budgets.  This dissertation explores the 
creation, propagation, success and failure of directed navalism between 1884 and 1914.  
Directed navalism, for the purposes of this project, refers to the cooperation between and 
support of navalism among three elite national groups: serving naval officers at the level 
of captain and above (professionals), naval correspondents and editors working for 
large-circulation national newspapers and periodicals (press), and members of 
Parliament in both houses, from backbenchers to high Cabinet-level officials, who dealt 
with navalist issues during the course of their public service careers (politicians). 
 Directed navalism was the bedrock upon which the more popular and ultimately 
more successful ‘soft’ navalism – penny dreadfuls, the Navy League, fundraising drives, 
fleet reviews – was built.  The three groups of professionals, press and (to a lesser extent, 
particularly before 1900) politicians purposefully created and fostered the navalist 
movement.  Navalism meant different things to each of the three, obtainable via different 
methods, but from 1884 onward they were able to put aside their differences in service 
to a broader movement.  This unofficial partnership remained effective through the 
majority of the Edwardian period, but after the twin upheavals of Liberal electoral 
victory and First Sea Lord Sir John (Jacky) Fisher’s naval reforms in 1906 it began to be 
overtaken by partisanship, factionalism, and a general radicalization of both public and 
parliamentary navalism.  The rise and fall of directed navalism – the backroom deals, 
surreptitious leaks and midnight meetings that laid the foundation for a national 
movement – is the story of this dissertation.  Though directed navalism collapsed before 
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the First World War, it was extraordinarily successful in its time, and it was a necessary 
precursor for the creation of a national discourse in which ‘soft’ navalism could thrive. 
 
TERMINOLOGY AND TIMELINE 
 Before beginning an exploration of the navalist era, two important definitions 
must be established.  First, what is navalism?  It was not a term used during the period; 
opponents of the movement generally called naval activists scaremongers or Jingoes, 
while pro-naval activists considered themselves concerned patriots.  The word first 
appears in propagandistic mass-market literature of the First World War, and not in a 
positive context.  Naval historian Julian Corbett wrote in his 1915 pamphlet “The 
Spectre of Navalism” that Britain was not and had never been a navalist nation – but he 
was using the term as a contrast to “Prussian militarism.”  Britain had not used naval 
power to invade other nations, and so was not a navalist power.3  The term was utilized 
similarly by naval journalist Archibald Hurd in 1918; he accused Germany of being the 
only navalist power by virtue of purposely beginning a naval arms race.4 
 The first historian to use ‘navalism’ specifically in reference to Britain was the 
colossus of Edwardian and First World War naval history, Arthur Marder.  In one of his 
earliest (1937) historical works he observed that “by the turn of the century the country 
                                                 
3 Julian Corbett, “The Spectre of Navalism,” Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK, 
Sir Julian Corbett Papers (hereafter NMM CBT), 7/7. 
 
4 Archibald Hurd, The British Fleet in the Great War (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1918), xxii-
xxiii. 
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was navally-minded.  All classes had, or thought they had, something to gain from the 
growth of the Navy, whether security, empire, trade, employment, or dividends.”5  This 
definition was simplified even further in his pioneering study of the prewar navy The 
Anatomy of British Sea Power (1940): “The term ‘navalist’ as used in this volume refers 
to those people, civilians and officers, who actively supported a big-navy policy.  
‘Navalism’ is the big-navy movement.”6  That vague characterization remained the 
standard for decades, whether due to a reluctance to re-approach the field-defining work 
of Marder or simply because it was adequate enough for his successors.  Historian 
Matthew Johnson has recently provided a more nuanced and more useful view of prewar 
British navalism, noting that it “cannot be understood in terms of strategic calculation 
alone.  It was a political, indeed an ideological, movement, based on a conception of 
naval power not simply as a legitimate arm of national defence, but as the basis of 
national might and prestige.”7  It is this definition of navalism that will be used 
throughout the dissertation. 
 The second central framework of the navalist movement is its timeline.  
Understandably, historians have tended to identify different points at which the 
movement begun based on their own methodologies and historiographical approaches.  
                                                 
5 Arthur J. Marder, “The Origin of Popular Interest in the Royal Navy,” Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution 82 (Feb 1937): 769-770. 
 
6 Arthur J. Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-
Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1964 [1940]), ix. 
 
7 Matthew Johnson, Militarism and the British Left, 1902-1914 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
69. 
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Cultural historian Jan Rüger dates it to the 1887 Spithead naval review, in his view the 
first point when the Admiralty purposefully brought forward a public relations 
initiative.8  Naval historian Shaun Grimes begins in the same year, taking the formation 
of the Naval Intelligence Department as the beginning of modern naval strategic 
thinking.9  Technological historians, led by Jon Testuro Sumida, generally begin with the 
Naval Defence Act of 1889;10 the historian of Alfred Thayer Mahan, William Livezey, 
perhaps predictably dates the navalist era to the publication of Mahan’s works on naval 
history between 1890 and 1892.11  The work of A.J.A. Morris on increasing journalistic 
distrust of Germany begins as late as 1896,12 while Roger Parkinson’s monograph on the 
late Victorian Royal Navy brings the periodization as early as Near East crisis of 1878.13 
 Then there are the historians who simply chose decades: 1860 for Paul 
Kennedy’s work on Anglo-German rivalry in the broader sense, 1870 for John Beeler’s 
technological history of warship design and Mary Conley’s important cultural study of 
naval masculinity, 1880 for Marder’s essential Anatomy of British Sea Power, 1890 for 
                                                 
8 Jan Rüger, “Nation, Empire and Navy: Identity Politics in the United Kingdom 1887 – 1914,” Past & 
Present 185 (November 2004), 164. 
 
9 Shawn T. Grimes, Strategy and War Planning in the British Navy, 1887-1918 (Rochester, NY: Boydell 
Press, 2012), 1. 
 
10 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 
1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 3. 
 
11 William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981 [1947]), 63. 
 
12 A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and Rearmament, 1896-1914 (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 13. 
 
13 Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy, viii. 
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Lisle Rose’s comparative study of world navalism, and as late as 1900 for Peter 
Padfield’s research on the Anglo-German naval race.14  This project takes 1884 as its 
starting point, and the “Truth About the Navy” campaign in the Pall Mall Gazette as the 
first substantive example of long-term cooperation between serving naval officers and 
the periodical press. 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 This project examines three major groups within British society, each with its 
own historiography.  The existing literature as regards each will be examined somewhat 
out of order, as works on the professional Royal Navy – both the largest and most 
current of the three – will be covered last.  First to be examined are histories of the 
periodical press, generally the oldest and most traditional in terms of methodology.  
Many are biographies of various editors and journalists, with navalist issues being 
covered only in passing; one contemporary work in this subcategory, Laurel Brake et 
al.’s 2012 edited collection on the life of W. T. Stead, makes no reference to the navy 
                                                 
14 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1980); John Beeler, Birth of the Battleship: British Capital Ship Design 1870-1881 (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Mary Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack: Representing Naval 
Manhood in the British Empire, 1870-1918 (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2009); 
Marder Anatomy of British Sea Power; Lisle A. Rose, Power at Sea.  Volume 1: The Age of Navalism, 
1890-1918 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2007); Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The 
Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914 (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1974). 
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whatsoever.15  The oldest of these is by far the most valuable: Alfred Gollin’s The 
Observer and J.L. Garvin (1960), though a study of traditional high politics and 
biography, is the only work to explore in detail First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher’s 
relationship with J. L. Garvin, an influential editor and strong navalist supporter.16  Also 
of note is Harvey Blumenthal’s unpublished dissertation on the “Truth About the Navy” 
campaign, a valuable resource on the earliest links between journalists and serving 
officers, and Iain O’Shea’s thesis exploring the result of elite public opinion on 
Admiralty war planning.17 
 There are also offshoots of press history relevant to this project, including a 
handful of broader histories of the press itself.  By far the most germane to this 
dissertation is A. J. A. Morris’ The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and 
Rearmament, 1896-1914 (1984), with its focus on the breakdown of journalistic relations 
towards Germany.18  There is similarly a thriving literature on elements of the press 
beyond traditional newspapers and dailies.  I. F. Clarke has published multiple works on 
                                                 
15 See Laurel Brake et al., W.T. Stead: Newspaper Revolutionary (London: The British Library, 2012); 
John A. Hutcheson Jr., Leopold Maxse and the National Review, 1893 – 1914: Right-Wing Politics and 
Journalism in the Edwardian Era (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1989); David Ayerst, Garvin of the 
Observer (London: Croom Helm, 1985); Raymond Schults, Crusader in Babylon: W.T. Stead and the Pall 
Mall Gazette (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972); Richard Brooks, Fred T Jane: An Eccentric 
Visionary (Alexandria, VA: Jane’s Information Group, 1997). 
16 See Alfred Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 1908-1914: A Study in a Great Editorship (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960). 
 
17 See Harvey Blumenthal, “W.T. Stead’s Role in Shaping Official Policy: The Navy Campaign of 1884” 
(Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1984); Iain O’Shea, “Selling ‘The Scheme:’ The British 
Periodical Press and the Discourse on Naval Reform, 1900-1910 (M.A. thesis, University of New 
Brunswick, 2010). 
 
18 See also Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: The Nineteenth Century, 2 
vols. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981, 1984). 
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invasion literature, the Victorian and Edwardian subgenre of foreign invasion that most 
famously included H. G. Wells’ The War of the Worlds; there was a great deal of 
navalist invasion literature, which Clarke abundantly demonstrates.19  The impact of 
popular fiction on both adult and juvenile audiences has been a topic of research since 
the 1980s, generally in the context of the army and imperialism;20 however, a recent and 
extremely useful short study by Max Jones has brought navalism into the discussion of 
children’s literature in particular.21 
 The category of press histories must also include works on the two major navalist 
pressure groups, the Navy League and the Imperial Maritime League, which both 
utilized the press as much as possible to spread their ideals and ideologies.  Work on 
pressure groups is scarce: a short chapter in Paul Kennedy’s Rise of the Anglo-German 
                                                 
19 See I. F. Clarke, ed., Voices Prophesying War, 1763 – 1984 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); I. 
F. Clarke, ed., The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871 – 1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and of Battles 
Still-to-come (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); I. F. Clarke, ed., The Great War with 
Germany, 1890-1914: Fictions and Fantasies of the War-to-come (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
1997). 
 
20 See John M. MacKenzie, Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-
1960 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984); John M. MacKenzie, ed., Imperialism and 
Popular Culture (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986); John M. MacKenzie, ed., Popular 
Imperialism and the Military, 1850-1950 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Jeffrey 
Richards, ed., Imperialism and Juvenile Literature (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989); 
Cecil Degrotte Eby, The Road to Armageddon: The Martial Spirit in English Popular Literature, 1870-
1914 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987); Steve Attridge, Nationalism, Imperialism and Identity 
in Late Victorian Culture: Civil and Military Worlds (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Kelly Boyd, 
Manliness and the Boys’ Story Paper in Britain: A Cultural History, 1855-1940 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003); Michael Paris, Warrior Nation: Images of War in British Popular Culture, 1850-2000 
(London: Reaktion Books, 2000). 
 
21 Max Jones, “’The Surest Safeguard of Peace’: Technology, the Navy and the Nation in Boys’ Papers, c. 
1905-1907,” in The Dreadnought and the Edwardian Age, eds. Robert J. Blyth, Andrew Lambert, and Jan 
Rüger (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2011). 
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Antagonism, a comparative article by Anne Summers in Paul Kennedy and Anthony 
Nicholls’ Nationalist and Racialist Movements (1981), and the only modern work on the 
Imperial Maritime League in Frank McDonough’s The Conservative Party and Anglo-
German Relations (2007).22  The one monograph on the creation and lifespan of the 
Navy League is W. Mark Hamilton’s The Nation and the Navy (1986), a valuable source 
on League activities and one that dovetails quite well – with important caveats that will 
be discussed presently – with the dissertation.23 
 Histories of high politics have experienced a late resurgence in works focusing 
on entire parties rather than specific individuals or departments, although traditional 
biographies remain a large portion of the literature.  The historiography of Edwardian 
British politics can be divided into two major categories.  The first, as with press history, 
is biography – and here it is no surprise to see Winston Churchill’s name feature 
prominently, with a significant amount of material on his role at the Admiralty from 
                                                 
22 Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, in particular 87-102; Anne Summers, “The Character of 
Edwardian Nationalism: Three Popular Leagues,” in Nationalist and Racialist Movements in Britain and 
Germany Before 1914, eds. Paul Kennedy and Anthony Nicholls (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1981); 
Frank McDonough, The Conservative Party and Anglo-German Relations, 1905-1914 (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), in particular 105-126. 
 
23 W. Mark Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy: Methods and Organization of British Navalist 
Propaganda, 1889-1914 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986). 
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1911 onward,24 though a recent work on the life and career of First Lord of the 
Admiralty Reginald McKenna must also be mentioned.25 
 The second major category of political history is works focusing on entire parties 
and how they dealt with the larger issue of national security or the narrower focus of 
either naval topics or public relations.  Each of the major parties has received their fair 
share of historiographical attention: Nigel Keohane, Frank McDonough, Frans Coetzee 
and Rhodri Williams for the Conservatives and A. J. A. Morris, Matthew Johnson, and 
Bernard Semmel for the Liberals.26  For this project McDonough and Coetzee are the 
most useful sources on Conservative navalism, with Johnson providing a valuable new 
perspective on Liberal navalism and Liberal members of the Navy League in particular. 
                                                 
24 See Richard Hough, Former Naval Person: Churchill and the Wars at Sea (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1987; Geoffrey Best, Churchill and War (London: Hambledon and London, 2005); Carlo 
D’Este, Warlord: A Life of Winston Churchill at War, 1874-1945 (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
2008); Christopher M. Bell, Churchill and Sea Power (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
25 Martin Farr, Reginald McKenna: Financier among Statesmen, 1863-1916 (New York: Routledge, 
2008). 
 
26 See Nigel Keohane, The Party of Patriotism: The Conservative Party and the First World War 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2010); McDonough, Conservative Party and Anglo-
German Relations; Frans Coetzee, For Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular 
Conservatism in Edwardian England (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Rhodri Williams, 
Defending the Empire: The Conservative Party and British Defence Policy 1899 – 1915 (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1991); A.J. Anthony Morris, Radicalism Against War, 1906-1914: The Advocacy of 
Peace and Retrenchment (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972); Matthew Johnson, Militarism and 
the British Left; Matthew Johnson, “The Liberal Party and the Navy League in Britain before the Great 
War,” Twentieth Century British History (2011); Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: 
Ideology, Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986).  Histories of 
the Labour Party do not generally cover navalism or naval policy issues, but for recent research on the 
prewar Labour Party see Paul Bridgen, The Labour Party and the Politics of War and Peace, 1900-1924 
(Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2009) and Paul Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism 
and the British Left, 1881-1924 (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1998). 
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 By far the largest relevant historiography is that of the professional Royal Navy, 
a category that encompasses everything from technological to cultural history.  As 
always, it begins with biography, and here the major figures are Admiral Fisher, with 
three biographies, and his great rival Lord Charles Beresford with one.27  There are even 
two works dealing specifically with the feud between the two admirals, which became a 
major point of contention within navalist movements.28  The entire subfield of prewar 
British naval history owes its modern existence to Arthur Marder; besides his Anatomy 
of British Sea Power he completed a magisterial five-volume history of the navalist era, 
From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow (1961-1970) and a three-volume collection of 
Fisher’s papers with commentary, Fear God and Dread Nought (1952-1959).29 
 Studies of the professional navy have undergone a renaissance, albeit in rather 
technical subfields.  Led by a broad technological and cultural history in Peter Padfield’s 
Rule Britannia (1981) and a more focused examination of fiscal policy and technological 
development in Jon Tetsuro Sumida’s In Defence of Naval Supremacy (1989), more 
recent works have explored the relationship between naval technology, Admiralty policy 
                                                 
27 See Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1929); Richard Hough, Admiral of the Fleet: The Life of John Fisher 
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1969); Ruddock F. Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973); Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B: A Biography of Admiral Lord Beresford of Metemmeh and 
Curraghmore, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., LL.D., D.C.L. (London: Peter Dawnay Ltd., 1968). 
28 See Geoffrey Penn, Infighting Admirals: Fisher’s Feud with Beresford and the Reactionaries (Barnsley, 
UK: Leo Cooper, 2000); Richard Freeman, The Great Edwardian Naval Feud: Beresford’s Vendetta 
against Fisher (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2009).  Freeman’s is the more useful of the two. 
 
29 Arthur J. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, 
5 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1961-1970); Arthur J. Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought: 
The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 
1952-59). 
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and war planning, and economic history.30  Technological developments have been 
traced throughout the period by Sumida, Roger Parkinson, and Nicholas Lambert.31  
John Beeler, C.I. Hamilton, Matthew Seligmann, Nicholas Lambert, Barry Gough, 
Shawn Grimes, Nicholas Black, and Stephen Cobb have all examined British grand 
strategy through lenses as varied as economic warfare and the development of the naval 
staff system.32  The related historiography, which turns mainly on debates over exactly 
what British naval strategy was during the Edwardian era and how it developed, is 
extremely contentious and not particularly relevant to popular navalism; a detailed 
breakdown of the current arguments for all sides can be found in Matthew Seligmann et 
al., The Naval Route to the Abyss (2015), and Christopher Bell’s review article of the 
literature in War in History.33 
                                                 
30 Peter Padfield, Rule Britannia: The Victorian and Edwardian Navy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1981); Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy. 
 
31 Parkinson, Late Victorian Navy; Nicholas Lambert, Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1999). 
 
32 See John Beeler, British Naval Policy in the Gladstone-Disraeli Era, 1866-1880 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1997); C.I. Hamilton, The Making of the Modern Admiralty: British Naval 
Policy-Making 1805-1927 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Matthew S. Seligmann, 
The Royal Navy and the German Threat, 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to Protect British Trade in a War 
Against Germany (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012); Nicholas Lambert, Planning 
Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2012); Barry Gough, Pax Britannica: Ruling the Waves and Keeping the Peace before Armageddon 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Grimes, Strategy and War Planning; Nicholas Black, The British 
Naval Staff in the First World War (Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 2009); Stephen Cobb, Preparing for 
Blockade 1885-1914: Naval Contingency for Economic Warfare (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2013). 
 
33 Matthew S. Seligmann, Frank Nägler, and Michael Epkenhans, eds., The Naval Route to the Abyss: The 
Anglo – German Naval Race 1895 – 1914 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015), xxii – 
xxxv; Christopher M. Bell, “Contested Waters: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era,” War in History, 23:1 
(Jan. 2016). 
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 Contemporary studies of the professional navy also encompass sociocultural 
history, and here a flourishing subfield has been jumpstarted by a single historian, Jan 
Rüger.  Rüger has expounded upon his concept of the ‘cult of the navy’ – nonpartisan 
low-level Admiralty support of navalist causes through public outreach such as fleet 
reviews and the resultant public support of the navy as a general concept, what this 
dissertation refers to as ‘soft’ navalism – in his own The Great Naval Game (2007) as 
well as a variety of articles and chapters in edited collections.34 
 Where does this project fit within the extant literature?  It aims to bridge the gap 
between the three concurrent yet disparate historiographies of press, political and 
professional navalism, and as such answers questions posed by all three.  From political 
historiography comes Matthew Johnson’s definition of navalism and his useful reminder 
that it “was a complex and multifaceted phenomenon” that meant different 
methodologies, goals and outcomes to the different groups involved.35  From the 
historiography of the professional Royal Navy comes Jan Rüger’s reassessment of 
officially-sanctioned navalism: “The Admiralty’s attitude towards the press and the 
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public has attracted very little attention.  Indeed, there seems to be a historical consensus 
that the Admiralty, and the British government in general, were incapable of something 
as disreputable as propaganda.”  Rüger has called for “this official and historiographical 
orthodoxy […] to be corrected.  Contrary to the image of a ‘silent service’, the 
Admiralty followed a well-defined publicity policy and did not hesitate to influence the 
press directly through a number of measures.”36  This dissertation answers that call, but 
from the perspective of directed navalism rather than Rüger’s ‘cult of the navy.’ 
 Most importantly, from the historiography of the British press comes W. Mark 
Hamilton’s analysis of prewar navalism: “a concerted attempt has been made to establish 
clear links between the naval activists and Navalist organizations, and such institutions 
as Parliament, the Navy, and the Press.  A central argument of the thesis asserts that 
there was a strong core of highly motivated individuals and associations behind the 
Navalist agitation.”37  This is absolutely true – but Hamilton’s work attempted to 
establish close connections between navalist organizations such as the Navy League and 
the three categories of press, professional and political navalists, while this project 
demonstrates that the navalist leagues were not able to maintain these connections (as 
elite navalists closed their ranks against them) and instead came to their greatest success 
only after directed navalism had collapsed into factionalism.  It has been decades since 
Arthur Marder wrote that it was merely “an academic point whether newspapers, 
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periodicals, and organizations voice public opinion or make it” and Paul Kennedy 
believed “government-press relations in Britain were usually managed in a 
‘gentlemanly’ fashion” and “only occasionally does one discover written evidence of 
attempted manipulation of public opinion.”38  The Edwardian Royal Navy is enjoying a 
historiographical resurgence.  It is time to bring the study of directed navalism, its 
considerable scale, and its importance to the broader movement into the light. 
 
ORGANIZATION 
 This dissertation is divided into five body chapters plus an introduction and 
conclusion.  Chapter II explores the early years of cooperation between serving officers 
and journalists from the “Truth About the Navy” campaign of 1884 to the Spencer 
Programme in 1894.  During this tentative decade, captains and commodores were able 
to achieve what admirals could not: long-term links of communication with pro-naval 
elements of the press in order to support naval reforms.  In this early period the navalist 
movement was nonpartisan, and inclined to view all forms of party politicians as 
enemies: a secret letter and a quiet meeting against the world.  By 1894 navalists had 
scored three major victories, each leading directly to increases in the yearly naval 
estimates that determined the Royal Navy’s budget, and the future looked bright. 
 Chapter III examines the period between 1894 and 1902, which saw the creation 
of the first navalist pressure group in the Navy League.  The Navy League attempted to 
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associate itself with professional and press navalists, and found itself rejected by both; as 
a result it began to turn to partisan navalism, though there were a multitude of internal 
debates as to how far the League should go in opening this potential Pandora’s Box.  At 
the same time the Navy League inadvertently helped to cause the first major crisis of 
directed navalism, as the League-affiliated journalist Arnold White was caught up in a 
breach of official secrecy with then-rear admiral Charles Bersford, leading to an official 
investigation; the result was a near-complete severing of the relationship between the 
League and serving naval officers for a decade. 
 The fourth chapter covers the rise to power of the most influential and most well-
known professional navalist, Jacky Fisher, between 1902 and 1907.  Where Beresford 
had been incautious in his relations with journalists, Fisher mastered the art of 
clandestine communications and plausible deniability, and the ‘Fisher system’ developed 
into the most powerful single outlet of directed navalism.  Great naval reforms took 
place in this period, from the reorganization of the officer training system to the 
complete redistribution of British fleets at home and abroad and the introduction of the 
revolutionary HMS Dreadnought.  Fisher bulldozed these reforms through with the 
assistance of a sympathetic press and – for the first time – a sympathetic Cabinet.  As 
committed navalists climbed the chain of command, they had to work within the 
political framework of Parliament as much as the familiar world of the Mediterranean or 
Channel fleets, and while maintaining cordial relations with one’s political colleagues 
helped Fisher in particular to revolutionize the Navy, it deprived the general body of 
navalists, particularly in the press, of a valuable scapegoat.  With navalists at the highest 
 17 
 
levels of the Admiralty, the pro-naval press could no longer clamor to throw the 
Admiralty out – unless the Admiralty was politically unacceptable, which became a real 
concern for navalists after the Liberal electoral victory of 1906.  Fisher did not help 
matters by purposefully creating the ‘Fishpond’ system of loyal subordinates and doing 
his best to ensure they received choice appointments within the service.  Directed 
navalism was at its most effective and its widest extend during this period, but its 
increasing favoritism and politicization were ominous signs for the movement’s 
continued survivial. 
 Chapter V looks at the crisis of directed navalism between the critical years of 
1907 and 1908.  Relations between Fisher and Beresford, the most influential and most 
well-known public faces of the Royal Navy, had soured entirely – and both men were 
more than willing to use the press to their advantage.  While Fisher struggled to maintain 
journalistic allies across the political spectrum, Beresford and his ‘Syndicate of 
Discontent’ turned to the Conservative press, themselves increasingly frustrated after 
their great defeat in 1906.  The result was a radicalization of navalist rhetoric from 
reasoned support of reforms both large and small to frankly vicious personal attacks 
slung back and forth in the London dailies on behalf of admirals who could no longer 
maintain even a façade of collegiality.  This period saw the Imperial Maritime League 
form as a splinter group of the Navy League, dedicated entirely to forcing both Fisher 
and the Liberal government from office.  By 1908 directed navalism was mainly being 
directed towards the personal feuds and political goals of an influential handful of high-
ranking officers and Cabinet-level politicians; the partisan press was selling papers at 
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unprecedented rates, but the vast majority of mid-rank serving officers – who had been 
so important in the formation of the navalist movement – were growing disillusioned 
with the entire system. 
 The fifth and final body chapter, chapter VI, reveals reasons for the rapid initial 
collapse (via official investigation) and ensuing slow demise of directed navalism 
between 1908 and the beginning of the First World War in 1914.  It had become entirely 
too wrapped up in the personal animosities and journalistic connections of Jacky Fisher, 
and when his career was unceremoniously ended as an indirect result of the 1909 
Beresford Inquiry the three groups of professionals, press and politicians fractured 
entirely.  Serving officers refused to have anything further to do with the press, 
developing a widespread distrust of naval journalists that would cause myriad public 
relations problems during the war.  At the same time the navalist press became 
increasingly more partisan, and those who replaced Fisher at the Admiralty wanted 
nothing to do with journalistic allies who could not be relied on to support them in any 
debate over the effective use of naval funds.  Yet as directed navalism fell apart, ‘soft’ 
navalism expanded rapidly.  By August of 1914 the old networks between the Admiralty 
and Fleet Street and between Whitehall and the House of Commons had disintegrated 
under nearly a decade of increasing radicalization and partisanship – but they left behind 
them a Navy League 120,000 strong and a yearly naval estimate of £50 million, both 
developments unthinkable in 1884. 
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PREFACE: PROTO-NAVALISM TO 1884 
 Few national movements arise in a vacuum, and the practice of naval officers and 
politicians communicating unofficially with journalists has a long history.  As early as 
the Napoleonic Wars John Wilson Croker, the First Secretary to the Admiralty, wrote for 
and edited the Quarterly Review when not dealing with naval matters and maintained a 
relationship with the editor of The Times; Cabinet members recommended he strike 
deals with “friendly papers” for naval exclusives.39  In the early 1840s Lord Palmerston, 
while Foreign Secretary, published Admiral Robert Stopford’s dispatches from the 
Levant to “meet the public’s desire for information, win goodwill for the Royal Navy, 
and head off Tory newspapers.”40 
 These connections, however, were isolated events at moments of crisis.  The 
Royal Navy in the nineteenth century did its utmost to remain aloof from both political 
and press entanglements.  George Goschen, First Lord of the Admiralty from 1871 to 
1874, spoke out against “panic shipbuilding” and the politicization of naval issues: “It 
would indeed be a bad thing for one set of politicians to cry down the ships built by 
another party and vice versa, because in that case the country would come to the 
conclusion that there were no ships worth having.”41  In 1868 the Conservative 
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Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty, Henry Lennox, was confident that it would be 
both “reasonable and popular” to reduce the yearly estimates.42  Henry Campbell-
Bannerman, a Liberal successor to the same office, felt that although “we have been 
invited by writers of great authority in the public Press to […] open up a new era of great 
Naval Expenditure […] we are not disposed to follow that advice.”43  In 1884, as 
previously noted, Lord Northbrook could find nothing further for the navy to spend its 
money on. 
 By the 1870s this attitude was shifting, particularly among the navy’s younger 
officers.  Captain John Fisher began organizing displays of the latest naval technology 
for visiting MPs and reporters aboard his various commands; Commander Charles 
Beresford later recalled in his memoirs how he had only been able to acquire required 
machine parts for his ship HMS Thunderer in 1878 by threatening to reveal the vessel’s 
decrepit condition to the public.44  These young officers were also beginning to 
communicate with the press directly, marking the beginning of relationships between 
journalists and naval officers below the highest commands.  Beresford wrote to T. G. 
Bowles, founder of Vanity Fair, in 1882: “If I have told you anything you did not know I 
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am so glad.  But do not let my name appear […] our orders are that we are not to 
appear as having written to any paper.”45  Captain Cyprian Bridge admitted in 1881 that 
he had been in contact with editor of the Pall Mall Gazette John Morley and had even 
encouraged him to speak with Rear Admiral Richard Vesey Hamilton about their mutual 
concern over “the ‘denavalisation’ of Britain.”46 
 The idea that the press could be a valuable ally as opposed to a nuisance took 
hold after the Royal Navy’s bombardment of Alexandria in 1882.  The immediate 
precursor to the British invasion of Egypt, the offensive was not short of gallantry; 
Beresford in particular became a household name in Britain after his daring and 
successful assault on an Egyptian shore installation in his tiny gunboat HMS Condor.  
But the actual naval operations were not particularly successful, British gunnery was 
extremely poor, and a bombardment that ended with sailors and officers disembarking 
and fighting in the streets of Alexandria did not offer a great deal of confidence about 
the navy’s effectiveness in battle.47   
 The Admiralty was not inclined to devote funds to improving ships that had 
proven perfectly adequate – so what were captains and commodores who saw a need for 
increased naval expenditure and modernized warships to do?  Beresford’s example 
provided the answer.  His actions at the bombardment had certainly been heroic, but 
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Britons knew his name due to the happy accident that Moberly Bell, Egyptian 
correspondent of The Times, had been aboard the Condor that day.  As a result it was 
Beresford’s story, out of a multitude of courageous undertakings at the bombardment, 
that was splashed across the pages of the most influential newspaper in the country.48  If 
the power of the press could create a national hero out of a day’s work, what could it do 
for naval reform?  Surely the nation would not idly stand by and watch its naval 
preeminence slip away – not if it knew the true situation.  Could not naval officers and 
the London dailies find common ground over the issue of national defense?  Introductory 
letters were sent, tentative meetings were arranged.  The age of directed navalism was 
dawning.
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CHAPTER II 
GETTING AT ‘THE TRUTH:’ THE RISE OF NAVALIST AGITATION, 1884-1894 
 On September 15, 1884, readers of the Pall Mall Gazette opened their 
newspapers to find a rather shocking headline.  The Gazette was edited by the social 
reformer William Thomas Stead, who had recently shifted the periodical’s editorial 
focus in a Radical direction with a series of articles on the conditions of life among 
London’s poorest residents.  Now the Gazette was embarking on a new project – to 
reveal to London “The Truth About the Navy.”  And the truth, according to Stead, was 
that Britain’s navy was in a much more precarious position than the general public 
suspected, for “the scramble for the world has now begun in earnest.  In face of that 
phenomenon, how far are we able to prevent our own possessions being scrambled for 
by our neighbors?”  The answer “depends upon the condition of our navy.  If it is as 
strong as it ought to be, we have nothing to fear.  If, on the other hand, it is no longer in 
a position of incontestable superiority to the navies of the world, we are in a position of 
peril too grave to be capable of exaggeration.”1  Keeping the Royal Navy in a state of 
robust health, Stead argued, was not a matter for Liberal or Conservative politics – it was 
an essential issue of national security. 
 But was the navy adequate?  Stead’s article of the 15th was the first salvo in what 
became a multi-month campaign intended to demonstrate to the British public that the 
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Royal Navy was, in fact, desperately in need of increased funding, and Stead had 
valuable allies on his side.  Three days later the Pall Mall Gazette ran another column on 
the state of the service.  Written by an anonymous author – the article was signed “by 
one who knows the facts” - it was nevertheless clear from the specific facts and figures 
quoted that the writer had access to internal Admiralty documents, and that the 
international situation was apparently grim; Stead had noted in his editorial that his 
source’s revelations were “so alarming […] that we hesitated in making it public.”2  
True, the British fleet had more ironclad battleships than any other power.  But as the 
Gazette’s anonymous correspondent demonstrated, Britain would come up short against 
a combination of two or more potential enemies – and the country also appeared to be 
deficient in both smaller ships and overseas bases.  The Gazette recommended a series of 
immediate shipbuilding and dockyard construction initiatives, and called for increasing 
the naval estimates – which stood at approximately £12.3 million per year in 18843 - by 
at least £4 million.4   
 Within just a few days of the first Gazette articles, worry about the state of the 
navy had begun to spread to other newspapers.  The influential Sunday newspaper the 
Observer worried that “the English Navy has no longer command of the sea, because 
France has outbuilt England in effective fighting ironclads,” and blamed the problem on 
                                                 
2 F. W. Hirst, The Six Panics, and other Essays (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1913), 47-48. 
 
3 Roger Parkinson, “The Origins of the Naval Defence Act of 1889 and the New Navalism of the 1890s” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Exeter, 2006), 328. 
 
4 Blumenthal, “Navy Campaign of 1884,” 71-77. 
 
 25 
 
the fact that “since 1870 the English people have let the Navy become the prey of 
political factions.”5  The Tablet thanked the Gazette for its hard work, and noted that 
more periodicals were taking up the call: “The hammer-sound of alarm has gone out into 
the land, and now almost every organ of public opinion in the kingdom is ringing with 
that first and last of all questions – the safety of Britain.  What strikes us as most strange 
is the unanimity there has been in the press.”6  Stead happily pointed out that newspapers 
across the political spectrum were becoming involved in the Gazette’s agitation.  On 
September 23 he wrote that “the Rip Van Winkles of the London Press are awakening at 
last, and the readers of the [Conservative] Daily Telegraph learn with astonishment this 
morning that ‘a cry of patriotic anxiety is rising in the country to which no ministry dare 
close its ears.’”7   
 Some commenters were more cynical.  The Liberal columnist F. W. Hirst 
believed “like a good journalist, Mr. Stead had arranged that his own cries of horror and 
astonishment should be well echoed, and there immediately appeared letters from 
Admiral This and Vice-Admiral That, couched in the most gloomy phraseology.  On 
September 20, only two days after ‘the Truth’ had leaked out, the Gazette was able to 
inform its readers that ‘the unanimity of assent is bewildering and appalling.’”8  
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Regardless of how orchestrated Stead’s campaign had been, it soon began to bear fruit.  
Edward Hamilton, secretary to Prime Minister William Gladstone, wrote in his diary 
near the end of September that “the Navy panic continues in the papers headed by the 
Pall Mall Gazette.  Stead is becoming an alarmist.”9  But Hugh Childers, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, recognized that “the Pall Mall Gazette’s furious demand for more 
naval expenditure has been received with considerable approval,”10 and parliamentary 
secretary to the Admiralty Henry Campbell-Bannerman wrote in early October that 
“although I do not believe the hysterical excitement of the Pall Mall Gazette extends far 
beyond London, there is sufficient interest and anxiety felt in the country to prevent the 
question being shelved or poohpoohed.”11 
 Stead and his fellow journalists placed strong emphasis on this interest of the 
‘nation as a whole’ as a necessary catalyst for increased naval expenditure.  Stead, who 
had written earlier in the year that Britain was “now well on our way to government by 
the Press,”12 contended that “if public opinion does not make itself felt, [the 
Government] will probably dawdle on until some great disaster teaches the nation the 
terrible significance of the treachery of neglect.”13  His colleague and collaborator, H. O. 
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Arnold-Forster, whose role in the Pall Mall Gazette articles will be examined below, 
also wrote in the Nineteenth Century that “all that is necessary for the English people is 
to act while they have still the power and still the time.  If they once get a real hold of 
the facts, I have not the slightest doubt that they will show that they possess the will.”14  
It was the press’s task to make sure the British public had the facts. 
 “The Truth About the Navy” became a regular feature in the Pall Mall Gazette, 
and by November of 1884 five more articles had appeared in the journal which, with the 
help of “one who knows the facts,” continued to shed light on perceived deficiencies in 
the Royal Navy.15  By this point questions about the Navy had also been asked in the 
halls of Parliament (first raised by W. H. Smith, the Conservative First Lord of the 
Admiralty16 under the previous administration, thus immediately involving navalism in 
partisan politics).  The ensuing debate was not recognized for its decorum; Liberal MP 
Wilfred Lawson claimed that it was of “a humiliating character for both sides of the 
House,” and found it “a pity that the government could not withstand the hysterical 
shrieks of a certain portion of the press.”17  Yet, by the end of 1884 First Lord of the 
Admiralty Lord Northbrook and Gladstone had given in.  Stead had asked for an extra 
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£4 million, and in December the Navy received a supplementary estimate of £5.5 
million, although much of that money was earmarked for new dockyard facilities.18  A 
gleeful Stead called his campaign a “very striking illustration of the new method of 
government”19 – that is, by the press.  Disgruntled Liberals found it “the beginning of a 
most disastrous expansion in naval armaments.”20  The Times commented that one result 
of Stead’s agitation was a growing lack of trust in the Admiralty: “The country must 
henceforth take the matter [of the Navy] into its own hands; it must judge for itself 
whether the Navy is efficient and sufficient, and if it finds that it is not, it must insist on 
the Board of Admiralty making it so forthwith, and, what is more, it must not rest until it 
finds a Board of Admiralty that is ready to do its bidding.”21 
 The “Truth About the Navy” campaign was the first journalistic effort (as 
opposed to internal Admiralty budget conversations) to raise public awareness of 
perceived deficiencies in the Navy – it would not be the last.  But why would W. T. 
Stead, to this point a Radical and social reformer, decide that the Navy would be his next 
target?  And who were his allies within the Admiralty and the government – those who 
knew the facts?  Stead’s first associate was his fellow navalist, the future politician and 
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current defense expert H. O. Arnold-Forster.  Arnold-Forster had been concerned about 
what he saw as Admiralty inadequacy for some time, and had published a series of 
articles calling for increased shipbuilding throughout 1883 and 1884.  But the articles 
had appeared in the literary magazine Nineteenth Century, and never reached the broad 
general audience the Pall Mall Gazette enjoyed.22  Northbrook’s 1884 speech on the 
navy’s comfortable budgetary situation so worried Arnold-Forster that the next month he 
dropped by Stead’s office to impress upon him the dangers the Royal Navy faced.  When 
Arnold-Forster laid out a view of the “panic, disorder, suffering, [and] starvation among 
our overcrowded population” that would result if naval funding was not increased, Stead 
found himself a rapid convert to the navalist cause; as he wrote later, from that point on 
“for a month or more I lived and moved and had my being in what may be called the 
world of the Navy.” 23 
 Stead already had friends in high places, the most valuable of whom was 
Reginald Brett, later Lord Esher, who in 1884 was secretary to Lord Hartington, 
Gladstone’s Secretary of State for War.  In this role Brett had access to the records of the 
Carnarvon Commission, which in the early 1880s had compiled detailed charts of 
Britain’s international trade routes and balances; Brett seems to have sent a good deal of 
this on to Stead, who used the information to call for an increase in the use of warships 
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for commerce protection.24  But Arnold-Forster was able to provide Stead with a list of 
Admiralty personages and serving naval officers who shared his concern about the Navy 
and who were willing to speak with the journalist,25 and these high-ranking officers 
became Stead’s first interviewees. 
 Stead started at the top; he first spoke with First Naval Lord Admiral Sir Astley 
Cooper Key, the professional head of the Navy.  Stead later recalled this meeting, 
remarking that Cooper Key “received me kindly at the Admiralty, listened to me with a 
certain sympathetic compassion, and assured me that it was all of no use.  There was 
indeed in the old Admiral’s eye a certain feeling of incredulous wonder at the supreme 
audacity of the young journalist, who cheerily declared that if only he could secure his 
facts, he would compel any Government, even Mr. Gladstone’s, to grant as many 
millions as were necessary, to restore the sea power of the Empire.”  Cooper Key was 
blunt with Stead, and asked: “So you think that you could succeed where all the Sea 
Lords have failed, and move Mr. Gladstone?”  Stead thought he could, “if you will give 
me my facts.”  Cooper Key’s answer was dismissive: “I have already given them to Mr. 
Gladstone.  We have all done everything short of resigning our offices to awake the 
Government to a sense of the deadly peril in which we stand.  But it is no use […] we 
can get nothing for the Navy; not a penny.”26 
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 The next Admiralty official Stead interviewed was Admiral Frederick 
Beauchamp Seymour, the Second Naval Lord. When Stead asked him how the Royal 
Navy would perform if a war with France broke out, Seymour’s response was 
pessimistic.  “Sir Cooper Key and I, and all the rest of us at the Admiralty, would be 
swinging by our necks from the lamp-posts in front of Whitehall, where we should be 
strung up, every man Jack of us, by the nation whom we had betrayed, and it would 
serve us right too.  Seymour also informed Stead that he and his fellow Board members 
had gone so far as to threaten resignation unless Gladstone’s government devoted more 
funding to the Navy. 27  Stead then visited the Royal Naval dockyards at Portsmouth, 
where he spoke with the commander, Admiral Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, about more 
technical concerns.28  Rear-Admiral Anthony Hoskins, Superintendent of Naval 
Reserves, also surreptitiously provided Stead inside information about Admiralty 
debates over funding during the campaign.29 
 The high-ranking Admiralty figures Arnold-Forster introduced to Stead proved to 
be valuable sources for the latter as he composed his articles; Stead had managed to gain 
journalistic access to the highest corridors of power.  Hoskins even proofread Stead’s 
articles before they appeared, commenting that they were not harsh enough towards the 
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navy.30  But reaching the top of the service’s professional ladder, particularly in the 
1880s, also meant that one had reached an advanced age; Cooper Key and Seymour 
would be retired by 1886.  Stead needed younger informants, captains and lieutenants 
who would be willing to work with him for years to come – and preferably who were as 
concerned as he was about the state of the navy.  He found his man in Jacky Fisher. 
 John Arbuthnot Fisher, known to all as Jacky, would eventually rise to the top of 
his profession and implement a series of reforms that would shape the Royal Navy that 
fought the Great War.  But in 1884 he was in his early forties and held the rank of 
captain commanding HMS Excellent, the shore establishment dedicated to gunnery 
training.  He was everything Stead needed – a young officer on the rise who had serious 
doubts about the preparedness for the Royal Navy for war, a gift for language, and a 
willingness to share information, particularly technical information.  In short, Fisher was 
‘one who knew the truth.’  Historians have never reached a consensus on who exactly 
introduced Stead to Fisher, although they seem generally to agree that their first meeting 
occurred as part of Stead’s research for his ‘Truth’ campaign.31   
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 In later years, Stead was happy to advertise his connections with admirals and 
first sea lords – but he kept his communication with Fisher secret for some time, likely 
because Fisher’s career would have been severely damaged if his role as an informer had 
been revealed.32  In his 1890s recap of the naval campaign, Stead spoke only of “one 
good captain, to whose patriotism and courage I was immensely indebted, who met me 
surreptitiously in byways and highways, and always concluded his conversation by 
pledging me to the most solemn secrecy as to the source of my information, ruthfully 
[sic.] adding: ‘You have got enough in your wallet to break half the officers in Her 
Majesty’s Service if you split.’”33  It was only in 1903 that Stead was able to relate how 
“I used to go to Captain Fisher, like Nicodemus, at night-time, meeting him at wayside 
railway stations;”34 Fisher recalled later in life how “Stead used to pay me surreptitious 
visits.”35  Even Stead’s biographer, Frederic Whyte, noted that any correspondence that 
took place between the two men had disappeared from Stead’s papers by the 1920s.36  
Apparently all that remains is a letter from Fisher to Stead dated March 8, 1885 – and 
thus after the initial press agitation – where Fisher sent his comments on a future Pall 
Mall Gazette article back to Stead with a warning: “I attach the pencil corrections of a 
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friend and a Yankee repartee is attached to end of proof for your consideration […] I 
must keep clear of you as my friends tell me an eye is upon me.  Still I hope to come & 
see you the week after next….”37  A long and expansive network of Admiralty-press 
contacts would spring from this first scrap of communication. 
 Yet even though Stead had productively brought what he saw as Admiralty 
weaknesses to the public eye, he was having less success in convincing his peers that 
this achievement was due entirely to the powers of the Pall Mall Gazette.  Stead 
believed that his Navy campaign had been an exemplar of the power the British press 
now had to move MPs and Cabinet Ministers, and found it “notable that in this last great 
Imperial work of the century neither the Commons nor the Lords rendered any service 
worth speaking of.  The work was done from first to last by the Press.  All that the 
Commons did was to vote the money which the newspapers had taught the public to 
demand.”38  Stead also downplayed the contribution of naval officers, emphasizing the 
fact that it was he who had sought them out: “So far from the specialists and experts 
setting to work to use the press to get up a scare, the initial impulse was not in any sense 
administrative: it was purely journalistic, and no one did so much to discourage and 
dishearten us in the agitation which we initiated as the experts and specialists….”39  He 
viewed the connections made with Admiralty officials as merely a successful working 
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relationship between journalist and informant, writing of “the ablest men in the Navy:” 
“They supplied me with my facts; I supplied them, as my share, with a buoyant faith in 
the possibility of rousing public opinion by the vigorous use of the Pall Mall Gazette.”40  
Stead’s claims were backed up by Fisher, who recalled later in his career that the ‘Truth’ 
campaign “was again an unexampled feat of journalism.  Imagine!  a penny London 
evening paper by itself quite unaided, indeed contemned, so swayed the Empire as to 
compel a most unwilling and reluctant Ministry to do its duty by the Navy….”41 
 However, some of Stead’s colleagues were skeptical from the beginning that he 
had planned the ‘Truth’ campaign entirely of his own volition.  The previously-
mentioned F. W. Hirst blamed the entire agitation on the Conservative Party as “a 
professional agitation for taxpayers’ money”42 – and this would certainly not be the last 
time that navalism would stand accused as the pawn of party politics.  More damning for 
Stead, Liberal MP (and former editor of the Pall Mall Gazette himself) John Morley 
wrote in an open letter to the Gazette in December 1884, while Stead’s articles were still 
appearing, that he believed Stead had been used by younger members of the Admiralty 
to put pressure on the Board and Parliament: “What we have seen for the last three 
months has been the spectacle of the Departments working the oracle through the 
newspapers.”  Stead immediately deprecated Morley’s comments, believing all they 
                                                 
40 Whyte, Life of Stead I, 151. 
 
41 From a 1918 article by Fisher on Stead, “The Greatest of Journalists,” CCA FISR, 9/15.  That Fisher 
explained how he secretly aided Stead later in the article makes his praise seem somewhat insincere. 
 
42 Hirst, Six Panics, 46-47. 
 
 36 
 
proved was that Morley “has hardly kept touch with the journalism of the day.”43  In 
doing so he was technically correct, since the ‘Truth’ campaign was originally planned 
by Stead and Arnold-Forster – but the serving Naval Lords would hardly have bashed 
their own department in interviews if they had no inkling of Stead’s plans, to say nothing 
of Fisher’s involvement (although as previously mentioned, Stead managed to keep the 
latter hidden until the early 1900s). 
 And even if Stead denied direct Admiralty involvement in the planning of his 
articles, the debate on increasing naval funding quickly grew beyond his control and 
involved more service personages than he had originally consulted.  Captains and 
admirals both retired and on active duty were soon contributing their thoughts on the 
matter to the London press, and not just to the Pall Mall Gazette; the retired Admirals 
Sir Thomas Symonds and Sir George Elliot both sent multiple letters to The Times 
supporting Stead’s proposals.44  Many of Stead’s contemporaries did not share his dim 
view of unsolicited advice from naval personnel.  Sir John Henry Briggs, chief clerk of 
the Admiralty, wrote in his memoirs that “in this controversy the most distinguished 
admirals and naval experts soon took a part, and, in their numerous contributions to the 
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Press, gave ample proof of the great ability and skill with which they were able to defend 
their cause….”45 
 Some naval officers, instead of making their support for Stead known through 
public letters, took the opportunity of increased attention towards naval issues to work 
behind the scenes.  When W. H. Smith raised the issue of increased Admiralty funding 
in Parliament, he was soon contacted by Lord Charles Beresford – who was at the time 
serving in Egypt with the Gordon Relief Expedition, demonstrating how quickly news of 
Stead’s navalist agitation spread across the Empire – with an urgent appeal to press the 
matter further and demand more money, as “the public are now aroused.”46  Beresford 
recalled in his memoirs that he was not the only naval officer to seize the moment: “Not 
only a number of my brother officers, but many students of the subject, did their best to 
enlighten the nation.  We were of course told that we were creating a scare; but a study 
of the Press of those days shows that nearly every great newspaper, irrespective of its 
politics, demanded the strengthening and reorganisation of our defences.”47  It can be 
seen from Beresford’s account that a circular process was already developing in which 
some naval officers, working behind the scenes, helped to drive press interest that then 
inspired other naval officers to join in.  Beresford noted that he “received great support 
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from the Press,” which he attributed to his staunch claim that he was interested only in 
the health of the Navy: “Writers on the subject of national defence were at least sure that 
I had, personally, nothing to gain by publishing the truth.”48 
 W. T. Stead’s “The Truth About the Navy” campaign represented the initial 
flourishing of directed navalism.  Naval officers who felt the Admiralty was being 
shortchanged by the Government of the day now had recourse to the growing popular 
press, rather than using official channels or risking their careers with open letters under 
their own names; reforming journalists such as Stead took on the mission of defending 
Britain and the Empire and – perhaps more realistically – a ready-made reason to sell 
more papers with exposés and accusations.  Stead was the first journalist to cultivate 
direct semi-clandestine press relations with high-ranking members of the Admiralty, 
although his colleagues James Thursfield and Arnold White would not be far behind.  In 
doing so, he did benefit both parties – and it seemed that both the Admiralty and the 
press would continue to benefit as long as they worked towards a common goal.  At the 
same time, the first crack in the barrier between professionals and the public made it 
highly likely that others would follow.  Everyone managed to pull together in 1884, 
despite many of the actors being unaware of what others were doing – Beresford, for 
example, was serving his own interests and would soon be elected to Parliament on a 
platform of increasing naval funding.49  This harmony would not continue – but in early 
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1885 Stead was able to write that since his campaign “everything has been smooth 
sailing.  A multitude of willing and able pens carried on the work with a zeal and a 
knowledge which left nothing to be desired.”50 
 Stead and his associates had succeeded in securing more funding for the Navy, 
but the ‘Truth’ campaign was not an end to press agitation but a beginning.  The spring 
of 1885 brought the Penjdeh crisis in Afghanistan, which greatly increased tensions 
between Britain and Russia; the Royal Navy was put on an active footing, and although 
the political situation was quickly defused it took nearly three months for the RN to 
gather an effective fleet.51  This led to immediate press criticism.  The humor magazine 
Punch composed a verse for the occasion: “Sing a song of millions / Voted then and 
there, / Eight-and-forty war-ships / Promised in a scare. / Now the scare is over, / Not a 
plank is laid. / Isn’t that a precious way / To see a trust betrayed?”52  Stead leaned on his 
acquaintance Alfred, Lord Tennyson, for assistance in keeping the public’s eyes on 
naval concerns; Tennyson responded with his poem “The Fleet,” published 
simultaneously in The Times and the Pall Mall Gazette in April 1885.53  In this work, the 
Poet Laureate sounded a word of warning to naval administrators who failed to live up to 
their country’s expectations: “You, you, that have the ordering of her Fleet, / If you 
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should only compass her disgrace, / When all men stare, the wild mob’s million feet / 
Will kick you from your place, / But then too late, too late.”54 
 Stead, however, was now happy to leave much of the job of keeping navalist 
pressure on the government to his colleagues.  For his part, Stead devoted much of the 
next eighteen months singing the praises of himself and the Pall Mall Gazette for 
successfully alerting the public to an imminent danger.  He tied the success of the 
‘Truth’ campaign back to his earlier claims about the power of the press, believing “in a 
democratic age no position is comparable for permanent influence and far-reaching 
power to that of an editor….”55  Stead even pushed his ideology in other periodicals such 
as the Contemporary Review, for which he wrote in 1886: “I have seen Cabinets upset, 
Ministers driven into retirement, laws repealed, great social reforms initiated, Bills 
transformed, estimates remodeled, programmes modified, Acts passed, generals 
nominated, governors appointed, armies set hither and thither, war proclaimed and war 
averted, by the agency of newspapers.”56  Less admiring observers such as the poet and 
critic Matthew Arnold, who saw Stead as the epitome of the disdainful ‘new journalism,’ 
believed that the “one great fault” of a campaign such as Stead’s was “that it is feather-
brained.  It throws out assertions at a venture because it wishes it true; does not correct 
                                                 
54 Hamilton, Nation and the Navy, 175. 
 
55 Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism 1860-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1980). 362.  Blumenthal, “Navy Campaign of 1884,” 13-14. 
 
56 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain: The Nineteenth Century, 2 vols. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981-84) I, 14. 
 
 41 
 
either them or itself, if they are false; and to get at the state of things as they truly are 
seems to feel no concern whatever.”57 
 Here Arnold was incorrect on at least one aspect.  Stead believed that the state of 
things as they were was not up to snuff, and he took pains to maintain the connections 
developed during the ‘Truth’ campaign.  Though Stead insisted in a much later article 
that he had cut off contact with Fisher for a period of years after 1885,58 the 
correspondence between the two did continue for a time and even broadened to draw in 
more naval figures.  Fisher was still proofreading Stead’s naval articles in 1886 when he 
wrote to the editor: “You will not do wrong if you insert the corrections I have made.  I 
should have been glad to add some original matter but having been in confidential and 
private communication with Lord Ripon [First Lord of the Admiralty] you will 
understand that I am bound in honor to refrain.”  He went on to declare his “unabated 
admiration of your efforts on behalf of the Navy and sincere sympathy with you,” 
although he cautioned Stead “never to allude to this.”59  Fisher even let Stead know later 
in the year that “I am so overwhelmed with work at present as to be quite unable to assist 
you in the way you desire but I suggest your applying to Captain Bridge of H.M.S. 
Colossus […] who I think the best able to assist you.”60  (Perhaps unbeknownst to Stead, 
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Fisher was also at this time subverting the chain of command by sending information 
directly to Geoffrey Phipps Hornby to aid his campaign for increased naval funding.)61  
However, Fisher’s continued correspondence with Stead remained behind the scenes – it 
seems to have been more the maintaining of a successful journalistic relationship than 
any strategy with a set goal of increasing naval funding – and large-scale public navalist 
agitation did die down for a time.   
 The Admiralty learned some lessons of its own about the value of the press from 
Stead’s campaign; if naval news was now in demand, perhaps the flow of information 
could be regulated through official rather than informal channels.  To this end the large 
naval review held in 1887 was much more open to the press than previous such events, 
largely thanks to two naval officers who knew the value of public relations; Fisher 
coordinated a series of naval displays for the benefit of journalists at Portsmouth, while 
Beresford brought 120 MPs to the review “to see for themselves how the money they 
voted was spent.”62  Following the successful review, journalists were invited on board 
warships during the annual maneuvers for the first time in 1888;63 by 1889 the majority 
of London newspapers sent multiple special correspondents.64  And in Parliament, the 
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naval estimates were accompanied from 1887 by an official explanatory statement – 
instead of merely a list of figures, every naval expense was now justified for the eyes of 
curious MPs and reporters.65 
 But it did not take long for the inevitable corollary of the ‘Truth’ campaign to 
rear its head.  Stead had taken pride in the fact that he had gone looking for the Navy.  
Now the Navy was going to come to him in the personage of Lord Charles Beresford.  
Beresford had returned from Egypt as a commander in the navy, but in 1886 he was 
serving for the second time as a Conservative MP, having run on a platform of naval 
reform.66  He was also at this time a close companion of the Prince of Wales, who 
enquired why he did not “go at the Admiralty in the…Commons?  I really believe our 
Navy now is worse than it has ever been.”67  A changing political situation gave 
Beresford an even greater opportunity, as Gladstone’s Liberal government was replaced 
in July 1886 by a Conservative ministry under Lord Salisbury; Beresford found himself 
in the Admiralty, serving as Fourth Naval Lord – in charge of supplies for the RN – 
under First Lord of the Admiralty George Hamilton. 
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 Beresford was certainly dedicated to his campaign platform; he believed strongly 
that increased naval funding meant nothing if the Royal Navy itself was run in an archaic 
manner.  His particular passion was naval strategy, or the lack thereof.  Disappointed by 
the slow mobilization in 1885 and the lack of any significant war planning at the 
Admiralty, he spent much of his time composing a long memorandum calling for the 
creation of what he called a naval intelligence division for the Navy.68  Beresford took 
his completed memorandum to his colleagues at the Board of Admiralty, who were 
unimpressed and chose to take no further action.  A frustrated Beresford then went over 
the head of his direct superiors to the Prime Minister, who shared Beresford’s concerns 
but whose hands were officially tied – the entire point of having a professional Board 
was that their decisions could not be overridden for political purposes, and they had to 
be trusted to make the best decisions for the Navy.69 
 Unable to continue further through traditional channels, Beresford instead took 
advantage of the Navy’s biggest supporter in the press.  In October 1886 Stead obtained 
a copy of the memorandum and duly published it in the Pall Mall Gazette.  Beresford 
claimed it had been stolen and leaked to the paper by an Admiralty messenger,70 which 
seems unlikely at best.  No correspondence between Beresford and Stead survives; 
Beresford had managed to cover his tracks, a feat for an officer who would eventually 
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end his career with twenty-three official reprimands.71 The memorandum apparently had 
a wide enough circulation thanks to Beresford’s efforts that the original archival file has 
been edited by a clerk to read “not confidential.”  Nevertheless, the appeal to the public 
had its effect; after a rush of press criticism, the Board of Admiralty approved the 
creation of the Naval Intelligence Division later that year. 72 
 Navalist successes were often fleeting; there was no guarantee that voted monies 
would be spent on a particular project, and new battleships in particular, with their long 
development time, could be obsolete before they were launched.  But the Naval 
Intelligence Division was a particular disappointment.  By 1887 the naval estimates, 
increased so greatly in 1884, were quietly being cut.73  The new Naval Intelligence 
Division was especially hard hit.  The salaries of its commanding officers were reduced 
to the point that the efficiency of the nascent department was effected; there was no 
money to consult outside experts, and no willing officers to draw up war plans.74  
Beresford, troubled by these developments, attempted to resign in protest in 1887 but 
Salisbury refused to allow it, writing that the Queen wanted Beresford to remain, 
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although regretting “that the affair got into the newspapers;”75 this was likely 
Beresford’s doing, as besides his earlier dealings with the Pall Mall Gazette he had been 
allowing the Standard to use his name as a supporter of naval reform since earlier in the 
year.76 
 His resignation on hold, Beresford turned to his Parliamentary constituency to try 
and bring public attention back to the navy – to the irritation of his fellow officers.  
Fisher told Phipps Hornby in November that Beresford “has circulated the draft of a 
speech he proposes to make his constituents in which he wants 5 more ironclads and a 
heap of other vessels, etc., etc., and this I think is causing annoyance to his colleagues.”  
Fisher noted that Beresford had asked him to proofread the speech, but he “declined, 
knowing what happens to the fender when you come alongside with too much weigh 
on!”77  Finally, Beresford decided that the court of public opinion offered better options 
than continuing to work from within the Admiralty, and he officially tendered his 
resignation as Fourth Sea Lord – which was this time accepted – in January of 1888.78  
Some of his political superiors privately welcomed this development.  The Prince of 
Wales recorded that Beresford “has resigned his seat in the Admiralty for the hundredth 
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time, and it has been accepted, as I fancy his colleagues could not get on any more with 
him….”79  Salisbury was more on point when he maintained that “Beresford is too 
greedy of popular applause to get on in a public department.  He is constantly playing his 
own game at the expense of his colleagues.”80 The Prime Minister was soon proven 
correct; Beresford immediately used his status as a serving MP to once again bring the 
issue of increased naval funding before the public – and, portentously, soon found a 
great deal more success in this endeavor than he had achieved while serving with the 
Board of Admiralty. 
 Navalist press campaigns were beginning to spread beyond Stead and the Pall 
Mall Gazette; in fact, Beresford did not contact Stead during his 1888 push for reform.81  
Instead, he shifted his focus from saving the Naval Intelligence Department to once 
again increasing funding for the Navy as a whole, and turned to other allies in the press.  
Pro-naval articles began appearing in more established outlets such as The Times, whose 
editor George Buckle wrote in May that “the country will not now be satisfied until the 
Government is able to assure it that, whatever plan of defense may be ultimately 
adopted, the Navy is strong enough to carry it into effect.”82  Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
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Magazine believed Beresford’s new tactic was the true path to success: “the only way in 
which it was possible to get money out of the country, to keep the navy anything like up 
to the mark in the matter of modern ships and modern ordnance, was by the fortuitous 
recurrence of periodical war scares, which so frighten the people, in consequence of our 
unprepared condition, that they are ready to lavish money as long as the scare exists.”83  
Beresford himself was so in demand with the press that when Murray’s Magazine 
contacted him with an offer “to enlighten the public on the subject” of the Navy, he 
politely declined: “I think excellent suggestion, but if I do write myself I have already 
promised another periodical.”84 
 Beresford still maintained his connections with many naval reformers within the 
service, and did his best to enroll many of his colleagues in his push for public 
awareness.  He held a series of public meetings in London dedicated to national defense, 
and even created an ‘executive committee’ for his movement that comprised a mix of 
retired naval officials (Vice-Admiral Philip Howard Colomb), serving naval personnel 
(Captain C. C. Penrose-Fitzgerald and Admiral Geoffrey Phipps Hornby), and pro-naval 
journalists (William Laird Clowes and the naval strategy expert Captain John Colomb).  
This Committee rapidly began firing off letters to London periodicals, particularly The 
Times, both calling for increased naval funding and criticizing those who disagreed with 
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their “unpatriotic agitation.”85  Penrose-Fitzgerald later recalled his time with “a gang of 
conspirators known as the ‘panic-mongers and chronic alarmists,’ who were trying to 
awaken their countrymen to the fact that for some years past our Navy had been allowed 
to fall into a state of weakness;” after learning how many prestigious naval officers were 
already aiding the cause, he “joined the gang and set to work.”86 
 Although Beresford’s committee was ostensibly non-partisan, he also attempted 
to broaden his agitation in the political arena.  Conservative politician Lord Dunraven 
asked Beresford to “let me know later on what revolution or whatever it is I shall have to 
spread […] Whatever you do don’t fail us as they are so anxious to get you.”87  And 
Beresford’s success was inspiring some of his naval contemporaries to try their hands at 
writing to the press as well.  An officer aboard HMS Invincible wrote to the naval 
journalist William Laird Clowes that “we had the pleasure of meeting at the early 
meeting of the Naval Agitation at Conservative Club in 1888, with Captain Fitzgerald & 
Lord Charles Beresford, & this is my excuse for writing to you on the subject” of the 
need to increase the size of the Mediterranean Fleet.  The officer realized that openly 
criticizing the Admiralty “requires an independent person like yourself to be able to 
carry it through, as in our position of full pay naval officers we are gagged […] I truly 
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want to be of any small assistance to you that I can.”  He also suggested that Beresford 
speak with Arnold-Forster, calling the navalist “useful in preaching this doctrine.”88 
 This combination of political and press agitation was beginning to antagonize the 
Admiralty and the Government, coming as it did from a brother officer (and from 
Conservative politicians criticizing a Conservative government).  Salisbury angrily 
protested in Parliament “against the tones of panic which prevail and the language which 
is used, as though the Government were passing by all these matters in utter apathy.”89  
Yet Salisbury was concurrently under pressure from the Queen, who was now convinced 
that George Hamilton, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was “not near strong enough” 
and should be removed.90  Matters came to a head in late 1888 when Beresford paid a 
visit to George Goschen, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Beresford’s account of this 
meeting is worth quoting at length: 
‘Do you know what I am shortly going to propose to Parliament?’ said I.  ‘No?  
I’ll tell you.  I am going to ask for seventy ships to cost twenty million sterling.’  
Mr. Goschen became really angry.  He said the notion was preposterous.  ‘You 
won’t get them,’ he said.  ‘You wouldn’t get even three ships, if you asked for 
them.  And for a very simple reason.  They are not wanted.’  ‘Mr. Goschen,’ said I, 
‘I shall bring in that programme, and it will cost twenty million; and you will all 
object to it and oppose it; and yet I’ll venture to make a prophecy.  Before very 
long you will order seventy ships at the cost of twenty million.  And for a very 
simple reason.  Because you must.’91 
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 Goschen and the Government called Beresford’s bluff.  When Beresford did 
bring the issue before Parliament in December, Hamilton repeated Goschen’s claim that 
the RN did not need any further battleships – and added that he “obtained his 
information from authoritative sources and not from newspapers,”92 while Beresford 
“was described in the House as an enthusiastic seaman given to exaggeration and 
generally not to be taken seriously by serious people.”93  Beresford, forced to retreat but 
undaunted, informed Salisbury early in 1889 that he would be bringing the matter up 
again in Parliament that year.94  This second effort was accompanied by a flurry of 
supportive articles in the press.  The Morning Post asserted “that the Fleet must be 
strengthened without delay is conceded by the vast majority of the people of this 
country,” and The Times sounded a warning: “let the Navy be managed by those who are 
competent, and if the Admiralty is unequal to the task the country must take the matter 
into its own hands.”95  One of those writing to The Times was the old navalist 
campaigner Phipps Hornby, to whom Fisher wrote that those who supported Beresford 
“owe you a deep debt of gratitude for pegging away as to the increase of the Navy.  It 
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promised to bear good fruit but the pressure must be maintained up to the last moment.  
One of my proverbs has come out well: ‘Re-iteration is the secret of conviction.’”96 
 The Admiralty still resisted Beresford’s campaign.  But in February of 1889, bad 
news arrived from another quarter, as a report was put before Parliament by three 
admirals – Sir William Dowell, Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, and Sir Frederick Richards 
– that revealed the naval maneuvers of the previous year had been an utter debacle, 
largely due to a lack of available smaller ships.  This report held more weight as none of 
the admirals who had composed it were known as navalist agitators (Vesey Hamilton 
would become one later in his career).97  Faced with attacks on multiple fronts, Hamilton 
and Goschen were forced to yield.  In March of 1889 Hamilton put before Parliament 
what would become the Naval Defence Act, which called for adding 10 battleships, 42 
cruisers and multiple support units to the Royal Navy.  The cost was staggering.  Four 
years earlier Stead’s ‘Truth’ campaign had been seen as a runaway success by adding 
£5.5 million to the estimates; the Naval Defence Act would increase the estimates by 
£21.5 million over the next five years.98 
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 The Naval Defence Act also officially committed the Royal Navy to what was 
known as the two-power standard for the first time.99  From 1889, by legislative fiat, the 
RN was required to be equal in size to the next two largest navies in the world (at the 
time this was France and Russia).  If the RN ever slipped below this threshold, more 
money would have to be allocated to rectify the situation.  This was not a partisan 
decision – the Liberals officially accepted the standard in 1890. 100  In his speech before 
Parliament introducing the act, Hamilton finally said publically what Beresford and his 
supporters wanted to hear: “If there are any nations abroad who do wish to compete with 
us in naval armaments, the mere enunciation of this scheme will show to them the utter 
futility of their desire.”101  Privately, Hamilton commented in his memoirs that an 
additional effect of the Naval Defence Act was a new appreciation by the Admiralty of 
the power agitation could wield, and the public relations benefits (never mind the 
country’s economy) of yielding: “The outcome of the Naval debates in Parliament […] 
tended to rehabilitate the Admiralty in public opinion, and those of us who were engaged 
in this work were pleased to find that not only had we succeeded in giving a real 
substantial increase to the strength of the Navy, but that in doing so we had added to the 
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popularity of that Service, and at the same time enhanced the confidence of the public in 
those who were in charge of it.”102 
 But a more dangerous lesson was being learned concurrently by the press.  The 
last two naval agitations, those of 1884 and 1889, had been greatly aided by journalists; 
as far as the general public knew, Beresford was the only serving officer to play a large 
role in increasing naval funding, and even this was more in his role as an MP.  Was the 
press becoming necessary to safeguard the Navy from its own masters?  H. O. Arnold-
Forster, one of the original navalists, thought so.  He penned an article for the Nineteenth 
Century in 1889 on the aftermath of the Naval Defence Act and the lessons it held for 
the Admiralty: “The British public will not listen to its sailors and soldiers […] 
Practically nearly everything of importance with respect to the services is settled by 
civilians, and whatever slight knowledge the public may have of naval and military 
affairs comes to them through civil channels.”  Public alarm in 1885 and 1889 had saved 
the RN, not its own leaders in Parliament and Portsmouth.  Arnold-Forster continued: 
“The fine fleet which left Spithead a few weeks ago [for a recent naval review] is, on the 
admission of every expert authority, at least seventy ships short of what it ought to be; 
and nearly every vessel of importance in it is an ‘agitation ship,’ the result, not of the 
wisdom and forethought of a minister, but the outcome of popular pressure.”103 
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 The Admiralty did make a respectable effort to harness this popular pressure for 
its own use.  Journalists continued to be carried on naval vessels during maneuvers, and 
their reports would appear yearly in the London dailies.  Larger projects were also 
undertaken, such as the 1891 Royal Naval Exhibition in Chelsea.  This celebration of 
Britain’s naval past (featuring a full-size replica of the deck of Nelson’s Victory) and 
present was put on, in the words of the Prince of Wales, because “it was the duty of 
every Englishman to do his utmost to increase the popularity of the Navy, an object 
which he considered the proposed exhibition was well calculated to fulfill.”  Upon 
viewing the exhibition, each visitor “would feel a personal interest in maintaining the 
supremacy of the country on the seas.”104  The Exhibition was a major success, attracting 
around 2.3 million visitors during its five-month run.105  The Royal United Services 
Institution Journal reported First Lord Hamilton’s thoughts on the exhibition and any 
future similar naval events: “He hoped the result of all the Exhibitions would be to bring 
home to all sections of the community the absolute necessity of maintaining their Navy 
in an effective state of strength, and that they might be instrumental in forming among 
men of all political parties the policy which would ensure” that the Navy would forever 
remain sufficiently funded.106 
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 Navalists not directly associated with the RN, meanwhile, were finding their own 
channels to reach their intended audience.  Music halls rang with naval-themed revues, 
and naval memoirs and popular histories enjoyed a newfound popularity.107  Dozens of 
articles on every aspect of naval life appeared in various journals, although sailors 
sometimes wrote in to complain about various inaccuracies committed by overzealous 
authors.108  Fictional tales of naval war began appearing, first as serials in the periodical 
press and later in book form.  These included works written by navalist journalists such 
as Fred T. Jane’s Blake of the ‘Rattlesnake’ (1895) and William Laird Clowes’ The 
Captain of the ‘Mary Rose’ (1892), both involving derring-do in the contemporary 
Navy; Laird Clowes also collaborated with his fellow Beresford supporter P. H. Colomb 
on1892’s The Great War of 189-, which highlighted the dangers that faced a Britain 
insufficiently protected by its fleet.109  Behind the scenes, naval officers were still 
slipping information to their journalistic allies regarding various pet causes.  While he 
was writing his popular naval books, Laird Clowes – by this time also the naval 
correspondent for The Times – was in surreptitious contact with young naval personnel.  
Swinton Holland offered Laird Clowes a place on board his ship the HMS Northampton 
during a training exercise as long as the latter agreed to “abide by the conditions which 
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you suggest in your note to me – viz. that you will write from the ship nothing about the 
cruize to any newspaper & that you will undertake to write nothing either during or after 
the cruize [sic.] to indicate that you have made it.”110  After the publication of Laird 
Clowes’ two books, the up-and-coming officer Dudley de Chair contacted him to 
suggest the author focus next on the Navy’s need for more torpedo boats, and sent him 
details of recent naval maneuvers for his use.111 
 Navalism was also beginning to expand in a more intellectual direction.  The 
naval historian John Knox Laughton, with encouragement from Laird Clowes, founded 
the Navy Records Society in 1893.112  Dedicated to reprinting historical naval documents 
for an upper-class professional and political audience, the Society was always small – 
never containing more than 500 members during the period – but it counted the naval 
correspondents of many London papers among them, and navalist money certainly 
flowed into the organization’s coffers.113  Mention must also be made here of the 
American Alfred Thayer Mahan’s famous The Influences of Sea Power Upon History, 
published in two volumes in 1890.  Although this was a work of history and not 
contemporary strategic thought, Mahan’s focus on the importance to national success of 
a powerful navy won many adherents.  Beresford, P. H. Colomb, and Captain Gerard 
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Noel all wrote Mahan admiring letters; Noel believed Mahan’s work could “have great 
effect in bringing home to our statesmen and legislators the vast importance of sea 
power to England,” while Colomb admired Mahan’s success in “getting people to 
understand what they never understood before” about the inner workings of naval 
strategy.114  Taken together, this increase in official Admiralty support for public 
engagement and surge in pro-naval literature of both the mass-market and upper-class 
varieties greatly amplified the Navy’s profile in the public eye.  The vast increase in the 
Admiralty’s budget and the consequent money spent on display and theater meant that 
within a few years of the Naval Defence Act, in the words of historian Roger Parkinson, 
“there was a well-organised propaganda machine in position, able to publicise the Navy 
and its place in society.”115  Journalists and naval officers were still working in harmony 
to ensure that the Navy was both well-funded and well-appreciated. 
 This new age of cooperation seemed to have no downsides.  By July of 1893, 
when the first of the half-dozen new Naval Defence Act battleships were entering the 
Fleet, the St. James’s Gazette was able to report the Navy as a whole had a new “spirit of 
swagger; and its signs are a love of ostentation and of theatrical showing off.”116  Yet 
when this article appeared the next navalist crisis had already begun with a tragic 
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accident in the Mediterranean.  On June 22, while on maneuvers in the Mediterranean, 
Vice-Admiral Sir George Tryon called for a turn that would put his flagship HMS 
Victoria on a collision course with another British battleship.  His calculations were 
obviously in error, but none of his subordinates were willing to question their admiral.  
The two ships collided; Victoria quickly sank, taking with her over 350 officers and 
crew including Tryon.  Public outcry led to an Admiralty inquiry, which found fault with 
no one other than the deceased admiral; orders were orders, after all.  The United Service 
Gazette featured an article by Phipps Hornby and Beresford on the incident where the 
two professional agitators rather ironically summed up the Admiralty’s view: that 
“unconditional obedience, no matter at what cost, is, in brief, the only principle on which 
those in the Service must act.”117  Still, an incident like the Victoria sinking shook public 
faith in the new, and expensive, Navy.  In August, when news reached London that 
Russia was planning to create a permanent Mediterranean fleet,118 fears of British 
weakness in the Mediterranean – particularly now that the RN in the Mediterranean was 
temporarily short two battleships – led to another uproar in the periodical and daily 
press. 
 Initially, the 1893-94 naval scare followed the same pattern as its 1884 and 1889 
predecessors (historian Frans Coetzee has pointed out that these early agitations occurred 
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at fairly regular five-year intervals).119  Officers with inside knowledge of what they saw 
as Admiralty failures harangued the public – in this case it was once again Charles 
Beresford, who addressed the London Chamber of Commerce in July with a demand for 
an immediate £25 million for the Navy.120  Professional figures wasted no time in 
turning to the press and the public for help in airing their views.  The military 
administrator Sir George Clarke wrote in The Times under the pseudonym of ‘Civis’ that 
only public pressure, applied “steadily, persistently, and uniformly,” could achieve 
“continuity and sufficiency” in naval budgeting.121  Another letter appeared that same 
day from Sir William White, head of naval construction for the Admiralty.  White 
editorialized under his own name, and was fierce in his support for continued agitations: 
“The only way to secure continuity and sufficiency in our naval policy, to overcome the 
native inertness of governments and their fatal tendency to that misplaced economy 
which is the worst form of extravagance, is to apply the force [of public opinion] 
required steadily, persistently, and uniformly.”122 
 But unpleasant news continued to surface about the Navy’s apparent state of 
turmoil amid an increasingly hostile international climate, and the situation worsened.  
In October Laird Clowes reported in The Times that the French navy was again 
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expanding, with the result that the RN was not living up to the two power standard.123  
Later that year the four Naval Lords – Frederick Richards, Jacky Fisher, Walter Kerr, 
and Gerard Noel – sent an official memorandum to the First Lord of the Admiralty, the 
Earl Spencer, calling for more warships and more funding.124  But just who the Naval 
Lords were writing to was equally as important.  Following the national election of 
1892, the arch-Liberal Gladstone was again Prime Minister.  George Hamilton was out 
at the Admiralty, replaced by Spencer.  Ominously, navalist agitation was becoming a 
question of party politics. 
 Gladstone never wavered in his dislike of naval expenditures; he had been forced 
to give in to popular pressure in 1884 and would not do so again, and he was currently 
more involved with his great mission to grant the Irish Home Rule.  The Prime Minister 
made clear in a series of speeches before Parliament that he was “perfectly satisfied as to 
the adequacy and capacity of the British Navy to perform all the purposes for which it 
exists.”125  Sir William Harcourt, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, thought it “perfectly 
evident that the whole thing is the sudden outcome of an ignorant newspaper scare.”126  
Yet already The Times was accusing Gladstone of “playing Irish melodies and Home 
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Rule ditties while England is sinking in the respect and estimation of the civilized 
world.”127 
 More vicious attacks soon appeared.  An anonymous pamphlet blamed Gladstone 
himself for the increasing politicization of navalism, in a section entitled “Who Keeps 
the Navy Weak:” 
Hitherto the question of the Navy has always been considered a non-party one.  
Mr. Gladstone has, for the first time, chosen to break the rule, and to use the whole 
strength of his party to support him in KEEPING THE NAVY WEAK.  Mr. 
Gladstone’s present allies have always been the avowed enemies of the British 
Sailor, have claimed credit for blowing up the ships he sails in, have abused the 
Service to which he belongs, and have rejoiced over every calamity which has 
overtaken him and the country which he serves.  It was by the votes of this gang 
that Mr. Gladstone carried his motion in favour of keeping the British Navy 
weak.128 
 
At the close of 1893 the four Naval Lords officially threatened to resign if more money 
was not dedicated to the Navy.129  The press and the Admiralty were again working 
towards the same purpose, although Admiralty officials could not have been happy with 
the partisan screeds now appearing through avenues such as the above pamphlet.  
Spencer, like Northbrook before him in 1885, submitted to the Lords’ demands and 
presented a greatly increased naval budget to Gladstone in January 1894.  The 
pamphleteers were skeptical of its success without an accompanying change of 
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government: “Luckily, the feeling of the Country has shown itself to be very strongly in 
favour of strengthening the Navy, and the Government has been compelled to plan a new 
programme whether it liked or not […] we must remember that the programme has been 
forced upon a reluctant Government by public opinion, and against the will of Mr. 
Gladstone.”130 
 Gladstone dug in his heels immediately, claiming that further increases in the 
estimates would lead only to a “race towards bankruptcy by all the powers of Europe.”131 
“I cannot and will not,” he said, “add to the perils and the coming calamities of Europe 
by an act of militarism which will be found to involve a policy, and which excuses the 
militarism of Germany, France or Russia.”132  But Gladstone was in his eighties, leading 
a minority government, and greatly disillusioned by the second failure of Home Rule the 
previous fall.  On March 2, 1894, he officially retired from the office of Prime Minister.  
Six days later the Cabinet, now under the leadership of Lord Rosebery, passed what 
came to be known as the Spencer Programme: seven new battleships, thirty cruisers, and 
over a hundred smaller craft at the cost of more than £31 million.133 
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 Many navalists were overjoyed at a third major success in a little over a decade.  
Beresford attributed the success of the Spencer Programme in his memoirs to “the great 
body of public opinion in the country,” and humbly claimed that “whose of us who had 
been toiling to educate it, may at least claim to have set in motion a force lacking which 
it is almost impossible, under a pseudo-democratic government, to accomplish any great 
reform whatever.”134  But some who supported naval reforms were less enthused about 
the latest additions to the Admiralty’s coffers.  H. O. Arnold-Forster, it will be recalled, 
had convinced Stead to write the ‘Truth’ articles a decade earlier in his capacity as a pro-
naval author.  Now he represented a different constituency as a Liberal Unionist MP and 
ally of Salisbury.  It was in this capacity that Arnold-Forster stood before Parliament in 
April of 1894 to register his displeasure with the press: 
I cannot but greatly regret the circumstances under which this programme has been 
put forward.  This programme has been put forwards, as we all know, 
subsequently to active public agitation.  Of course we shall be told that agitation 
had nothing whatever to do with the production of the programme.  It has been my 
fate to take part on three separate occasions in an agitation which has had for its 
object an increase of the Navy, and on each occasion I have heard a statement of 
that kind; I greet it therefore with the respect to which it is entitled as an old friend, 
but I do not attach any exaggerated importance to it.  […] It seems to me a matter 
for infinite regret that this method of procedure should be necessary, but 
experience has taught us that it is necessary.135 
 
 Arnold-Forster’s speech struck at the heart of what popular navalism had become 
by 1894.  In some ways, navalist agitation was at the height of its power – Gladstone’s 
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resignation was the last time navalists directly played kingmaker, and naval budgets had 
increased from £12 million a year in 1884 to £18 million a decade later.   But the 
inherent contradiction in navalism was already becoming apparent.  In 1884 and 1889, 
there were only two groups fighting against what they saw as governmental neglect – 
naval officers and the press.  Both of these could work together, one behind the curtain 
and one in front, to pressure the Admiralty for increased funding.  But the crisis of 1893-
94 introduced a third actor by making navalism an issue of party politics.  Navalists 
could wear two hats, but they could not wear three.  A middling officer unhappy with his 
superiors could justify writing to a special correspondent pleading for a bigger budget, 
but most would balk at calling for their superiors to be tossed out of office entirely – and 
those that did not would run roughshod over the Admiralty in the years to come.  Over 
the next few years large national navalist organizations would spring from the seeds 
planted in the agitations of the 1880s and 1890s; each of these would have to decide 
whether to remain officially non-partisan or dive fully into the political fray.  At the 
same time professional naval figures began to become more and more active behind the 
scenes, and the relationship between them and their clandestine journalistic 
correspondents grew closer and closer.  Within a decade naval correspondents and pro-
naval journalists would be receiving a steady stream of everything from confidential 
technical information to Admiralty gossip, as cliques within the Navy itself began to 
compete for the favor of the largest national papers.  The fight for the future direction of 
navalism had just begun. 
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CHAPTER III 
LEAGUES AND LIARS, 1894-1902 
 The last five years of the nineteenth century seemed to herald a new age of 
navalist political success.  William Gladstone had resigned as prime minister over his 
inability to prevent the passage of the Spencer Programme, and as a result navalists 
could celebrate both a large increase in warship construction and the advent of a 
Conservative government sympathetic to increased naval funding.  Yet many pro-naval 
journalists had taken to heart the words of H. O. Arnold-Forster in Parliament.  Despite 
three major navalist victories in a decade, the future of the Royal Navy would depend on 
how successfully they could continue to manipulate public opinion.  As the last 
Gladstone ministry fell, a major effort spearheaded by members of the press arose in a 
concerted effort to keep navalist agitation in the public eye.  This led to the formation of 
what would grow to become the most successful general-interest naval pressure group in 
Britain, the Navy League.  Within a decade, the League boasted a strong membership of 
pro-naval journalists and legislators and had made inroads into the Admiralty, the 
London press, and the national political conversation.  But it also made enemies among 
all three of these important groups, and in attempting to win over every relevant subset 
of navalist society found itself master of none.  The Navy League – though it made a 
valiant effort – could not direct naval officers, party politicians and naval journalists 
towards the same end. 
 Like W. T. Stead’s ‘Truth’ campaign, the League’s foundational moment was a 
series of articles in the Pall Mall Gazette.  However, this second influential Gazette 
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series sprang from a much different pen than Stead’s.  Spenser Wilkinson had served in 
the thankless post of military and naval correspondent for the Manchester Guardian in 
the 1880s before being dismissed for holding insufficiently Liberal views; he later held 
the same position for the Conservative Morning Post.  In his position as a navalist 
private citizen, however, he wrote a series of articles titled “The Command of the Sea” 
for the Pall Mall Gazette in the fall of 1894.1  The articles focused mainly on the danger 
posed to British seaborne commerce in a foreign war without an adequate Royal Navy to 
defend it – a criticism that had been leveled at the Admiralty since the ‘Truth’ campaign.  
Wilkinson was also a firm believer in Lord Charles Beresford’s call for a naval general 
staff.   
 Where Wilkinson differed from his predecessors was in his methods.  Half a 
decade earlier Beresford, although he certainly had made overtures to the general public 
through newspaper and magazine interviews, had preferred to work for change within 
the framework of either the Admiralty itself or Parliament.  As Wilkinson wrote in the 
Gazette on October 11, he instead believed that an effective navy could “only be 
obtained by taking the proper means – that is, in this country, by organizing votes.”2  
Wilkinson’s recipe for naval success did not involve what he termed ‘details’ or ‘fads;’ 
rather, the British voting public should “say to the Government; ‘You shall prepare the 
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navy for war or we shall turn you out.  We will have no vague assurances.  We insist on 
your doing what common-sense dictates.’”  He also called for the development of a non-
party resolution supporting the Royal Navy that prospective Parliamentary candidates 
could sign, demonstrating their support for both a strong navy and a greater focus on 
proactive national naval strategy.3 
 Wilkinson’s call for public action had near-immediate results.  On the 16th of 
October an open letter appeared in the Pall Mall Gazette.  Signed by ‘Four Average 
Englishmen,’4 it called for a non-professional and non-political pressure group whose 
goal would be to educate the general public about the navy’s position and needs.  
Donations and correspondence were welcomed.  These were soon forthcoming, and in 
December a preliminary conference of navalists was held in London.  Chaired by Harry 
Cust, Conservative MP and editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, the meeting led to the 
official formation of a navalist organization that would be formally known as the Navy 
League.5  After some debate, the career reformer Admiral Phipps Hornby was chosen as 
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the League’s first president.6  The League also chose the up-and-coming naval journalist 
H. W. Wilson to edit its official Navy League Journal.  The first issue of the Journal, 
which appeared in July of 1895, featured letters of support from Wilkinson, Admiral Sir 
Richard Vesey Hamilton, and the naval advocate and retired admiral Frederick Maxse.7  
Beresford, Arnold-Forster, and the radical politician Sir Charles Dilke also expressed 
their approval of the new League.8 
 What were the political and public goals of the Navy League were, and how did 
the League and its members plan to carry out these goals?  The first question to examine 
is why the League felt it had to exist at all – after all, many navalists saw the political 
events of 1894 as proof positive that navalism was a growing ideology among MPs and 
Cabinet ministers.  But the League sought to reach a broader audience, particularly after 
an increased franchise and the parliamentary reforms of 1884 and 1885 made public 
organizations acutely aware of the new power of middle and working-class voters.  Its 
members realized that it would be “no easy task to convey to the man in the street the 
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reasons why a Navy League had become a necessity if the Navy was to be cured of the 
cankers of a long peace.  Captain Mahan’s books and the late Vice-Admiral P. H. 
Colomb had roused interest on the subject of Sea Power; but their books were read only 
by the few.”9   
 The League was an early attempt to bring navalist ideals and ideology to the 
general voting public rather than the upper echelons of power.  The debut issue of the 
Navy League Journal recognized the difficulties inherent in reaching out to the 
contemporary British working man: “His clubs echo with socialistic denunciations and 
detractions of an imperial policy.  He is only half convinced of the value of our Empire 
and but a lukewarm supporter of larger naval budgets.”10  The solution was for the 
League’s members to “be at him and teach him.  It is the duty of the better educated 
amongst us to go down into the market place and refute the sophistries of the blind 
leaders of the blind.  The lower classes can be led, but they want leaders, men with the 
courage of their opinions, men with devotion to the great ideals at which this nation 
should aim.”11  “The working man is to day the arbiter,” observed another League 
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pamphlet.  “He should not be slow, then, to vote for an all powerful fleet, above all, 
when he remembers that to prepare for war is to avoid it.”12 
 Reaching and teaching the common man would be one of the League’s major 
goals, and it was to be accomplished using whatever means were available.  The Navy 
League Journal recommended a course of action: “Where our members can, let them 
hold small meetings and put the facts before their audience.  Where they cannot hold 
meetings, let them attack the workingman in the train or on the omnibus.”13  The 
League’s leadership also recognized the value of a successful publicity campaign.  
Arnold White, naval journalist and member of the League’s executive council, wrote 
that “the task of the League was to advertise the articles of its faith. […] Every good idea 
and sound institution is in peril that is not wisely and continuously advertised. […] The 
secret of securing conviction is the incessant repetition of truth freshly clothed in words 
fastidiously chosen to suit the audience and the readers whose support is desired.”14 
 The League was advertised early and often, both through its own journals and 
pamphlets and more generally through press statements.  In the wider press, it was 
presented as the most constructive outlet for a national outpouring of navalist agitation: 
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“Government by periodical panic is the only substitute for the Navy League; a policy of 
alarms and excursions instead of one of steady progress.”15  Admiral Vesey Hamilton 
sent an open letter to the Times in June 1896 recapitulating the League’s reason for 
being, explaining that “in recent years […] the raising of the Navy to the point of 
strength which is considered indispensable for national safety has only been approached 
in deference to public opinion […] to convince all subjects of Her Majesty that these 
matters are their vital personal interest, as well as their obvious public concern, is the 
object of the Navy League.”16  Royal Navy Captain Sydney Eardley-Wilmot wrote 
privately to the Pall Mall Gazette that “if ever there was a necessity for a Navy League, 
now is that time.  All experience shows that if the present effort is not to be spasmodic, 
public attention must be kept rivetted on the great issues involved.”17 
 In its own publications, the League painted itself as a noble organization whose 
singular focus was the defense of Britain and the Empire.  In the very first issue of the 
League’s journal, editor H. W. Wilson claimed the group’s goal was “to strengthen that 
England which has made us what we are” and “to retain the inheritance of greatness 
which our fathers bequeathed to us;” this would be accomplished “by making the Navy 
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strong.  For by the Navy we stand or fall.”18  Wilson’s editorial took a poetic turn: “With 
passion not, we hope, misguided, with enthusiasm not miscredited, with courage 
unabated, we press towards the goal. […] We may be tiresome, but our object is to make 
our countrymen uneasy.’19  A later article in the League’s journal admitted that “no one 
can have a desire for panics,” but asked whether “a knowledge of the plain truth, and 
possibly a consequent panic” would be more welcome than “ignorance, a fool’s 
paradise, and […] the anxiety and ridicule of the world.”20  In other authorized League 
materials the association’s efforts were likened to the Anti-Corn Law League of the mid-
nineteenth century.21  Above all the League was determined to appear nonpartisan, as in 
an official pamphlet from 1895: “It is because the Navy League trusts the people, 
because it believes that you are honest and patriotic, when you know the truth, that it 
appeals to you….Sink your party feelings for a day; be neither Conservatives nor 
Liberals, but something greater and better, be ENGLISHMEN.”22  Arnold White went so 
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far as to claim the “Navy League is a peace society” that existed chiefly to explain the 
importance of a large navy to Britain’s continued existence.23 
 This commitment to a broad political and social base of public support was laid 
out in the League’s first constitution in 1895.  The second clause was significant: it 
pledged that the League would “spread information” about the “vital importance” of the 
Royal Navy, point out that the RN was not currently equipped to meet the demands of a 
naval war, “secure adequate preparation for the maritime defence of the Empire,” and – 
importantly – “to urge these matters on public men, and in particular upon candidates for 
Parliament.”24  The third clause declared the League “absolutely distinct from all Party 
politics.”25  The League’s constitution was revised in 1898.  The second clause was 
amended to: “convince every taxpayer and every politician that judicious expenditure 
upon the Navy is, for the nation, only the ordinary insurance, which no sane person 
grudges in private affairs….”  Party politics were still anathema to the League, which 
preferred a constant general maintenance of naval support: “continuity of preparation is 
the essence of national security, and the only preventative of ruinous and discreditable 
scares.”  The 1898 revised constitution was also more specific regarding how the League 
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meant to spread pro-naval information: “by lectures, by the dissemination of literature, 
by meetings, and by private propaganda.”26 
 Just how successful the early League was in achieving its stated goals is open to 
interpretation.  Its earliest members often claimed the organization had been subjected to 
a near-constant barrage of criticism from anti-navalists.  Arnold White later recalled that 
“the young League was assailed with vituperation which would have been appropriate 
had the strengthening of the British Navy been a criminal act.”27  In 1896 the Navy 
League Journal congratulated itself on a full year of survival in the face of being 
“regarded with absolute disfavour by the greater part of the English Press” and meeting 
with “ridicule and opprobrium of every kind.  Its founders and first members were 
assured that they were meddlesome busybodies or pushing self-advertisers.”28  In 
something of a defensive move, the very first issue of the Navy League Journal (July 
1895) recalled that “we have been called a ‘sickly bantling’; we have been christened 
fools, enthusiasts, busybodies, prigs.  But, moved by the right spirit, sickly bantlings 
have before now graved their names upon history and won imperishable renown.”29 
 The League likely protested too much, for what the organization’s 
contemporaries noted most was its rapid success.  As early as March of 1895 the Pall 
Mall Gazette believed “the Navy League is to be congratulated on the influence it has 
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already acquired.”30  Charles Beresford credited the League in a speech at Oxford: it 
“woke up the country, got the Press to work, had meetings, made statements, and invited 
arguments” on the role of British naval power.31  The League distributed navalist 
pamphlets and literature to Parliamentary candidates, mayors, chambers of commerce, 
newspaper editors, colonial governors, and workingmen’s clubs throughout the United 
Kingdom and the Empire.32  League members also gave lectures and held essay contests 
at elementary schools with an eye on winning over a future generation of navalists, and 
the League claimed some responsibility for inspiring the surge of late-century popular 
literature on naval themes.33  Although it was difficult, at least initially, for the League to 
capture the working class support it concluded was necessary, by 1900 the group could 
boast a strongly middle class membership of over 14,000.34 
 Yet the League, despite its continued claims of nonpartisanship and working-
class support, could not avoid high-level politics if it sought to be a presence in the 
corridors of power in London – the executive committee was raising its supposed army 
of working-class navalists for a purpose, after all.  One of the organization’s first official 
acts was to make good on its spiritual founder Wilkinson’s call for a pro-naval pledge 
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for Parliamentary candidates of any party.  By June of 1895 concerned League members 
could ask candidates for any constituency in the United Kingdom to “pledge yourself, if 
elected to parliament, to urge upon Government, irrespective of party, the necessity for 
Naval Estimates adequate in the opinion of the admiralty….”35  This pledge 
unsurprisingly made the League vulnerable to charges of partisanship, as it was released 
just days before that summer’s Parliamentary elections which resulted in a large 
Conservative and Liberal Unionist victory.36  As early as August H. W. Wilson was 
defending the League in the Navy League Journal, where he differentiated between the 
‘two senses’ of political action: “In the first sense it means ‘relating to public affairs,’ in 
the second ‘relating to party.’  In the first sense the Navy League is, and always must be, 
political, since after all the Navy is a public affair […] In the second, and now more 
accepted use of the word, the Navy League is non-political.”37 
 Wilson’s justification was apparently not widely believed, for early the next year 
the League revised its definition of non-partisanship in an open letter sent to the press.  
“We desire it to be understood,” according to the League’s executive council, “that the 
main object of the Navy League is not to interfere in the organisation of a Government 
Department like the Admiralty.”  Rather, the League worked “to spread information as 
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to the vital importance to the British Empire” of the RN, “and thereby to insure to the 
Government the support of the people for the expenditure necessary for providing an 
adequate Navy.”38  Chairman of the League’s Executive Committee H. Seymour Trower 
wanted the country to recognize that the League “are neither Jingoes nor alarmists, but 
when our pastors and masters talk of war […] we should point out that it is all-important 
that the public should face the situation fairly and squarely….”39 
 This policy could be difficult to follow in a non-partisan fashion.  Trower 
proudly announced in January of 1898 that Charles Beresford, “although the Tory 
member for York, and probably a very good Tory member, is first and foremost a 
member for the Navy.”40  Beresford himself had given a speech to the Oxford branch the 
previous year where he had declared that “the object and justification of the Navy 
League” was not to “dictate to Government in whom they had confidence, or to the 
Lords of the Admiralty, but to educate the community….”41  Yet a mere six months later 
Trower had to clarify that Beresford and his fellow politician Sir Charles Dilke, despite 
being quite active in navalist circles, were not actually members of the League: “They 
speak on their own initiative, and they may propound views and ideas which the Navy 
League does not share.  Therefore please to understand that the Navy League is not 
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responsible for what the speakers may say [at the League’s annual conference], and that 
the speakers on their part are not implicated in the works of the Navy League.”42  In 
1900 the executive council turned down a proposal to agitate for the removal of George 
Goschen – now First Lord of the Admiralty – in favor of Beresford, as “any attempt on 
the part of the League to interfere in such a matter, would not only be ill-judged, but 
mischievous….”43 
 The attempt to find a working balance between popular navalist agitation and 
partisan political activity proved difficult for the League from its earliest days.  By the 
late 1890s some of the League’s better-known strategic thinkers – among them John 
Knox Laughton, Philip Colomb, and John Colomb – had left the organization, 
condemning its executive committee as scaremongers.  At the same time other high-
profile members such as Fred T. Jane, Rudyard Kipling and Arthur Conan Doyle 
expressed concern that the League was not devoting enough attention to the failures of 
the Admiralty’s naval policy;44 Jane would eventually leave the group after deprecating 
it in a private publication as the ‘Gravy League,’ more concerned with what he saw as 
trifling publicity stunts than with real sustained naval improvements.45  It must be 
emphasized that many of the members who believed the League was becoming too 
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jingoistic had been connected with earlier upper-class navalist movements such as the 
Navy Records Society, while those pushing for increased public criticism of the 
government had often come to the movement from popular literary circles.  It was 
already becoming difficult to keep all the League’s supporters under one umbrella. 
 However, perhaps the League’s most valuable early defector left for entirely 
different reasons.  One of Spenser Wilkinson’s original demands for his proposed 
navalist pressure group in 1894 had been a stronger naval general staff.  But the 
League’s early popular success meant that there were many serving naval officers 
among its membership, and it soon became impolitic to push for changes within the 
structure of the Admiralty.  The League’s original 1895 constitution made no provision 
for “providing a brain for the Navy,”46 and W. L. Ainslie wrote to Wilkinson early in 
1896 that “public opinion is not yet ripe” for any more specific focus on a naval advisory 
staff.47  Wilkinson quietly left the League he had helped begin in 1896, only a year after 
its founding.48 
 The ongoing tension among at least three factions of League members – those 
who wanted open partisan agitation, those who wanted to remain distinct from the 
political scene, and those like Wilkinson and the Colombs who stood for a more 
‘technical’ navalism – was nevertheless kept in check for the first half-decade of the 
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League’s existence, albeit at the expense of Wilkinson and many of his like-minded 
adherents.  The Boer War, especially after 1900, threw the League’s delicate balance of 
approaches into disarray.  During the South African conflict the Royal Navy’s biggest 
role was the continued ferrying of troops around the Empire, and the Boers never 
possessed a navy – but the performance of the British army, particularly during the early 
stages of the fighting, led the League to push once again for increased naval estimates.  
To the League, the army had proven itself deficient in the field, which merely placed a 
greater emphasis on the importance of the navy as the ultimate protector of the home 
islands.49 This new campaign reached its peak in October of 1900 when the League 
released a public manifesto calling for further growth in naval spending, for if “Britannia 
rules the waves, she rules them by virtue of occult laws unknown to the members of the 
Navy League.”50  It was no coincidence that this manifesto appeared just before the 
general election of 1900, the ‘Khaki election’ fought and won by the Conservatives 
under Lord Salisbury essentially as a referendum on the success of the Boer War.  This 
rather aggressive act of electioneering led to criticism of the League from such figures as 
Joseph Chamberlain, who declared in a public speech on the eve of the vote that 
“Britannia still rules the sea, and, with humble excuses to the Navy League, I think that 
she will continue to do so.”51 
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 The open disapproval of Chamberlain did nothing to dissuade the League, and 
after 1900 the balance of power within the organization began to shift towards those who 
wanted to take more direct political action.  Although working to remove members of 
the Board of Admiralty was still seen as a step too far, the League began to debate the 
idea of pushing for specific Parliamentary candidates, rather than calling for all 
candidates to support a larger navy.52  There was a former member of the Board and 
current associate of the League who was more than happy to be nominated: Charles 
Beresford.  After his resignation in protest from the Admiralty in 1888, Beresford’s 
career had been a busy one.  It was not forbidden for naval officers to serve in 
Parliament even if on active duty,53 and Beresford had alternated between professional 
assignments and the House of Commons for much of the previous decade.  Since 1900 
Beresford, now a rear-admiral by rank, had served as second in command of the Royal 
Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet.  He still considered himself a force for the promotion of 
navalist interests in Parliament, claiming in 1897 that 40 separate constituencies had 
approached him to “represent the interests of the Navy.”54   
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 Beresford’s political machinations were not always appreciated by his superior 
officers: that same year the First Naval Lord, Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, found it to 
be “very bad form” when the same day Beresford was promoted to rear-admiral he 
“resigned an appointment, in which he was doing good service, for the avowed object of 
stumping the Country as a political talker on Naval subjects, and the proceeding is 
characteristic.”55  But he had always supported the Navy League, in some cases more 
overtly than was prudent.  In 1900 Vice Admiral Sir John Fisher – himself no stranger to 
the intersections between publicity and professionalism, and now Beresford’s direct 
superior in the Mediterranean Fleet – observed to a fellow captain that First Lord of the 
Admiralty Goschen had expressed concern over a “strong Mediterranean flavour” in 
recent Navy League campaigns, implying that Beresford, whose membership in the 
League was no secret, had been passing the group information (Fisher deflected Goschen 
with the comment that the League’s criticisms “are patent to everyone who takes the 
trouble to enquire”).56 
 In short, Beresford was exactly the sort of Parliamentary candidate the high 
councils of the League could rally around – a staunch navalist who moved in high 
professional and political circles and was amenable to serving once again as a ‘member 
for the navy.’  As early as January 1901 Beresford told Arnold White that he “had a talk 
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with several straight, honest men and see my way to lead a party out on a bold clear line 
of reform in the near future.”57  In late 1901 Beresford was again considering leaving 
active naval service and returning to Parliament.58  For the first time the Navy League 
agreed to play a direct role in a Parliamentary campaign.  When a seat opened in 
Hampstead, the League’s executive committee pushed for Beresford’s candidacy as the 
Conservative candidate for the coming by-election.  R. A. Yerburgh, president of the 
League and a Conservative MP himself, offered personal financial support and secured 
the services of a local election agent.  In January 1902 the entire executive committee 
resolved to “take an active part in the Hampstead election on behalf of Rear-Admiral 
Lord Charles Beresford, and invite[d] the healthy co-operation of all members to provide 
cash, canvassers, and speakers required.”  The committee also contributed £50 towards 
any expenses Beresford might incur.59   
 Officially, even this direct support of a Conservative candidate was non-partisan.  
In the statement announcing Beresford’s candidacy, the League’s executive committee 
claimed they had a duty to directly support navalist parliamentarians, as “any failure on 
their part to bring the influence of the League to bear on contested Elections, not as party 
politicians but as patriots, would deprive the League of its most valuable lever in public 
affairs, and impair, if not destroy, its influence for good upon the only true National 
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policy.”60  Unofficially, an authorized League campaign for a Conservative candidate 
raised eyebrows – and it must be stated that although Beresford was not even officially a 
member of the League his opponent, Liberal G. F. Rowe, was.61  In any event the 
League’s efforts were for naught.  In mid-January Beresford withdrew his name from the 
contest; he would return to Parliament later that year in another by-election as 
Conservative member for Woolwich.62 
 The first foray of the League into direct political action had misfired.  More 
ominously for the League, it had continued an ongoing tarnishing of the organization’s 
reputation among serving naval officers, who were loath to publicly associate with 
partisan politics – Jacky Fisher wrote to the First Naval Lord, Walter Kerr, that he had 
forbidden Beresford from “either quoting me or using my name in any way in his 
approaching campaign […] I much fear he will put his foot in it.”63  This severing of 
contact had begun with the League’s pre-election declaration of 1900, which Fisher 
referred to as “the stupid exaggerations of the Navy League”64 – although Fisher also 
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wrote to James Thursfield, naval correspondent of The Times, that the “Navy League 
admittedly exaggerated in their manifesto, but there is much truth in what they say.”65 
 Fisher did contact League representatives himself on occasion.  Early in 1901 he 
thanked Arnold White for the League’s recent agitations: “I am anxious you and Mr. 
Yerburgh should know that your joint endeavours have produced much more effect than 
either of you probably have any idea of and I am most desirous you should both fully 
realize the great services you have both rendered.”  Fisher then admitted that the “Navy 
Estimates would not have been at the figure they are had it not been for the influence 
brought to bear from outside.”66  He wrote again to White the very next day with a wish 
that “you would kindly tell [Yerburgh] when opportunity offers how personally grateful 
I am to him.”67  
 Other officers who corresponded with or about the League, such as Admiral Sir 
Sydney Fremantle, were more ambiguous in their views.  Fremantle wrote to Archibald 
Hurd, naval correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, to register his displeasure with a 
series of letters on supposed naval deficiencies that appeared in League publications 
early in 1901: “I am very angry with the League for allowing such letters to appear.  It is 
regular nuisance mongering […] they are also gross & unpatriotic exaggerations.”  The 
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admiral also “told the Editor [of the Navy League Journal] that if any member of the 
house asked a question” on naval affairs in Parliament, “he would get an answer which 
would discredit the NL Journal as publishing absurd & unpatriotic panic statements.”68  
Yet Fremantle still wrote an article for the League on the navy’s need for more warships, 
realizing that although “reluctant to show how weak so many of our cruizers are […] the 
only way to call attention to special needs is through the press.”69 
 Eventually the Admiralty refused any connection with League business, no 
matter how slight.  Near the end of 1901 the League contacted the Admiralty seeking 
permission to offer a 50-guinea prize to the best-shooting ship in the fleet at the annual 
maneuvers.  The letter was apologetic, expressing “the hope that the Lords 
Commissioners of the Admiralty will believe that however misguided, injudicious, or 
violent the efforts of the Navy League in the past may have been considered to have 
been the action of the League has been dictated by considerations of patriotism alone.”70  
Nevertheless the Admiralty declined the League’s offer – as the reply pointed out, the 
Naval Lords “have not in the past been always convinced that the attitude adopted by the 
Navy League on questions of naval policy has been advantageous to the Navy.”71 
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 Beresford’s abortive election campaign in 1902 only widened the gap between 
the League and many of its professional supporters.  The League was unshaken, and in 
March Arnold White sent a form letter to a group of serving naval officers on the 
organization’s behalf.72  The letter’s intent was to gauge interest in a second League-
supported Parliamentary campaign on behalf of another veteran navalist officer: “Vice-
Admiral C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald is, I believe, willing to stand if his expenses were paid.  
If he could be helped to obtain a seat with the view of furthering naval interests in 
Parliament he would be prepared to do his best in that direction.”  White made it clear 
that the League wanted a serving officer, as “an officer on the active list would have 
more weight in the House than one who had retired.”73  He also noted that Fitzgerald 
was a Conservative, and “he justly requires freedom to speak or vote on all subjects 
other than naval questions according to his own convictions.”74 
 White’s form letter was not published, and was for internal League use.  The 
responses were mixed – while the majority of replies supported the idea, those who did 
not were vehement in their disapproval.  G. H. Atkinson-Willes spoke for those officers 
who had grown weary of the League’s tactics: “The Navy League, which began its life 
as a most useful and patriotic institution, has now lost the confidence of the Naval 
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Service to a great extent by parading about the streets exaggerated statements on boards, 
carried by sandwich men.”  Atkinson-Willes did write that he welcomed any return of 
Beresford to the Commons, and supported Fitzgerald’s campaign but not his backers: “I 
should like to see [Fitzgerald] in Parliament, but not returned by any body of men such 
as the Navy League is composed of, because then, we should not have Admiral 
Fitzgerald’s opinions unadulterated but warped to suit the views of the League.”75 
 By mid-1902 the Navy League appeared to have irrevocably poisoned its 
relationship with both the Admiralty and most serving naval officers, although it retained 
the admiration and support of Beresford.  The near-concurrent rift between the League 
and many of its allies in the daily press, which eventually deprived the League of 
another major base of support, can be traced to a specific moment in June 1901 when the 
League navalist Arnold White inadvertently laid the relationship between League-related 
activists and serving officers before the public in the Daily Mail. 
 It is important to emphasize that the League, despite its publication of the Navy 
League Journal, did not consider itself part of the London Press, the collection of daily 
and weekly newspapers and magazines that played a major role in shaping upper-class 
public opinion.  But it did strive for recognition from the major papers, and considered 
getting any League article or manifesto printed in a London daily a success.  League 
publications certainly credited much of the organization’s early success to the wider 
press.  At an 1898 conference an official speaker declared that “the influence the League 
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has exerted and the effects it has produced could scarcely have come about but for the 
immense assistance of the Press, the conductors of which, appreciating the great 
importance of our cause, have always given our articles and letters and proceedings a 
wide and generous publicity.”76  In 1901 the Navy League Journal specifically thanked 
The Times for running a leading article on the League’s latest campaign: “The Press is so 
well conducted, and such a power in this country, especially The Times, that its 
assistance in making known the views of the League is a great support to the 
Committee.”77 
 These achievements are not as significant as they might first seem.  Many of the 
League’s leader-writers also worked for the London press – H. W. Wilson and Arnold 
White, two of the League’s most prolific authors, were both naval correspondents for the 
Daily Mail.  And the League’s attempts to gain press support could go awry.  The early 
departure of the League’s first journalistic supporter, Spenser Wilkinson, has been 
discussed previously – in 1896 he left the organization ostensibly over differences as to 
the League’s future direction.  However, it is likely that there were other factors behind 
Wilkinson’s departure.  H. W. Wilson wrote to his navalist colleague William Laird 
Clowes in December of 1896 that “I am beginning to think that opportunism was a 
mistake on our part.  We sold Spenser Wilkinson [who was by now at the Morning Post] 
for [James] Thursfield [naval correspondent for The Times], & Thursfield has never 
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lifted a hand to help us.”78  Still, the League generally maintained close relations with as 
many major periodicals as possible. 
 Naval journalists’ roles as reporters and League members were hard to separate, 
meaning that dealing with official visits could be a headache for the Admiralty.  In 1900 
Arnold White and Yerburgh visited the Mediterranean Fleet as Beresford’s guests.79  
Both men came in their capacity as high-ranking members of the Navy League, though 
Yerburgh was an MP and White was a naval correspondent for the Daily Mail at the 
time.  Beresford introduced the two men to Jacky Fisher, who asked White why he wrote 
for a mere halfpenny paper; White’s response that “the price of a paper had less effect 
upon the future of mankind than its circulation among people who could think and 
wished to know the truth”80 would begin a working relationship with Fisher that far 
outlasted either’s connection with the League. 
 The League’s political manifesto of late 1900 had marked the organization’s 
entry into the realm of party politics, and when Beresford proposed bringing White and 
Yerburgh back as his guests during the summer of 1901 some of his fellow officers had 
grown suspicious of the organization in the interim.  Fisher wrote to the Admiralty in an 
unsuccessful attempt to either have their visit prohibited or to have them accompanied 
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by Thursfield of The Times, a journalist he may have seen as a more moderate influence; 
as Fisher remarked to the First Lord, “you will observe […] in view of the previous 
action of the Navy League that these two gentlemen were not coming as ‘tame cats’ to 
purr away as if all was very comfortable.”81   
 He was right to be concerned.  In the weeks leading up to the League’s proposed 
visit, Beresford had been in contact with White about what both men saw as continued 
Admiralty unpreparedness – “The Admiralty are all wrong, not only in their estimates 
but in their policy.”82  It appears White was pushing Beresford to bring his claims to the 
public’s attention, which Beresford was hesitant to do.  Just days before the scheduled 
visit the admiral wrote to the navalist: “You and I only differ as to the question as to 
whether my time has come yet, to do good?  I think not just yet and will convince you 
when you come to me I hope.”83  White and Yerburgh’s second visit to the 
Mediterranean Fleet took place in early June of 1901 – both men spoke with Fisher and 
Beresford, as they had done the previous year.  On his return to London, White 
discussed his interviews with the League’s executive committee.  Impressed, the 
committee decided to “endeavour to bring before the public certain information which 
was thus placed in their possession.”84  This information took the form of three articles 
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by White that appeared during the summer of 1901, two in the Daily Mail and one in the 
longer monthly, the National Review.  Two dealt with Fisher, one with Beresford.  
Together they would redefine the relationship between navalists and the Admiralty. 
 Fisher was initially cautious in dealing with White and Yerburgh.  Just after the 
two had concluded their visit, Fisher wrote to both separately.  He gave Yerburgh 
permission to show the letters the two had exchanged to former Liberal Prime Minister 
Lord Rosebery and Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence Sir George Clarke, 
but requested that Yerburgh avoid “any personal allusion to me especially in the way of 
commendation.  I don’t want it and it will harm the cause we have at heart.”  Still, the 
two were kindred spirits when it came to increasing naval budgets.  The admiral thought 
highly of Yerburgh’s plans for navalist agitation: “I do earnestly hope that you will 
succeed in convoking a Pan-Parliamentary Synod and that you will establish a House of 
Commons Vigilance Committee on the Navy.  Outside pressure is most urgently 
necessary […] it may even wear away the Board of Admiralty and compel the 
Government to recede from their un-English position of a big army and a little Navy.”  
Fisher ended his letter with the optimistic comment that “if you succeed your chances of 
going to heaven will be immeasurably increased […] and Patriotism like Charity will 
cover a multitude of sins.”85 
 Fisher’s missive to White contained more of a concrete plan for future navalist 
political action.  He agreed with the journalist that a “Psychological Moment” was 
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approaching where the government, reluctant to spend more on defense, would be forced 
to choose between increasing the army or the navy budget – this point is similar to the 
Yerburgh letter.  But Fisher realized that “if Mr. Yerburgh or you or Lord Rosebery were 
to make certain statements they might be officially categorically denied.”  His solution 
was to suggest that if Beresford was “to be in a position of greater freedom and less 
responsibility than at present […] and were to get up in the House of Commons or at any 
public meeting in England and make the following statements as coming within his own 
knowledge, it would be impossible for any official, however supple, to wiggle out of an 
admission that his statements were correct.”86  Thus Fisher suggested – albeit indirectly 
– that the League support a Beresford political campaign six months before they actually 
did.  This was how Fisher generally dealt with the navalist press, surreptitiously and 
behind the scenes. 
 Arnold White ignored all of Fisher’s advice (though not all of his letter, a point 
which will be examined further).  Soon after his visit to the Mediterranean Fleet, White 
sent a memorandum directly to King Edward VII decrying the weakness of the fleet and 
calling for more political support of Fisher.87  He then published a short character sketch 
of Fisher in the Daily Mail of June 25 – anonymously, though it was easy for Fisher to 
guess the identity of the author.  The admiral angrily wrote to his wife that the 
“scoundrel Arnold White contrary to my most distinct request has put in a sort of journal 
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of my days work &c. & he promised me faithfully not to mention my name as it does far 
more harm than people generally suppose & does me personally no good at all.”  He 
worried that “this last article in the Daily Mail will set all the Admiralty and the 
Admirals by the ears & I shall have most abusive letters appearing in the papers in 
consequence,” and even blamed “that scoundrel Beresford” for being White’s impetus, 
as White told Fisher he had spoken to the second in command about Fisher’s reforming 
interests.88  Fisher even wrote to White, feigning ignorance of the article’s author and 
claiming that “the oil would have been heated seven times hotter for the writer of the 
article could I have got him!  However he would have been delivered […] as the cause 
was righteous and it was written for the good of the cause and certainly not for the good 
of the person described.”89 
 Fisher also expressed his disappointment pointedly to another sympathetic naval 
correspondent, James Thursfield: “I was assured by a mutual friend of the absolute trust 
that could be placed in Mr. Yerburgh and Mr. White, and they, having asked me in 
confidence my views, I gave them freely, but quite privately, in view of their enthusiasm 
on behalf of the Navy.”  He had made both men “aware how especially distasteful to me 
personally it would be if I were in any way ‘boomed’ or alluded to, so you may imagine 
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my disgust at being trotted out in the Daily Mail.”90  For his part, White sent an 
extraordinary letter to Fisher’s wife.  He took credit for the article (confirming Fisher’s 
suspicions), but claimed it was merely the beginning of a broader plan: 
One result has followed this agitation.  Sir John Fisher is now a distinct personality to 
the public, and the fact that he is a silent personality does not tell against him in these 
blatant days.  What I hope to see is that he should be made Minister of Marine, with a 
Seat in the Cabinet and unremovable for five years.  It seems to me that his day will 
come when the public recognize the fact that the navy can no longer be entrusted to 
an ignorant politician.  In the meantime we are doing all we can at home to forward 
his views and get for him the place in the people’s thoughts which he deserves.91 
 
 Public praise of this sort was distasteful to Fisher.  But Fisher’s mood improved 
when a second article on his Mediterranean career authored by White – this time 
officially – appeared in the Conservative journalist Leo Maxse’s National Review for 
July 1901.  Entitled “A Message from the Mediterranean,” it covered the same general 
ground as most contemporary navalist arguments – the Royal Navy, particularly in the 
Mediterranean, was weak.  It needed more cruisers and auxiliary units, but the public did 
not realize the danger because they were too caught up in both the general belief that the 
navy was supreme and contemporary arguments within the defense community that what 
Britain really needed was a stronger army.92  The essay proved popular – the Navy 
League’s executive council was so impressed that they immediately authorized £200 
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“for an immediate agitation by hand bills or otherwise” upon the article’s major 
points.”93 Only weeks after Fisher had denounced White’s first article, he headily 
commended the second: “you have done the State some service,” he wrote the journalist.  
“Nearly every point [raised in the article] has been officially though very secretly 
conceded.”94    
 There was good reason, besides his general support for navalist agitation, for 
Fisher to be so supportive of White’s National Review article.  He had essentially written 
it.  In the previously discussed letter the admiral sent to White immediately following the 
latter’s visit to the Fleet, Fisher had also enclosed what he called a “’fragment’ written 
offhand just now,” which became the basis for White’s effort in the National Review.  
White even retained many of Fisher’s characteristic scriptural references, and generally 
confined himself to tidying up much of Fisher’s literary exuberance; for example, 
“[Britons] are languidly indifferent as to who governs them” in the finished product had 
been “We don’t care a damn what set of idiots are governing us” in Fisher’s original.  
But the thrust remained the same.95 
 White’s second article, although successful in turning Parliamentary attention 
back to the navy, also once again brought suspicion on the Mediterranean Fleet and 
Fisher in particular (Beresford was experiencing his own concurrent struggles with 
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Parliament and the press).  One of Fisher’s particular causes was the rather esoteric issue 
of a lack of gyroscopes in the Mediterranean, and the admiral asked that either White or 
Yerburgh “make certain statements” on the matter.  The statements were made, but it 
was too technical an issue for a non-professional arena, and they met with scorn in 
Parliament.  One MP asked whether “the League know what a gyroscope is?  They 
ought not to prevent people sleeping in their beds at night by telling them there are no 
gyroscopes in the Mediterranean, unless they first of all explain what a gyroscope is.”96  
Around the same time Kerr wrote to the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, that 
Fisher was suspected of having leaked information to “Navy Leaguers and kindred 
spirits,” which had led to “discussion in public of the most delicate questions.”97  Kerr 
specifically mentioned the National Review article, calling it merely a restatement, “in 
many instances in identical terms, of the views expounded to the Board by the C-in-C.”98 
 Fisher replied to Kerr’s secretary that he was “sorry words and phrases of mine 
are quoted, as you mention, but with a large Fleet like this the Admiral cannot hide his 
views and opinions, and mine, as you know, are very strong.”99  Yet his actions had not 
gone unnoticed among his fellow officers.  Fisher’s chief of staff, George King-Hall, 
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noted in his diary that he did “not think Sir John has acted loyally to his superiors, for he 
disclosed to Arnold White and Mr. Yerburgh, at two visits for two at a time, all our 
plans.”100  Fisher received an uncomfortable letter from Beresford: “he hears that unless 
Arnold White had not written those personal articles on me the agitation would not have 
gone ahead.”  Fisher was, at least briefly, convinced that White’s articles had 
permanently damaged his career: “It certainly has done away with any idea of my going 
to the Admiralty!  Nor do I think it likely I shall ever get anything else after this.  
However I feel I have done the right thing, and I daresay I shall get along all right on 
half pay!”101 
 Soon after this discomfiture Fisher again contacted White: “I think for various 
reasons and for the good of the cause that I had better not write to you further, but you 
must not suppose from this that I do not appreciate your self-sacrifice in this matter and 
your splendid patriotism, and I have the same to say in regard to Mr. Yerburgh.”102  He 
would not deal closely with either Yerburgh or the League again in any major capacity – 
possibly the gyroscope fiasco had led him to avoid groups composed mainly of 
enthusiastic amateurs, or perhaps the League was becoming too partisan for a serving 
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officer.103  But the working relationship between Fisher and White would continue for 
many years, because while White had angered Fisher by publishing a hagiographic 
sketch of the admiral, he had also taken Fisher’s talking points and given them a 
nationwide audience with the National Review article.   
 From White’s perspective, he truly believed that Fisher was the reformer the 
navy needed.  At the height of the agitation he wrote to Fisher’s wife that Fisher’s “silent 
devotion to country is what appeals so strongly to my imagination.  There is a Spanish 
proverb ‘he who would be a Christ must expect crucifixion.’ […] You may rely upon it 
that the heart of England is with Sir John Fisher.  Speaking personally I would gladly go 
to prison to help him in the very slightest degree.”104  Fisher’s back-channel methods 
were certainly better for a navalist’s job security than Beresford’s.  For White’s 
reference to prison was no joke – because while White’s articles on Fisher had captured 
the attention of the Admiralty, his simultaneous article on Beresford had captured the 
attention of Parliament, and White and Beresford stood accused of revealing classified 
naval information to the public. 
 Although White had interviewed Fisher on his recent visit to the Mediterranean 
Fleet, he was there at Beresford’s invitation and stayed on Beresford’s flagship HMS 
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Ramillies.105  Beresford, like Fisher, was a strong believer in navalist agitation being 
necessary for increased naval funding and, as he had not yet embarked on his Hampstead 
parliamentary campaign, he chose to work through the League.  Initially Beresford 
shared the same reticence as his fellow admiral; he wrote to White that “it would be 
most improper and prejudicial to discipline if I were to give you details as to why” he 
had concluded the British Fleet in the Mediterranean was ill-prepared for war.106  But 
White apparently convinced the rear-admiral of the importance journalism could play in 
naval budgets.  As he recorded in a later letter setting down the history of the 
controversy, White “had obtained permission to write certain letters to the Daily Mail 
with the object of rousing public opinion on the subject of the Fleet.”  But he worried “as 
to whether my unassisted efforts to rouse the public by means of the Press to a sense of 
the danger of the situation would be successful,” and asked Beresford to “write a short 
letter for publication which should contain one sentence indicating that the 
Mediterranean Fleet was not organised for war.  After considering the matter for two 
days [Beresford] wrote the draft of a letter in which I suggested some alterations.”107 
 Beresford accepted White’s alterations – his only suggestion was for White to 
send the document to the entire Press Association rather than simply the Daily Mail, 
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which White looked into but found the organization unreceptive.108  When White left the 
fleet he carried with him Beresford’s letter, which criticized the “want of strength and 
the want of proper organization” within the fleet in the rear-admiral’s own hand.109  
Beresford wrote to White on June 21 that “everyone will agree with us once they know 
[…] I am entirely with you in your views that to get at ‘the people’ it is necessary to 
ventilate matters in the papers which they read.”110  That same day his letter was 
published in the Daily Mail.  White’s name was not attached to the article.  Beresford’s 
was.  It was considered highly unusual for a high-ranking officer on active service to 
publish a direct attack on Admiralty policy using his own name,111 and although this was 
not the first time Beresford had taken up his pen in support of the navy,112 Parliament as 
well as the press immediately took notice. 
 The Beresford letter quickly became a topic of conversation in the daily press.  
Early opinions were split on Beresford’s tactics, but the majority of pro-naval periodicals 
and dailies supported the letter, some with more reservations than others.  Many 
commentators were willing to overlook Beresford’s transgressions if they had been 
undertaken out of a sincere desire to improve conditions in the Mediterranean Fleet.  The 
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debate often centered on the navalist idea – now approaching its second decade of 
national relevance – that only public support could save the navy.  The Daily Express 
claimed that “it is the custom of our Government to stigmatise all who cry for reform as 
alarmists,” but saw Beresford’s letter as containing “statements that cannot be denied, 
here is a danger to the Empire patent to all. […] If Ministers will not act it is to their 
masters, the people of Britain, that we look for aid.”113 Correspondence poured in to the 
Daily Mail.  “We have grown weary of Administrations that cry peace when there is no 
peace,” wrote one editorialist.114  Another believed it was “time that the Government 
were reminded by ‘the man in the street’ of their responsibilities in regard to the 
reinforcing of our ‘crack’ fleet in the Mediterranean.”115 A column in The Referee was 
more poetic in its support for Beresford: “[L]et us tell our rulers plainly that The 
Meanest Pro-Boer that Crawls, and leaves his trail of treason as he goes, is not such a 
traitor to England as would be the Minister who risked the existence of the British 
Empire by his crass neglect of the British fleet.”116  The Westminster Gazette believed 
that if Beresford knew about the letter’s publication he should be investigated by the 
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Admiralty, but if the rear-admiral’s charges were true the only solution would be to 
immediately install Beresford as First Lord of the Admiralty.117 
 The Navy League strongly supported the Beresford letter and sent public 
statements to a variety of newspapers, including the Morning Post and the Daily Mail, 
pushing for a full investigation into Beresford’s claims; “In these circumstances there is 
no other course to pursue than to continue the agitation,” read one League editorial.118  
The Times, however, took a dim view of the League’s involvement with the Beresford 
controversy: “It is not at the bidding of a few ‘sea-gallopers’ […] that the country will 
disestablish the Admiralty and install the Navy League in its place.  It is not because 
some of them choose to publish letters they have received from officers in high 
command that the country will give itself over to panic.”119  The Times strongly 
condemned the publication of Beresford’s letter from the outset, and its editors 
deliberately “dissociate[d] ourselves entirely from the too transparent attempt which is 
being made in certain quarters to represent the two very capable and distinguished 
officers who command our naval forces in the Mediterranean [Fisher and Beresford] as 
parties to the agitation which appears to be impending.”120 
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 One of the ‘capable and distinguished officers’ could not have been happier with 
the initial response to the letter’s publication.  “Well done,” wrote Beresford to White on 
June 27, “you are manipulating things well.”  Beresford was only sorry that White could 
not “have got my letter taken up by Press Assoc. instead of one paper (Daily Mail) then 
it would have been in every single paper in England on the same day with comments….”  
He had not publicly denied his authorship of the letter, and even had a plan if Parliament 
or the Admiralty asked any inconvenient questions: “If they write to me to know if I 
wrote the letter I shall reply that I have written hundreds of the same sort.  I do not see 
that I have done anything short of complete discipline or prejudicial to the Service….”121 
 Beresford soon found himself defending his concept of ‘complete discipline.’  
Most press representatives supported the publication of Beresford’s correspondence; 
even the Naval and Military Record wrote that while “technically this may be a dire 
offence, […] it is impossible to doubt the excellent motives of the gallant rear-admiral, 
and he is far too popular in the country to be made the scapegoat of the Admiralty.”122  
But the technicality was an important one.  Article 682 of the King’s Regulations, which 
bound every serving member of the Royal Navy, stated that “all persons belonging to the 
Fleet are forbidden to write for any newspaper on subjects connected with the Naval 
Service, or to publish or cause to be published directly or indirectly in a newspaper or 
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other periodical any matter or information relating to the Public Service.”123  If 
Beresford had purposely written his letter for general publication, he could be court-
martialed.  Of course he had written it specifically for White’s use, but now Beresford 
and White had to convince the Admiralty that Beresford had not done so.  To do so, they 
would have to satisfy the Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty – H. O. Arnold-
Forster, who as a veteran navalist himself knew a great deal about the dangers posed by 
enthusiastic admirals. 
 As soon as Beresford’s letter was published in the Daily Mail, a Parliamentary 
debate commenced over what the rear-admiral’s motivation had been.  Initially 
Admiralty officials were loath to believe that Beresford would have purposefully 
committed such a blatant breach of discipline.  Arnold-Forster, as the Admiralty’s voice 
in Parliament, stated before the House of Commons that “there was nothing in Lord 
Charles Beresford’s letter to show that it was intended for publication and it seemed 
highly improbable that the Rear Admiral would take a step so contrary to the discipline 
of the Navy….”124  There were rumblings that the letter was a forgery125 and even that it 
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had been stolen from the Admiralty.126  The fault must lie, so the Admiralty believed, 
with the letter’s anonymous recipient.   
 Then, less than a week after the letter’s publication, Arnold White wrote to 
Arnold-Forster claiming responsibility for its appearance in the Daily Mail – it had been 
sent to him, and it was entirely his decision to print it.  Rather than begging forgiveness, 
White’s letter was brash and combative.  First, he emphasized to Arnold-Forster, the 
Admiralty had no right to complain – after all, it had approved White and Yerburgh’s 
visit to the Fleet as representatives of the League (despite Fisher’s dissatisfaction with 
the arrangement, which White was not aware of).  “The situation [of the Mediterranean 
fleet] is disquieting and in the opinion of a large number of people well qualified to 
judge of the situation from a national point of view requires vigorous and immediate 
action.  Where is the impulse towards vigorous action to come from except from public 
opinion?”  White believed he was merely aiding the Admiralty’s fight for increased 
funding, claiming “the object of those with whom I am acting is in the first place to 
strengthen the hands of the present Board of Admiralty in providing the Mediterranean 
Fleet with such essentials as the responsible authorities know to be necessary….”  He 
promised more disclosures to come, telling Arnold-Forster that “a preliminary statement 
of the facts will be published by the Navy League tomorrow or next day.  Those facts are 
undeniable and that they cannot be refuted is known to nobody better than yourself.”127 
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 Arnold-Forster’s reply was milder than expected.  “Of course I am not so stupid 
as to think or pretend that agitation and newspaper attacks are out of place or useless in 
such a matter as the condition of the Navy,” he wrote to White.  “I think I should 
obviously be one of the last persons to take such a line […] I know we are both 
interested in the same matter and both trying to arrive at the same result, namely, the 
strengthening of the Navy, though we are compelled to do so by somewhat different 
means.”  With regards to the real issue, whether Beresford had told White to print his 
letter, Arnold-Forster only commented that he was “not surprised to know that Lord 
Charles’ letter was sent to you; indeed I supposed that was the case.  Whether or not he 
instructed you to publish it I do not know, nor do I ask.”128 
 He did not ask, and White did not answer – he merely pointedly replied that he 
was “not in the habit of publishing private letters or giving publicity to any 
communication without the permission or knowledge of the writer.”129  Why did White 
not directly implicate Beresford?  He explained his motivations in a letter written, but 
never sent, to Beresford after the original furor had died down: “the publication of this 
letter, if brought home to you [Beresford] at that time, might have necessitated the 
hauling down of your flag.  In my judgment your degradation would have been injurious 
to the country. […] On this ground I took the only course that was honourable.”130  
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Arnold-Forster was not convinced by White’s claim that he acted alone.  He wrote to 
Fisher his “hope that I am mistaken about the whole business, and the publication of the 
letter which appeared here may have been altogether contrary to Lord C’s. wishes.  But 
thanks I am bound to say to some of his friends, an impression was created which has 
added to the difficulties of the situation, and has I know aggravated a great many people 
whose good will and esteem are well worth retaining.”131 
 However, White’s word was good enough for the Admiralty, and Arnold-Forster 
duly announced in Parliament that the letter had been printed without Beresford’s 
knowledge; it was merely a “private letter, written without any intention of its being 
published, and that its publication was unauthorized.”  Beresford would not be 
questioned in the matter.132  White then sent his letter of the 25th claiming responsibility 
to The Times.  It appeared in early July along with an additional preface by the journalist 
claiming the Admiralty would never have let White and Yerburgh visit the 
Mediterranean Fleet if it “was not willing to be strengthened by an expression of public 
opinion.”133  If the veteran navalist was expecting the letter to vindicate him, his plan 
was not a success.  The Times in particular, although it did publish White’s admission, 
believed White “must surely feel by this time that he has done Lord Charles Beresford a 
very grave disservice; and his distinguished correspondent must probably feel, too, that 
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officers in high command must needs be very careful in future how they write private 
letters to persons who cannot be trusted not to publish them.”134 
 This immediate criticism struck a nerve with White.  He confided to Leo Maxse, 
the editor of the National Review, that “Beresford’s letter was of course written for 
publication & handed to me for that purpose as I did not at that time think that anything I 
could do would arouse the country to the facts […] it seemed to me only fair to him to 
leave him to avow or disavow the publication of a telegram which might end his sea 
career.”  White also asked Maxse for the opportunity to publish another article on the 
Mediterranean Fleet in an upcoming National Review.135  Beresford neither avowed nor 
disavowed the letter; he would make no public statement on the matter until the next 
year.  Although it is uncertain what White – who certainly knew the danger Beresford 
would be in if he admitted culpability – thought that Beresford would be willing to say 
in his defense, he clearly decided that Beresford should be doing more.  He sent a 
telegram to the rear-admiral shortly after The Times published his confession in hopes 
that Beresford would explain himself to the Admiralty, if not to the general public.136 
 Beresford’s response must have come as a shock to the embattled navalist.  His 
encouragement of the previous month had vanished entirely; now Beresford wrote 
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sternly that White “would have made a stronger case if you had not let Mr. Forster or 
anyone know to whom my letter was addressed.”  As to White’s appeal for an official 
explanation from Beresford to Arnold-Forster: 
[Y]ou evidently seem to think I ought to wire home that you published my letter 
either with my authority or by my desire. As far as I am personally concerned it is 
immaterial to me what line I take with regard to my letter being published but if one 
is fighting an uphill game it is always as well not to build up obstacles to our advance.  
If I had sent you a wire to say you published my letter by permission or desire from 
me I put myself palpably in the wrong with authority and after having done an act 
which certainly is against the customs, traditions and even orders of the Service I 
aggravate the offence by publishing a further remark which infers that I not only did 
an act of indiscipline but glory in having done it.  Such a proceeding would put a very 
large number of my brother officers against me, who are now strongly in support of 
my views.  Why volunteer anything. 
 
Beresford went on to say that he would only confess if the Admiralty directly asked him 
whether or not he had sent the letter – which Arnold-Forster had already announced the 
Admiralty would not do.  He concluded with a stinging rebuke to White: “You must 
work the agitation your own way and you believe in using names.  I do not.  Using 
Fisher’s and my own names creates an enormous amount of jealousy and opposition 
amongst our brother officers in the Navy […] You will remember that I told you that 
when you were with me.”137 
 Beresford’s rebuff of White came near the end of the public controversy over the 
Daily Mail letter.  As far as the Parliamentary representatives of the Admiralty were 
concerned, the whole episode had merely been an unfortunate combination of a rear-
admiral who talked too much and too loudly and a fervent journalist who took a private 
                                                 
137 Beresford to White, 9 Jul 1901, NMM WHI, 1. 
 
 112 
 
conversation into the public sphere.  As a result the Admiralty was modifying its public 
relations policy behind closed doors.  A high-level meeting was held early in 1902 to 
discuss how to deal with “erroneous criticisms” of the Royal Navy appearing in the 
nation’s newspapers.  First Naval Lord Kerr summed up the apprehension of those in 
power: “So far as this country is concerned I doubt these fables carrying much weight, 
but if the malicious lies that appear in our gutter Press are taken up seriously on the 
Continent and reproduced in respectable journals, no doubt harm is done.”  Eventually 
the decision was made to continue with a reactive strategy, with the Admiralty officially 
contradicting in Parliament any information it deemed inaccurate that had appeared in 
the periodical press.138  The Admiralty also banned press representatives from speaking 
to anyone in the Admiralty offices except the Permanent Secretary.139   
 Press interest died off without any new news to report.  Fisher, who already knew 
the value of keeping communication anonymous, continued to work with navalists more 
tactfully than his colleague; Beresford was soon involved in his election campaigns for 
Hampshire and Woolwich.   Only Arnold White, who was still searching for a more 
amenable answer from Beresford as to why he had not supported the journalist further, 
was still keeping the issue alive.  In an August 1901 article on the Mediterranean Fleet 
for the National Review, White again claimed that in publishing Beresford’s letter the 
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ends had justified the means: “It will be generally admitted that the publication of this 
letter was a disgraceful and even criminal act unless the fact stated in it was literally true.  
Since, however, it is true, as is officially admitted, it would have been dastardly to have 
shrunk from the consequences of responsibility for its publication.”140 
 Privately, White was continually in contact with an increasingly distant 
Beresford throughout the summer of 1901, always attempting to persuade the rear-
admiral to admit his connection with the letter.  Beresford generally replied that he 
would set the matter straight when his personal circumstances allowed him to return to 
London: “When I come home and then am in a position to do so I will put the letter 
incident all right;”141 “So far as the letter goes you will see that I will turn it to good 
account when I get home;”142 “You need not be uneasy in any way as to the incident of 
the letter.  I will put that exactly as it occurred.”143  He also recommended that White “sit 
quite still and do or say nothing about the letter.”144 Beresford remained with the 
Mediterranean Fleet during his brief Navy League-aided Parliamentary campaign for 
Hampstead, but did haul down his flag and return to London on half pay in order to run 
for the Woolwich seat.  At this time he wrote to White that – as recorded by the latter – 
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“unless I [White] asked you to [admit responsibility for the letter] you did not intend to 
take action,” which White interpreted to mean that Beresford would deal with the matter 
after his Parliamentary contest.145 
 Beresford’s second campaign of 1902 was easier than the first, as he ran 
unopposed in a by-election to fill the vacated seat for Woolwich.  He still delivered a 
series of campaign speeches, and true to form they focused on the idea that the 
Mediterranean Fleet was woefully unprepared for a future naval engagement.  The 
public airing of Admiralty laundry, particularly on subjects that cannot much have 
interested the voters of Woolwich – one of his main criticisms was an insufficient supply 
of Welsh coal at Malta – led to condemnation of Beresford from some of his oldest and 
most strongly navalist colleagues.  Retired admiral E. R. Fremantle found “the subject 
chosen by Lord Charles […] not one I venture to think suitable for popular discussion, 
and, to make it interesting, it was necessary to exaggerate largely our deficiencies.”146  
C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald, perhaps smarting from his own recent misguided attempt at a 
navalist Parliamentary campaign, contended that Beresford’s speech was “contrary to the 
best traditions of the Navy, injurious to its true interests, and consequently to those of the 
country, subversive of all discipline, and absolutely destructive of the noble lord’s 
reputation as a serious critic of naval affairs.”147  Jacky Fisher wrote to the former First 
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Lord, Earl Spencer, that Beresford “could do so much good for the Navy with the public, 
for there is no doubt the ‘oi polloi’ [sic.] believe in him and listen to him like no one 
else,” but “his uncontrolled desire for notoriety alienates his brother officers!  He 
promised me faithfully […] that he would be circumspect and judicious in what he was 
going to say in public.  He has been neither!  and has forced me much against my will to 
disavow him….”148 
 Still, there was no doubt that Beresford would return to the House of Commons.  
When he did, in late April of 1902, White wrote to him immediately.  “While you were 
on full pay or seeking a seat in the House of Commons I held my hand and suffered in 
silence under the infamous charge [that he had published Beresford’s letter without 
permission].  Now that you are a free man and in Parliament I am sure that you will see 
that justice is done to me in this matter.”149  Finally, White’s plea was heard.  A short 
letter – just two sentences – appeared in The Times of April 29, and Beresford had 
finally come clean.  “The publication of that letter was a very grave mistake, but all 
blame (which I own is thoroughly deserved) for that mistake should be laid on my 
shoulders as I am the person solely responsible.”150  The newly-minted parliamentarian 
also wrote rather defensively to White: “There was no direct charge ever made against 
you, it was all by insinuation.  I hope now the whole affair may be dropped as if it is 
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revived again […] that will nullify if not entirely destroy any power I may possess for 
getting an improvement in the Administration of the Services.”151 
 So Arnold White found himself vindicated after nearly a year of being impugned 
in the London press, particularly by The Times.  Indeed, the newspaper published an 
official retraction of its previous anti-White editorials, writing that “in all this deplorable 
business Mr. Arnold White has been much more loyal to Lord Charles Beresford than 
Lord Charles Beresford has been to Mr. Arnold White – or to his own superiors at the 
Admiralty.”152  White also attempted to obtain an official apology from Arnold-Forster 
and the Admiralty, which was not forthcoming.153  He met with Beresford at the latter’s 
home, where Beresford displayed an alarming lack of tact by telling White that while 
“the only point that gives me some satisfaction in the whole of this affair is that no doubt 
we shall mutually suffer for the cause that we have at heart […] there is no doubt on the 
face of it I shall suffer more acutely than you.”154 
 Privately, Beresford was seething.  He told his fellow officer George King-Hall 
that he had been “a fool to trust Arnold White.”155  And when Beresford had to explain 
himself to Arnold-Forster – for a public admission demanded, finally, an explanation – 
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he wrote to Arnold-Forster that “Arnold White is one of the most dangerous men that I 
have had anything to do with. […] I told him he could do what he liked with the letter 
when he asked me ‘might he publish it’, and I said there was nothing in it.”  He also 
emphasized that if he had claimed responsibility for the letter’s publication while still on 
active duty, he likely would have been forced to resign.156 
 This letter was discussed in the House of Commons, and although Arnold-Forster 
omitted lines “so offensive to Mr. Arnold White that I thought [Beresford] would not 
wish me to publish it”, Beresford in his role as MP asked to speak and reiterated his 
conviction that White was not to be trusted.  He then claimed to “know I was wrong, but 
I can prove to this House that though I was wrong I did right”157 – as concise a statement 
of Beresford’s views towards public relations as ever there was.  Beresford was 
officially reprimanded by the Admiralty, and as far as the navy was concerned the matter 
was ended.158  After the report of this Parliamentary exchange appeared in The Times, 
White composed a long and detailed message to Beresford laying out the entire history 
of the Daily Mail controversy from his point of view.  It concluded with a final statement 
of wounded innocence from White: “You stated that I am ‘a dangerous man’ and you 
give as an explanation a comparison to yourself that I sometimes blurt out things which I 
regret.  I am unaware of any episode in our relations which justify you even in hinting 
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that I have not exercised proper reticence in regard to either your interests or those of the 
Fleet.”159  White never sent the letter, though he kept it with his personal files.160  And 
he never again dealt with Beresford in a personal or professional capacity. 
 White had also recently stepped down from the executive committee of the Navy 
League – a surprising decision for a committed navalist who had been one of the 
League’s earliest supporters.  His motivation may be explained by a letter Jacky Fisher 
sent to the embattled journalist shortly after his resignation: 
To tell you the truth (between ourselves) I’m glad you have left the executive of the 
Navy League, simply because its efficacy is vitiated by having retired Naval officers 
amongst its members.  First because a purely civilian executive carries more weight 
with the public, as then there is no professional bias!  Second because these retired 
Naval Officers did nothing to remedy the deficiencies they complain of now, when 
they were on the active list and had then the power more or less to do so!  However 
all this is between you and me, and in view of my shortly going to ‘a certain place’ it 
is not desirable I should be in any way quoted.  One of my first visits on reaching 
England will be to [White’s home], to pay my respects and offer my thanks to a much 
abused but real patriot who notwithstanding all sneers to the contrary has 
substantiated his assertions and sees them gradually acquiesced in and has done a 
great service, regardless of personal inconveniences and personal abuse!161 
 
The ‘certain place’ Fisher referred to was the Admiralty.  In June 1902 he was appointed 
Second Naval Lord, in charge of personnel decisions for the entire Royal Navy.162  He 
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brought – unofficially – his closest journalistic allies with him into the halls of power.  In 
1902 these were Arnold White and James Thursfield, but Fisher’s circle would soon 
expand. 
 When the Navy League began in 1895, its original members strove to set 
themselves apart from the contemporary navalist circles of power.  They aimed to create 
an organization that included members of the press as well as serving naval officers; 
both of these groups, along with a concerned citizenry motivated to take action by 
League organization, would be able to lobby the Admiralty and Parliament for increased 
naval funding.  In a perfect world, the League would involve all pre-existing navalist 
groups while being beholden to none.  By 1902 the League had successfully 
disentangled itself from the Admiralty, Parliament, and much of the press, but in a 
manner the League’s earliest champions had never intended. 
 For the League had attempted to do too much too quickly, and in doing so had 
turned friends into critics.  Its misguided foray into partisan politics, with the election 
manifesto of 1900 and the attempt to support Beresford in 1902, had alienated many 
serving officers who could only support a non-partisan League in good conscience.  The 
Daily Mail fiasco had severely damaged relations between Arnold-Forster, the 
Parliamentary voice of the Admiralty, and Arnold White – and it must be remembered 
that White visited the Mediterranean Fleet in the first place as an agent of the League.  
Arnold-Forster’s dislike of White’s methods may have also been related to the 
Parliamentary Secretary’s previous successful navalist agitation in the 1880s – Arnold-
Forster knew how the game was played, and seems not to have appreciated White’s less 
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discreet approach.163  The result was that the League sacrificed the services of White to 
keep those of Beresford.  Beresford was certainly a major asset for the League.  He was 
the only high-ranking naval officer who could move almost effortlessly between the 
Mediterranean Fleet and the House of Commons and performed a valuable service for 
navalists by disseminating technical details from the former amongst the latter.  But 
White was a highly credentialed naval journalist, and the League needed as many 
capable pens as it could obtain – by 1902 it had already lost Fred Jane, the Colombs, J. 
K. Laughton, and Spenser Wilkinson. 
 In terms of its ability to affect naval policy, the League had little to offer 
potential allies.  Its executive committee wanted speeches and articles by politicians and 
admirals to bolster the League’s navalist credentials.  Yet an admiral could not send in 
letters under his own name to the Navy League Journal,164 or he risked facing discipline.  
There were more effective ways for a navalist officer to make his views known, as Jacky 
Fisher well knew.  The League’s allies in Parliament were more concerned with 
supporting their party – generally the Conservatives, despite the League’s best efforts to 
have a broad base of support – than in the nebulous concept of a ‘member for the navy.’  
And the departure of specialist public intellectuals like Laughton and the Colombs 
                                                 
163 Throughout the entire Daily Mail controversy, Arnold-Forster was the major mouthpiece of the 
Admiralty’s views to the public.  First Lord Selborne only noted that he found Beresford’s letter to be 
“about the funniest thing I have ever seen.”  Selborne to Arnold-Forster, 26 Jun 1901 [the letter is dated 
1902, but context indicates it was sent in 1901], BL ADD MS, 50288. 
 
164 Though Beresford in particular gave many navalist speeches at League-sponsored events. 
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placed the League in an uncomfortable position as neither a dedicated policy periodical 
like the Royal United Services Journal nor a partisan outlet.   
 In the previous chapter, the problem of naval reformers attempting to wear three 
hats arose – a navalist agitation could not enjoy the support of the press, the professional 
navy, and Parliament at the same time.  The Navy League ended up with none of these 
groups’ support.  Focusing too strongly on technical issues aggravated Parliament (and 
generally meant sensitive information had leaked, leaving the Admiralty none too 
pleased), running candidates for Parliament implicitly meant a degree of partisanship 
unacceptable to most serving officers, and its inability to formulate a coherent public 
relations strategy other than sending constant screeds to the London papers fractured 
many of its relationships with other periodicals, particularly The Times.  This is not to 
say that the Navy League was moribund by 1902 – it remained the largest navalist 
pressure group in the nation until the First World War.  But its fingers had been singed 
by its early forays into parliamentary campaigns and high-level clandestine 
communication, and the League shifted its focus much more towards public outreach – 
school lectures, essay contests, community naval history addresses (it was the League, in 
an effort spearheaded by Arnold White, that first popularized the celebration of Trafalgar 
Day as a national event).165  When the League split in 1907, it would be over internal 
criticism that the organization was not being navalist enough. 
                                                 
165 Marianne Czisnik, Horatio Nelson: A Controversial Hero (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 125. 
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 Charles Beresford and Arnold White had also learned an important lesson about 
successful navalist agitation.  It could not take place in the open.  The Admiralty had 
criticized White in Parliament and reprimanded Beresford for the publication of a single 
concise letter.  Jacky Fisher had written an entire article for White; as the next chapter 
will demonstrate, it was neither the first nor the last time he had done so.  But Fisher had 
covered his tracks.  He dealt with multiple journalists over multiple years, and – as 
Arnold White famously told Fisher’s son many years later – encouraged his journalistic 
allies to “publish as widely as possible, but don’t give me away.”166  The second clause 
was equally as important as the first. For Beresford, White, and the Navy League their 
troubles had arisen from overt navalist cooperation.  Navalist politicians, journalists, and 
officers did not differ a great deal in their overall goals, at least in the first years of the 
twentieth century.  Most simply wanted increased naval funding and more auxiliary 
craft, particularly in the Mediterranean, but official regulations and press decorum 
prevented direct collaboration.  Covert cooperation was the answer.  Beresford’s public 
pronouncements and vocal support of navalists in both Parliament and the Fleet had met 
a rocky end.  Jacky Fisher’s more subtle system would prove to be a major success in 
intertwining the interests of the Admiralty and the press during the next few years – all 
under the protection of plausible deniability. 
                                                 
166 Hough, Admiral of the Fleet, 128-129. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE SUCCESS OF THE FISHER SYSTEM, 1902-1907 
 Sir John Fisher’s appointment as Second Naval Lord in June of 1902 ushered in 
an era of great reforms in the Royal Navy, the majority of which were organized and 
directed by Fisher himself.  It also marked the most influential period of covert 
cooperation between journalists and the uppermost commands of the Admiralty.  The 
three major navalist groups again coalesced into a two-versus-one scenario, with serving 
officers and their supporters in the press guiding a series of naval reorganizations 
through a changing political climate.  However, this collaboration differed from previous 
navalist efforts.  The Admiralty efforts were guided almost entirely by Fisher, who had 
his own specific vision of the role navalist journalists could play in supporting his 
reforms and worked tirelessly to ensure the cooperation of like-minded editors and 
authors.  Through early 1907 Fisher’s system proved extremely effective even in an 
increasingly partisan political and professional atmosphere.  During this period Fisher 
rose to the highest echelons of the navy and brought his closest press allies with him.  
Initially, these were mainly his old compatriot Arnold White, naval correspondent for 
The Times James Thursfield, and the naval historian Sir Julian Corbett.  His circle, 
however, would continue to grow.  As Fisher wrote to White soon after their first 
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meeting in 1900, he was searching for the “league of preaching friars required for a new 
Crusade!”1 
 Shortly after the two were introduced by Beresford in the summer of 1900, 
Fisher and White began a correspondence that would last over a decade.  The vice 
admiral initially wrote to thank the journalist for both his visit and his “disinterested and 
powerful efforts to help on the Navy.”  He expressed a hope that White’s writings 
“might have the more extended circulation of the ‘Times,’” but cautioned White “that no 
names should be quoted even secretly as of course it would be a breach of discipline for 
any one on Service to make any communications of a public nature what ever his private 
opinions might be.”2 
 However, Fisher was determined to air his own private opinions through White.  
The Fisher-inspired “A Message from the Mediterranean” was still nearly a year away.  
Yet the first visit between Fisher and White inspired an article of its own.  Titled “Shall 
Britain be “Ladysmithed”?” – a reference to the siege of a British-held town during the 
Boer War – this early article by White appeared in Cassell’s Magazine in September of 
1900.3  Unlike White’s National Review article discussed in the previous chapter, Fisher 
                                                 
1 Fisher to White, 17 Jul 1900, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, 1st Lord Fisher 
of Kilverstone Papers (hereafter CCA FISR), 15/2/1/1. 
 
2 Fisher to White, 30 Jun 1900, CCA FISR, 15/2/1/1.  Fisher often suggested that White should work for a 
more prestigious national newspaper; in 1900 White generally wrote for the Daily Mail.  The pledge of 
secrecy was related to White’s bringing Fisher’s concerns about naval efficiency in the Mediterranean to 
the attention of the Duke of Bedford. 
 
3 Ruddock F. Mackay, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 242-243. 
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did not write the majority of the Cassell’s piece.  But he certainly saw and approved an 
initial proof copy, calling it “the most eloquent and graphic exposition I have ever read” 
of the idea that the British army would be useless if the navy was first defeated in a 
battle at sea.  This was a concept to which Fisher would return throughout his career, and 
he wanted White to spread the message.  “The intense ignorance of the men at the head 
of affairs is what frightens and appals [sic.] me,” Fisher wrote to White.  “Our curse is 
the parochial politician in Parliament and the ineptitude of our Foreign Office, and our 
ill-informed democracy!  Can you reach them with this splendid article you have sent 
me?”  Fisher hoped that both White and R. A. Yerburgh, president of the Navy League, 
would “keep on preaching this same Missionary Sermon,” and reminded White that 
“repetition is the secret of conviction […] you must keep on telling people the same 
thing and of course this is the secret of advertisement.”4 
 Before White’s Cassell’s article appeared, Fisher did have some suggestions to 
make on the proof.  He removed four lines, noting to White that if left in “the lines 
would rather indicate an acquaintance with details which it is desirable you should avoid 
as you only want to put forward what is open to the ‘Man in the Street’ to know as well 
as you do!”5  He also recommended that White include quotes from Alfred Thayer 
                                                 
4 Fisher to White, 17 Jul 1900, CCA FISR, 15/2/1/1. 
 
5 Fisher to White, 18 Jul 1900, CCA FISR, 15/2/1/1. 
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Mahan’s recent work.6  White’s article did not have a major impact on the contemporary 
political scene, especially contrasted to the uproar his “Message from the 
Mediterranean” would generate a year later.  But Fisher was satisfied, and thanked 
White for getting the Mediterranean Fleet mentioned through his Cassell’s work in 
larger-circulation papers such as The Times and the Standard.  For his part, Fisher 
resolved to bring the article to the attention of the powerful Liberal Unionist politicians 
Joseph and Austen Chamberlain – due for a visit to Fisher’s current home port of Malta 
– and “go through it with them line by line.”7 
 Fisher also encouraged White to continue writing articles and editorials on the 
theme that the Royal Navy must always be prepared for war.  He was not yet prepared to 
send confidential documents directly to White; as he wrote to the journalist, “I should 
very much like to give you some recent facts […] but it is impossible to do so without 
transgressing official secrecy.”  But he understood, in contrast to other navalist admirals, 
that a strong argument could do more for the pro-naval cause than a list of figures.  “Do 
not be drawn into discussing details or modus operandi,” he warned White.  “Simply 
state the undeniable requirement that the Mediterranean and Channel Fleets should be 
kept organised for war in every detail […] keep harping on that one subject.”8 
                                                 
6 Fisher to White, 17 Jul 1900, CCA FISR, 15/2/1/1; Fisher did not specify which of Mahan’s works he 
wanted White to quote, but considering the subject matter it may have been his Story of the War in South 
Africa (1900). 
 
7 Fisher to White, 6 Nov 1900, CCA FISR, 3/1. 
 
8 Ibid.  Emphasis in original. 
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 At the same time, Fisher was cultivating another valuable press ally in James 
Thursfield, naval leader writer for The Times.  Like White, Thursfield had been involved 
in the navalist movement before Fisher knew him, and was a ready friend to reform-
minded naval officers.  Captain Reginald Bacon, an associate of Fisher’s, remembered 
that despite the Navy’s “instinctive horror of newspaper correspondents” Thursfield 
“disarmed all mistrust and earned the complete confidence of the authorities.  He did 
more than any man alive, or dead, to make the Navy look on the Press as a friend and not 
as a prying busybody.”9  He had famously hidden under a dinner table and been secretly 
fed by two officers in order to obtain the first report of a naval visit to the Kaiser in 
1895.10  Thursfield came to Fisher’s attention in 1897 when the vice admiral wrote that 
in the Mediterranean Fleet “we all fully recognize what splendid work you have done for 
the Navy;”11 Fisher also assured Thursfield that he would obtain a place for the 
journalist’s son, a young naval officer, in his flagship HMS Renown.12 
 Fisher did not attempt to write articles or correct proofs for Thursfield as he had 
for White.  He did make suggestions as to what direction Thursfield could take in his 
naval editorials. Chancellor of the Exchequer Sir Michael Hicks Beach irritated Fisher 
                                                 
9 Admiral Sir Reginald H. Bacon, A Naval Scrap-Book: First Part, 1877-1900 (London: Hutchinson & 
Co., 1925), 157. 
 
10 Lord Chatfield, The Navy and Defence: The Autobiography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield, 2 
vols. (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1942), Vol. I 24. 
 
11 Fisher to Thursfield, 3 Dec 1897, CCA FISR, 1/27. 
 
12 Fisher to Thursfield, 10 Aug 1897, in Arthur J. Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought: The 
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953 
[1952]), I 137-138. 
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repeatedly between 1900 and 1902 with attempts to lower the naval estimates.  In 
response, Fisher wrote to Thursfield in 1900 complaining that his colleagues “are all 
greatly dreading a relaxation of Naval Shipbuilding in the next Estimates.  This will be 
nearly fatal.  Sir M. Hicks Beach has terrorized the Admiralty.”13  The next year Fisher 
had more specific advice, calling for Thursfield to encourage first lord of the Admiralty 
Lord Selborne to push for increased estimates against the economizing tendencies of 
“that unmitigated cold-blooded rude brute Hicks-Beach” with “a little ‘stiffening’ from 
outside in the shape of one of those unmistakable ‘do-your-duty-or-you’ll-catch-it’ 
leading articles in The Times.”14  Later in 1901 he warned Thursfield to be prepared for 
the year ahead: “You don’t want to be reminded that this is the time of year a leading 
article has the most effect in keeping the Admiralty up to the mark and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer in his proper place.”15  And while Fisher was as unwilling to send official 
documents to Thursfield as he was to White, he had no compunction in sending the 
journalist officially released Admiralty material along with his own ideas for its use.  He 
showed a 1900 Admiralty report on the use of cruisers to Thursfield, calling it “a 
valuable text to preach upon and by taking & quoting this report as your text you would 
prevent suspicion falling upon those it is undesirable should be suspected.”16 
                                                 
13 Fisher to Thursfield, 20 Feb 1900, Caird Library, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK, Sir 
James Thursfield Papers (hereafter NMM THU), 1/1; emphasis in original. 
 
14 Fisher to Thursfield, 8 Jan 1901, in Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought I, 179-180. 
 
15 Fisher to Thursfield, 16 Nov 1901, NMM THU, 1/1. 
 
16 Fisher to Thursfield, 22 Feb 1900, NMM THU, 1/1. 
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 Of course, Fisher was not the only naval officer communicating with journalists 
at this time.  Charles Beresford’s rocky relationship with Arnold White in particular has 
been previously discussed, and he made no secret of his belief in cooperation with the 
press.  When the Morning Post incorrectly reported in 1900 that Beresford, not Fisher, 
was the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, Fisher requested an explanation 
from his subordinate.  It had been a mere misunderstanding, replied Beresford.  “The 
great British Public are accustomed to the name of Lord Charles Beresford, but as yet 
ignorant of the name of Sir John Fisher.  I would suggest that the remedy lies entirely in 
your own hands.”17  To Beresford, public attention was an important factor in advancing 
navalist ideas – a lesson that Fisher took to heart, with suitable modifications. 
 In fact a number of naval officers were in contact with journalists, although 
Fisher and Beresford were certainly the most prolific.  Fisher referenced the prior 
navalist Admiral Sir Frederick Richards to both Thursfield and White, lamenting that the 
Admiralty had “missed in the last few years that clear, broad old back of Sir F. Richards 
set against the wall!  It was no good politicians […] arguing with him!”18   Admiral Sir 
Edmund Fremantle maintained a correspondence with Archibald Hurd, naval 
correspondent for the Daily Telegraph, that was entirely separate from Fisher and 
Beresford’s dealings.  Like his colleagues, Fremantle “believe[d] in publicity in the 
                                                 
17 William Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built: Nine Men who Made a Modern Navy (London: Rupert 
Hart-Davis, 1962), 85. 
 
18 Fisher to Thursfield, 8 Jan 1901, in Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought I, I 179-180.  Fisher also 
referenced Richards to White on 6 Nov 1900, CCA FISR, 3/1. 
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hands of those who are capable of making a good use of their information”19 and hoped 
to “encourage non service men like yourself [Hurd] to write about the Navy and I am 
willing to help them if I think they are writing in the interest of the Service.”20  But his 
relationship with the press soured after daily newspapers committed a series of minor 
technical errors when referring to Royal Navy warships, and Fremantle regretfully 
curtailed his messages: “I am sorry to fall out with the correspondents who I know 
generally do us good service, but my hands were forced to a great extent & for the 
reasons given above I was very angry with the press, who I think acted in a very 
impolitic manner.”21 
 So there were a variety of ways serving navalist officers could approach 
cooperation with journalists, from Fremantle’s technical focus to Beresford’s bombastic 
private letters intended for public consumption.  Initially Fisher too did not seem certain 
as to how the press could most efficiently be dealt with; he suggested that both White 
and Thursfield should run for Parliament, even offering to contribute £1000 to a 
prospective Thursfield campaign.22  However, by 1902 Fisher’s letters to various 
journalists had begun to coalesce into a defined system of communication featuring 
                                                 
19 Fremantle to Hurd, 21 Feb 1899, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, Sir 
Archibald Hurd Papers (hereafter CCA HURD), 1/20. 
 
20 Fremantle to Hurd, 31 Dec 1900, CCA HURD, 1/20. 
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several aspects.  First, as previously discussed, Fisher preferred to simplify naval issues 
as much as possible for a general audience.  There was no reason for a mass-market 
newspaper to deal with technical matters, for “if you want to attract the attention of the 
public you must lay the colour on thick with broad lights and shadows!”23   
 Second, Fisher’s cooperation with navalist authors was calculated as often as 
possible to benefit both parties.  Fisher regularly acted as a sort of information broker, 
disseminating articles and editorials he thought worthwhile throughout his networks and 
introducing authors to political figures he felt could aid the cause.  For example, Fisher 
directed White’s attention to a navalist letter sent to The Times by the retired admiral and 
MP Sir John Hay in late 1901.  Though neither Fisher nor White had had anything to do 
with the letter, Fisher suggested White write to The Times to thank the paper “for giving 
such prominence to his letter in big type as it tends to prevent the public imagining you 
are airing your own personal views,” thus using Hay “to fight your battles.”24  In early 
1901 Fisher read an article by Rudyard Kipling in the Navy League Journal he 
considered “splendid,” but complained to White – perhaps embarrassingly, as White was 
still on the League’s executive committee – that it “has no circulation where it could do 
good!”  Fisher’s solution was for White to combine Kipling’s article with his own recent 
work for Cassill’s Magazine and send the whole assembly to The Times under the 
                                                 
23 Fisher to White, 6 Nov 1900, CCA FISR, 3/1. 
 
24 Fisher to White, 26 Nov 1901, CCA FISR, 15/2/1/1. 
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signature of Navy League president Yerburgh.25  When Beresford was preparing a 
speech in Parliament in support of higher naval estimates, Fisher even suggested that his 
subordinate should “consult Thursfield before you make your speech – indeed I should 
ask him to revise your speech were I in your place.”26  To hedge his bets, Fisher sent the 
draft of Beresford’s speech to Thursfield on his own accord but warned the journalist to 
keep the matter a secret, as he only wanted Thursfield to help Beresford “to keep his 
head straight.”27 
 Dealing with Fisher furthered journalists’ causes as well.  Navalist authors and 
editorialists firmly believed that the Royal Navy had to be constantly supported 
publically, and the information Fisher sent to them could be used – always unofficially – 
in navalist campaigns.  As early as 1900 Fisher’s dictum of always possessing “fleets on 
a war footing” appeared in Navy League material authored by Arnold White.28  When 
Fisher became concerned that an MP was going to “make himself extremely 
disagreeable” in Parliament on the subject of the Navy, he drafted a response to the 
projected criticisms and sent it to White with the note that “I would be glad if you would 
show it confidentially to Mr. Yerburgh and alter the wording in any way either of you 
                                                 
25 Fisher to White, 8 Jan 1901, CCA FISR, 3/1. 
 
26 Fisher to Beresford, 27 Feb 1902, quoted in R.A. Burt, British Battleships 1889-1904 (Annapolis, MD: 
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27 Fisher to Thursfield, 27 Feb 1902, quoted in Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone, 271. 
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consider to be expedient as it is just as well to be prepared beforehand and to make sure 
that I have your approval in anything I may be called upon to say.”29 
 Third, Fisher had learned a valuable lesson about secrecy even before 
Beresford’s Daily Mail fiasco.  Although Fisher certainly became less cautious about 
confidential material as his career progressed, he always reminded his allies in the press 
“to keep our correspondence and any peculiar phrases I may use as your own private 
property”30 in order to ensure plausible deniability that he had corresponded with the 
press at all.  He wrote, as he told Arnold White, “only for your private eye, to put you on 
the right tack!”31  At the same time, Fisher warned those he communicated with to “have 
nothing to do with half-pay Admirals or sailors of any kind.”32  Those who supported 
Fisher were making a conscious choice to deal with him and him alone, and Fisher had 
little time for the opinions of officers who had retired decades earlier.  He wanted fresh 
faces dedicated to reform both in the Admiralty and in the newsroom.  Among his naval 
contemporaries and subordinates, this would eventually lead to the ‘Fishpond’ system of 
favoritism and a popularity-based schism in the uppermost ranks of the service.  But in 
1902, as Fisher first rose to a position where he could affect national naval policy, it 
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meant an ever-growing circle of journalistic associates focused on “purely civilian 
advocacy” with “no technicalities.”33 
 His promotion to Second Naval Lord meant that Fisher was for the first time in a 
position of real administrative power at the Admiralty.  Soon after his appointment, 
Rear-Admiral Reginald Custance, no fan of Fisher’s modernization efforts, wrote to his 
colleague Vice Admiral Cyprian Bridge that “Heaven only knows what Fisher may not 
attempt to run.  Any wild-cat scheme finds a supporter in him.”34  Custance was right to 
be concerned, as Fisher, long a believer in keeping abreast of developing naval 
technologies, immediately used his new office and rank – he became a full admiral that 
same summer of 1901 – to set in motion a series of naval reforms.  The Second Naval 
Lord traditionally controlled personnel decisions throughout the navy, but Fisher went a 
step further and assumed responsibility, essentially on his own authority, for the 
appointment of all officers below the rank of captain.35  He retreated from his 
journalistic allies for much of the rest of the year, though not without purpose: as he 
wrote to Arnold White, “I have a very big work on hand, and I think success seems 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 
 
34 Custance to Bridge, 3 Jun 1902, quoted in A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War and 
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assured, but it is essential that no inside personal antagonism should be evoked by any 
outside personal allusions to what may be in progress.”36 
 The first knowledge any source outside Admiralty corridors had of Fisher’s 
initial major reform was the release of a memorandum to the Cabinet on Christmas Day 
of 1902 setting out a proposed complete overhaul of the methods by which prospective 
officers would enter the Royal Navy.37  There were three aspects of Fisher’s plan.  The 
first two were comparatively minor: the age of incoming cadets was to be reduced from 
14 to 12½ and the elderly wooden battleships HMS Britannia and HMS Hindustan, 
which had housed and trained cadets since the 1850s, were to be replaced with shore 
establishments.  The third was much more far-reaching.  In 1902, cadets enrolling in the 
three branches of the Royal Navy – executive, engineering, and the marines – entered 
the navy and underwent training entirely separate from each other.  Fisher proposed a 
system of common entry that would give all cadets the same general seamanship and 
engineering training until they became lieutenants, at which point they would enter their 
chosen specialty.38  Although the training reforms were Fisher’s creation, they were 
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Spottiswoode, Ballantyne and Co. Ltd., 1960), I xv; details of the plan were released to the general public 
in January of 1903. 
 
38 Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought I, 243-244. 
 
  
136 
 
collectively known as the Selborne Scheme, named after First Lord of the Admiralty 
Lord Selborne.39 
 When the Selborne Scheme became public knowledge in early 1903, Fisher’s 
brief withdrawal from his journalistic allies came to an end almost overnight.  Soon 
Fisher was encouraging White and Thursfield to spread the supposed benefits of the 
Scheme far and wide in what amounted to a public relations campaign.  But he did not 
want his own name associated with any reforms, and wrote to White that it was “better 
for the great main object we both have at heart (the efficiency of the Navy) that we 
should appear to be revolving in different orbits!”40  To Fisher, the Scheme would be 
most effective if it appeared as a joint effort by all the Naval Lords, but only them; 
Fisher warned White that critics of the scheme would claim the Admiralty had not 
consulted outside experts, and that the Admiralty’s response would be “we ain’t fit to be 
here if we have to ask advice!  We are doing what we believe to be right and we fear no 
one!”41   
 Fisher cautioned Thursfield to not even mention other officers’ views on the 
Selborne Scheme, as “public opinion has far more weight than the strongest 
                                                 
39 Hough, Admiral of the Fleet, 147; it is uncertain why Fisher did not want his first major reform to be put 
forward under his name.  Hough suggests that Fisher either was attempting to peremptorily strengthen 
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representatives of even the fighting admirals and 3 lines in a newspaper produces more 
effect than an ultimatum from the Admiral in Command of the Mediterranean.”42 And 
“to quote any way present Admirals is to lead the public astray, because they are the men 
of the past!  So pray don’t encourage them.”43  The admiral did inform his colleague 
Commander Herbert Richmond, currently serving in the Mediterranean Fleet, that 
Thursfield should be provided with “all help and advice” if he came calling.44  
Generally, Fisher continued his earlier policy of proposing to his press contacts the 
direction they should take on naval matters and passing along articles he considered 
effective.  He suggested that Thursfield read a letter sent to The Times in January by a 
pseudonymous author and then “in your own inimitable style […] recapitulate the chief 
features of the scheme and perhaps paraphrase the letter of the anointed scoundrel 
(whoever he was!) who signed himself ‘Tria Juncta in Uno’, because that letter certainly 
stiffened up many in the inner circle!  So perhaps it did in outer circles!”  Fisher 
recommended that Thursfield rework the Times article into either a pamphlet or a series 
of further articles supporting the Scheme.45 
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 What Thursfield did not know at the time was that Fisher had written the article 
and sent it to The Times himself under the Latin pseudonym, a reference to the 
combining of the three branches of officers under the Scheme.  But Fisher had not 
covered his tracks well.  Arnold White knew of his authorship, calling the article “just 
the ‘pointer’ required by lay disciples whose faith is greater than their knowledge,” 
perhaps a dig at Thursfield.46  And Fisher’s writing style was so distinct, peppered with 
exclamation points and biblical allusions, that Thursfield soon deduced who had written 
to The Times.47  At any rate, the proposed pamphlet on the Scheme never appeared. 
 Fisher was playing a dangerous game.  His letter to The Times was the second 
time he had written anonymously for the public press in less than two years, following 
his article that had been revised by Arnold White and had appeared in the National 
Review.  Worse, Fisher’s tactics were creating difficulties for supporters of the Scheme.  
He refused to be directly quoted in the newspapers but frowned upon his press allies 
dealing with other admirals.  The end result was that journalistic supporters of the 
Scheme such as White and Thursfield, although really quite well informed by Fisher 
behind the scenes, could not reveal that they even had sources; it appeared to the reading 
public as if there was nothing behind their optimistic predictions of the Scheme’s 
success.  And the Scheme’s overturning of traditional cadet training – which also upset 
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traditional unofficial class distinctions between executive and engineering officers48 – 
was beginning to produce enemies within Parliament and the Admiralty. 
 Early opponents of the Scheme were not in a position of strength, as all the Naval 
Lords ostensibly were backing the personnel reforms.  Naval officers could still 
complain; Rear Admiral Hedworth Lambton wrote to Selborne that he was “prepared 
with tongue and pen (and sword) to denounce you […] and I must not forget Thursfield 
[…] or rather the theories which the latter ‘expert’ (God help us) has bullied you all into 
accepting through his remarkably foolish letters in the Times.”49  But politicians and 
concerned (Fisher would say meddlesome) citizens unable to voice their concerns 
directly to the Admiralty took to the press to air their grievances.  George Stewart 
Bowles was a former naval officer, a future Conservative MP, and the son of the founder 
of Vanity Fair – theoretically, a model navalist.  But he found the Scheme “h—l, and 
Fisher is the devil,” and in early 1903 was “gingering up my Father to make a great row” 
against it.50  He also contacted Leslie Cope-Cornford, naval journalist for the Morning 
Post and an active member of the Navy League, for assistance in speaking out against 
the Scheme.  To Stewart Bowles the very existence of the Scheme was a result of “the 
Country’s devastating ignorance of the Navy,” and “it is upon that ignorance, solely, that 
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the Admiralty reposes.”  Journalists like “that prize ass Thursfield” were misleading the 
public by “slobber[ing] with joy in ‘that organ of knaves and oracle of fools’ the Times 
and say[ing] that another great Naval Reform had been carried.”51  “These gentlemen 
who write for the Papers are really too much,” wrote Stewart Bowles.  With Cope-
Cornford’s help he would “have some of them by the nose, & explain to them clearly 
what I think of them.”52 
 Cope-Cornford did his best, penning a series of anti-Scheme articles in the 
Spectator and Morning Post.  They focused on the idea that the Admiralty, through its 
secrecy and official silence, was not allowing the relevant information on personnel 
reform to be placed before the public: “the House of Commons and the country are 
studiously kept in ignorance of the true posture of naval affairs and of the details of 
naval administration ashore and afloat.”53  Instead, as retired Rear Admiral Edward Field 
wrote to The Times, the Admiralty had “gone out of [its] way to introduce a needless and 
uncalled-for change, in deference to an agitation put forward by a small minority in 
Parliament and the Press in recent years.”54 
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 Supporters of the Scheme within the Admiralty did their best to downplay these 
press criticisms.  When Admiral Field sent his disparaging missive to The Times, Fisher 
wrote to his colleague Commander Bryan Godfrey-Faussett: “You see the Mandarins are 
coming out in the open in the ‘Times’ today!  We propose to give that fine old sailor 
Admiral Field the Yellow Jacket and the Peacock’s feather!”55  To do so, Fisher called 
upon Thursfield and “some more of your sledge hammer leading articles to smash up 
these silly asses.”56  “The great harm such writers do,” according to Fisher, “is they 
criticize without knowing the details of the scheme which they perversely will not 
study!”57  Charles Beresford – who had been approached by anti-Scheme officers and 
“told them they ought to be stuffed and put in the British Museum”58 – painted with a 
broad brush when he called the Scheme’s opponents “those who are too old, or whose 
brains are not receptive enough […] I have often observed that the most obstinate, 
violent, and passionate anti-reformers are men who in no case whatever have ever even 
distinguished themselves by adopting the old methods which they wish to leave 
untouched.”  He reassured Fisher that “a reformer’s life is only to be compared to that of 
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an Early Christian, and both, perhaps, receive the honour and respect due to them a trifle 
late.” 59 
 Fisher was confident that his reforms would succeed.  There was, he wrote, 
“universal approval of the new scheme except amongst some of the ‘old ones,’”60 and 
with his tight control over official appointments the number of officers supporting the 
Scheme could only rise; he told Thursfield that the Scheme boasted the support of two 
dozen captains and commanders who would command Britain’s fleets in a future 
conflict, whose backing he preferred over “any 24 Admirals now existing but who are 
passing away.”61  He was carrying his point with some of the ‘old ones’ as well.  Retired 
Admiral Thomas Le Hunte Ward wrote to The Times on the dilemma that “the public at 
large” approved of the Scheme, while its critics were generally “Naval Officers, 
especially the old ones.”  Yet Ward felt that an officer who disapproved of the 
Admiralty’s reorganizations was merely struggling with “strongly ingrained ideas which 
have grown up with him and become part of his nature,” and chose to “side with the 
public against my brother Officers.”62   
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 The challenge to the Scheme posed by what Arnold White called the “Blue Funk 
School”63 proved to be slight.  But it was there, and Fisher was planning on pushing 
forward with a second stage of his personnel reforms.  He wrote to his son in 1903 he 
had “got a new big scheme hatching next year” that was “interesting some very 
influential people,” including the editor of the Monthly Review,64 and to his colleague 
Godfrey-Faussett that he was working on expanding the Scheme to other branches of the 
Royal Navy but “at present only Lord Selborne knows the outlines.”65  He had to answer 
his critics, and officers and MPs were less likely than most to be swayed by an editorial 
in The Times.  Instead, Fisher turned to the well-respected naval historian Sir Julian 
Corbett. 
 Corbett was an intellectual naval historian with a wide audience both popular and 
professional, one of Britain’s answers to Alfred Thayer Mahan.  In 1903 he was known 
in navalist circles as a major figure in the Navy Records Society and a lecturer at the 
Royal Naval College.  Fisher was searching for a learned public figure to push the 
Scheme, and had originally come to Henry Newbolt, navalist poet and editor of the 
Monthly Review; by early 1903 Newbolt had put the admiral in contact with Corbett.  
Fisher supplied him with Admiralty documents supporting the Scheme66 and warned him 
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that C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald, Richard Vesey Hamilton, and “other ‘pre-historic’ 
admirals [were] trying to make mischief.”67  Fisher also sent Corbett his notes from 
lectures on naval policy the admiral had delivered to his subordinates in the 
Mediterranean, but reminded the historian that for the Scheme it was not naval 
technology that should be focused on but “the best men!  Preach that gospel!”68 
 Fisher’s support additionally meant Corbett had access to any officer in Fisher’s 
circle of professional friends who supported the Scheme, many of whom were still on 
active fleet duty and also happily sent Corbett privileged information.  Captain Edmond 
Slade provided notes from his Mediterranean station that Corbett revised into two 
leaders for The Times,69 and W. H. Henderson aided Corbett with another article on 
naval education.70 Herbert Richmond, whom Fisher had already asked to assist 
Thursfield, also worked with Corbett – leading to at least two more articles – but went a 
step further.  He lent a copy of the correspondence between himself, Corbett and 
Henderson on naval strategy to the Liberal MP Charles Trevelyan, who was a supporter 
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of the Scheme; soon afterwards “Jacky sent for me & told me he heard I had been doing 
good ‘missionary work’ & thanked me very cordially.”71 
 Corbett must have thought his articles were having some benefit, for he wrote to 
Henry Newbolt that “it’s good to think we have really helped.”72  While producing his 
articles, Corbett found that his “opinion of the Navy has risen to the highest,” which he 
credited to “the exuberant stirring of the Jack-Fish spirit.”73  Fisher certainly gave 
Corbett credit for his role in publicizing and popularizing the Scheme, writing to the 
historian – and providing a glimpse into his own internal circle of correspondents in the 
process – that “I have my emissaries and missionaries on every station.  I admit they are 
all enthusiasts and fanatics!  Nevertheless, they tell me what makes me certain of a most 
magnificent success, and your terse and delightful articles deserve a lion’s share in what 
by-and-by will be the whole country’s gratitude.”74  Privately, Fisher was bothered by a 
Corbett article in the Monthly Review that mentioned him by name, telling Thursfield 
“Corbett has done me an ill turn in dragging in my name.  It really is very annoying as I 
think his article is good as objecting the […] objectors of the scheme.”75  Still, he wrote 
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to Corbett that the articles must continue, and “we mustn’t stop!  You must please come 
and stay with me when I am Admiral at Portsmouth, and I hope to make your mouth 
water when unfolding further plans….”76 
 The move to Portsmouth was part of the next phase of Fisher’s reforms.  In late 
1903 he stepped down from his post of Second Naval Lord to serve as Commander-in-
Chief Portsmouth, a position that ensured he could directly oversee the rollout of the 
Scheme in September at the RN’s largest dockyard.  The new office also put a safe 
distance between himself and First Naval Lord Walter Kerr, who had required a great 
deal of convincing as to the necessity of the Scheme; Fisher recalled that he “never knew 
that Admirals could be so rude to one another” until a heated meeting with his superior. 
77  But Fisher did not retreat entirely into the day to day business of overseeing the 
personnel reforms.  Naval officer Reginald Bacon recalled Fisher’s short tenure at 
Portsmouth: “Fisher did much towards bringing the modern developments in the Navy to 
the notice of prominent public men.  He frequently invited persons of influence in 
Parliament or the country to stay at Admiralty House […] These statesmen at all events 
left with some knowledge about the Navy and its work in war.”78 
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 Around the same time Fisher was appointed as one of the three members of the 
Esher Committee, formed by the new Conservative Prime Minister Arthur Balfour in 
late 1902 in an attempt to reform the War Office and increase cooperation between the 
Army and Royal Navy after the struggles of the Boer War.  Fisher, chosen as the 
Admiralty representative to the committee, used this new platform to preach his gospel 
of naval reform.  He had a strong ally in his old friend Reginald Brett, who had aided the 
admiral in the 1884 “Truth About the Navy” campaign.  Brett – now Viscount Esher, the 
ranking member of the committee and a close advisor to King Edward VII – eagerly 
supported Fisher’s reforms, and the two rekindled a dormant professional relationship 
that would last for more than a decade.  The two spent most of their time united in 
opposition to Colonel Sir George Clarke, the Army’s representative on the Committee.79 
 Fisher had never been a strong believer in the value of the army, and believed 
that any proposed army budget increases would not convince the “British Public” that 
the Royal Navy was “anything less than “the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, ad infinitum line of 
defence;” he went so far as to write to Esher that any growth in the Army estimates 
would simply lead to the fall of the government.80  If the Army was to make any 
improvements, it must follow the lead of the Navy: “a root & branch reform” and a press 
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campaign.81  Fisher wrote to the prime minister of his disappointment with high Army 
officials’ refusal to consider the importance of public opinion.82  Journalistic agitation 
had helped the Navy, as Fisher told the army reformer and Times correspondent Leopold 
Amery: “It was the Press & the Press alone that has enabled us to carry through a 
revolution in the Navy of which the British Publics have as yet very little conception 
of!”  The admiral believed that any similar reforms undertaken under the broader 
administrative umbrella of the Committee of Imperial Defence “shall require the whole 
influence of the Press very strenuously exerted.”83  Clarke evidently agreed with Fisher’s 
argument, for he met with Julian Corbett, “despairing of getting anything done unless 
people like ourselves [Corbett and Henry Newbolt, to whom the letter was addressed] 
can get up a public opinion,” and left Corbett with enough internal documents to create 
two articles pushing army retrenchment and reform.84 
 Still, the Esher Committee and resultant communications with the CID were not 
major aspects of Fisher’s career at this time – the Committee’s most valuable 
contribution to his own system of press and public alliances was putting him back in 
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touch with both Esher and his first journalistic ally W. T. Stead.85  By the time he was 
appointed to the Committee, there were already rumors circulating that he was destined 
for bigger things.  Fisher’s acceptance of the Portsmouth position was at best a lateral 
move from Second Naval Lord, and he took it on the conditional understanding from 
Balfour that he would become First Naval Lord, the professional head of the Admiralty, 
when Kerr reached retirement age in the fall of 1904; Balfour officially offered the 
promotion to Fisher in May 1904.86   
 Balfour and First Lord of the Admiralty Selborne promoted Fisher for what may 
seem a surprising reason – Fisher had promised to save the Admiralty money.  Naval 
estimates had risen from £27.5 million in 1900 to nearly £37 million in 1904, and even 
Balfour’s Conservative government was beginning to face pressure to reduce the 
numbers.87  Fisher had been writing to both his professional colleagues and journalistic 
allies for nearly a year that he could bring about “a very great reduction”88 in the 
estimates.  During his time at Portsmouth he had also become a frequent correspondent 
of King Edward VII, who wrote to Selborne in support of Fisher’s economizing.  Fisher 
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was less clear on how he would lower the estimates, and Balfour’s private secretary 
warned the prime minister that promoting Fisher could lead to more “revolutionary 
schemes.”89  But Balfour and Selborne were convinced Fisher was the man for the job, 
and the backing of the King removed any doubts.  Fisher received news of his promotion 
and a memorandum from Selborne calling for “a substantial decrease” in the 1905 
estimates in the same envelope.90 
 Of course, Fisher had already worked out a new set of reforms intended to both 
modernize the Royal Navy and save money in the process – he was simply unwilling to 
tell anyone else what those reforms would be.  His colleague Sir Robert Arbuthnot 
recorded a meeting with Fisher when the latter was still C-in-C Portsmouth: Fisher 
claimed he was “not such a born idiot as to tell all those chaps at the Admiralty what I’m 
going to do before I go there. […] Wait till I get up there, then I’ll burst it on the Navy, 
and it shall all be done. […] When I get up there I’ll alter it all, and those who get in my 
way had better look out.  I’ve ruined about 8 men in the last 18 months, and I’ll ruin 
anyone else who tries to stop me.”91  He wrote to Arnold White that “even you will want 
an extra whack of jam to swallow the powder” when he revealed his new plans, but 
asked White nevertheless to support “the new great scheme of reform which will emerge 
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from the Admiralty like Minerva from the brain of Jupiter, full grown and armed against 
all objectors!”92  Only Selborne had any inkling of Fisher’s new proposed policies.  
Fisher met with the First Lord in August, claiming he: “sat him in an arm-chair in my 
office and shook my fist in his face for 2¼ hours without a check!  Then he read 120 
pages of foolscap, and afterwards collapsed!”  Besides acquiescing in Fisher’s new 
program, Selborne also granted the admiral even greater leeway to appoint his own 
subordinates than he had enjoyed as Second Naval Lord and a place on the warship 
design committee.93  Fisher had made great strides towards achieving his second wave of 
reforms before he ever walked through the doors of the Admiralty as First Naval Lord. 
 When the time came for him officially to assume office, Fisher chose an 
auspicious date – he would begin his tenure as First Naval Lord on October 21, 1904, the 
99th anniversary of the Battle of Trafalgar.  Characteristically, he actually began work 
the day before.94  His first act of official business was to change his title, reverting from 
First Naval Lord to the office’s original title of First Sea Lord.95  One of his earliest 
Admiralty memorandums set the tone for the Fisher regime: Fisher “propose[d] a lecture 
to all the C-in-Cs and Admiral Superintendents whom I am going to have at the 
Admiralty for an amiable and conciliatory setting-forth of their damned stupidity, 
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pessimism and effeteness, of which I have full and authenticated particulars, and which I 
shall read out to them and rub their noses in it.”96  Yet Fisher did not implement his next 
set of major reforms immediately.  Only hints were dropped throughout the last months 
of 1904, the equivalent of what might be called a trial balloon.  Fisher had written to his 
compatriots of his plan to ‘Copenhagen’ an enemy fleet in a hypothetical future war by 
destroying it in harbor via a surprise attack.97  In November 1904 the same idea appeared 
in a handful of newspapers and magazines, including the Sun, Vanity Fair, and the Army 
& Navy Gazette.98  But this was too extreme a tactic for most naval officers – that same 
month Charles Beresford had vowed to attack an enemy fleet with only half of his ships 
“on the grounds of chivalry”99 – and such an extreme strategic shift was shelved after 
Balfour said that Arnold White, who had written some of the articles, “ought to be 
hanged.”100 
 Real details of Fisher’s latest plan began to emerge in December and, as was 
usual with Fisher’s reforms, his press allies knew of them before any other group, save 
the board of Admiralty itself.  Fisher informed the Board of Admiralty of the next phase 
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of his reforms on December 6.  The same day he wrote to Leslie Cope-Cornford that he 
had “arranged the memorandum of the new scheme will be sent to the Editor of the 
Morning Post next Saturday afternoon so you will have all Sunday as well to write your 
article.  You must tell no one this not even the Editor.”101  He asked James Louis Garvin, 
a new press ally who at the time was editor of The Outlook, to “come to the Admiralty 
and see ‘the collected works of the First Sea Lord’ and choose out some of them to 
meditate upon!”  He explained to Garvin why he was so willing to part with sensitive 
information: “I am ready to furnish you and all other patriots with the best of my time 
and what I have of brains to maintain that proud and splendid heritage won by our 
forefathers […] To do that we must fight (or be ready to) on the slightest 
provocation.”102 
 The reforms themselves were far-reaching even compared to the Selborne 
Scheme.  Again there were three aspects, each as large in scope as the entirety of the 
previous Scheme: the nucleus crew system, the scrapping of outdated warships, and the 
redistribution of the fleet.  Nucleus crews replaced the current manning system, under 
which a ship was either fully manned or laid up in reserve, with a new procedure where 
any warships not on active duty permanently carried 40 percent of their full crew 
complement.  Fisher’s argument was that this system meant that ships in reserve could 
be ready for war much more quickly, creating a fleet as strong in reality as it was on 
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paper.  But manning all the Navy’s ships required crews, which was the justification for 
the scrapping policy.  The RN was a global force, and Victorian-era gunboats and 
cruisers were spread around Britain’s global possessions in twos and threes.  
Technological advances had made most of these smaller, older ships unnecessary, and 
Fisher planned to scrap them and transfer their crews to the new nucleus system.  As a 
result, by early 1905 over 150 warships had been condemned to the scrapyard. 
 The third phase was the wholesale redistribution of British fleets, as the Royal 
Navy retreated somewhat from its midcentury role as the ‘world’s policeman.’  The 
geopolitical world was changing; by 1904 the alliance with Japan had made the Eastern 
fleets unnecessary, it was becoming obvious that there was no threat of war with the 
United States, and the recent Entente with France had reduced the role of the 
traditionally vital Mediterranean Fleet.  The Victorian-era policing fleets and cruising 
squadrons in the Pacific, West Indies and South Atlantic were done away with (the 
China Squadron would follow the next year), and naval power closer to the United 
Kingdom was reorganized into three major fleets: Channel, Atlantic (based at Gibraltar), 
and Mediterranean, which was reduced in size from its former glory.  Unspoken in these 
fleet reorganizations was the result that the majority of British naval power could now be 
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quickly and easily aimed at Germany.103  The end result was a savings in the 1905 naval 
estimates of £3.5 million.104 
 Such restructuring was contentious, even more so than the Selborne Scheme.  At 
the outset Fisher was not concerned about official opposition; Selborne and Balfour 
approved of the new policies, and no other serving officer outranked Fisher.  It was the 
retired admirals, he believed – those who had criticized the personnel reforms – who 
must be quieted before they could raise an uproar in the press and in Parliament.  Fisher 
again turned to his press allies – and with his power to influence national policy at its 
zenith, more allies made themselves known every day.  The admiral’s contemporaries 
and modern historians alike have commented on the reach of Fisher’s journalistic 
network after 1904.  The ‘Fishpond’ system of official favoritism within the Navy can be 
traced to the introduction of the Selborne Scheme and Fisher’s increased authority in 
controlling appointments,105 and Fisher was concurrently creating a similar system 
among authors and editors.  The roles played by W. T. Stead, Arnold White, James 
Thursfield, and Julian Corbett have already been discussed.  By 1905 Fisher had added J. 
A. Spender, editor of the Westminster Gazette, A. G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News, 
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contemporary and contentious.  For the latest scholarship on the issue see Matthew S. Seligmann, Frank 
Nägler, and Michael Epkenhans, eds.  The Naval Route to the Abyss: The Anglo – German Naval Race 
1895 – 1914 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015), particularly chapter 2.  The 
description of Fisher’s reforms is taken from Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought II, 22-25; any history 
of the period will have the same general account. 
 
104 Conley, Jack Tar to Union Jack, 30. 
 
105 Hough, Admiral of the Fleet, 155; ‘Fishpond’ was a contemporary term, used by Fisher’s opponents by 
1906. 
 
  
156 
 
and J. L. Garvin, editor of the Outlook and after 1908 the Observer, to his list of 
correspondents.  Both Conservative and Liberal papers were thus used to disseminate 
Fisher’s ideas.  He also maintained communications with naval journalists John Leyland 
(The Times), Archibald Hurd (Daily Telegraph), and Gerard Fiennes (Observer), among 
others, and his status as First Sea Lord came with the implicit backing of the service 
periodicals Army and Navy Gazette and Naval and Military Record.106 
 The specific information Fisher sent to journalists and editors was always a well-
kept secret between the two parties (at least until the articles appeared), but his naval 
colleagues were certainly aware that Fisher was in contact with the papers.  Reginald 
Bacon was Fisher’s first biographer but also his subordinate, and wrote that Fisher “was 
the first of our Admirals to make an intelligent use of the Press for the benefit of the 
Navy.  He was convinced that, in order to get his various reforms understood and 
appreciated by the country, it was necessary to have the Press primed with the whole 
truth about them, and not merely with a smattering of half-truths” and educated guesses 
by journalists on a deadline.107  Editor of the Westminster Gazette J. A. Spender 
gratefully recalled Fisher, time at the Admiralty, when the admiral “cultivated the Press 
unblushingly…He gave with both hands to each in turn, and we rewarded him with such 
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an advertisement of himself and his ideas as no seaman ever received from newspapers, 
and probably none ever will again.”108 
 Initially, the orchestrated push for acceptance of the latest policy shifts was 
successful.  Fisher wrote to Arnold White that “all is going splendid!  That general 
outside feeling of perfect confidence in what we are doing is and has been of inestimable 
value.”109  To his recent associate Garvin, the message was “we have done much!  We 
are going to do more! But we must have Public Opinion as an Avalanche to hurl and 
dash the pessimists into the bottomless pit of perdition out of our way of progress!”110  
By May 1905, Arnold White was able to declare in the National Review “the reformed 
Admiralty is now the object of a chorus of praise from an enchanted and adoring 
press,”111 which was to public eyes entirely separate from any official encouragement. 
 As always with Fisher’s reforms, there were criticisms.  Initially many of these 
came from those who could speak out without fear of angering the Fishpond, which 
generally meant disapproving retired naval officers.  The veteran navalist C. C. Penrose 
Fitzgerald, now retired, wrote to the editor of the National Review, Leo Maxse, with a 
plea to print his article criticizing the Selborne Scheme and the scrapping plan.  He 
believed Fisher “is now suffering from a bad attack of what the Yankees call swelled 
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head. The adulation of the Press and the personal patronage of Royalty have quite upset 
his balance.”  Penrose Fitzgerald was concerned that Fisher’s influence was already too 
strong: “Lord Selborne cannot check him, he is completely under his thumb, and the 
other members of the Board are Fisher’s creatures, so it is autocracy, pure and simple, or 
at any rate simple.”  Perhaps his concerns were justified – his article had already been 
rejected both by Blackwood’s Magazine (the editor expressed concern that “it might be 
picked up and used as a political weapon to damage the government”) and by the Royal 
United Service Institution, which Penrose Fitzgerald attributed to “the awe inspired by 
Sir John Fisher!”112   
 Fisher worked swiftly to marginalize his critics.  When Carlyon Bellairs, a retired 
member of the RN turned politician, penned a series of articles critical of Fisher in the 
Daily Express Fisher went immediately to the highest circles, writing the Prince of 
Wales that Bellairs was a mere malcontent who proved “utterly useless as a sailor, so he 
has taken to the pen and politics – the usual refuge of naval duffers! […] I imagine, Sir, 
the feelings of the old women of both sexes on reading this!”  Fisher recommended that 
Bellairs lose his £300 a year naval pension “for fouling his own nest!”113  The First Sea 
Lord was not the only member of the Admiralty upset by burgeoning criticisms in the 
press.  Charles Ottley, the Director of Naval Intelligence, wrote to Sir George Clarke of 
the Committee of Imperial Defence asking him to pressure Valentine Chirol, head of the 
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Foreign Department of The Times, noting that it would be “very desirable, if practicable, 
to put a stopper to the published hysteria with which some of our newspapers at present 
(in a time of peace) regale their readers….Could we tell Chirol, or some other sane 
newspaper authority, our views and beg him to work the oracle in such wise as to 
moderate the rhetoric and the transports of our less responsible journalists?”114  Clarke 
did write to Chirol, but took the opportunity to denigrate “the attitude of the Admiralty 
and War Office to the press” as “most stupid and impolitic […] When hard up they try to 
use it.  Ordinarily they keep you at a distance and wrap themselves in a cloud of silly 
mystery.”115 
 Still, Fisher and his allies could keep criticism from men like Penrose Fitzgerald 
and Bellairs under control.  What Fisher could not tolerate was internal dissent that 
spilled into the halls of Parliament and the offices of Fleet Street – but in 1905 Fisher 
uncovered a powerful new opponent to his reforms and inadvertently created another.  
The foe he created came first, and the antagonism arising from a personnel decision in 
1905 would grow privately and publicly for over a decade.  It was Fisher’s old ally Lord 
Charles Beresford.   
 Beresford had resigned his parliamentary seat at Woolwich in 1903 and returned 
to active duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Squadron after being promoted to 
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the rank of admiral.116  It was in this role that Beresford, as previously discussed, offered 
to fight the Russian fleet with half of his ships as an act of honor in late 1904.  To a 
pragmatic First Lord like Fisher this was an absurdity, and he apparently believed 
Beresford should be taught a lesson.  Beresford’s tenure in command was scheduled to 
end in March of 1905, but Fisher ordered Beresford to haul down his flag a month early.  
Fisher compounded the slight by rather tactlessly not informing Beresford himself – 
instead Beresford’s successor, Sir William May, delivered the news.  Beresford 
informed May that “he would be very glad to give him lunch or fight him, but he would 
not be superseded.”117 
 Beresford then took his case to Selborne, who sent him to Fisher.  When the two 
met the situation rapidly degenerated.  Fisher’s chief of staff, George King-Hall, kept a 
diary, and he recorded the outcome of the meeting.  “Beresford said: ‘You dare to 
threaten me, Jacky Fisher.  Who are you?  I only take my orders from the Board.  If I 
have to haul my flag down on the 7th February, I will resign the Service, go down to 
Birmingham, get into the House and turn out both you and Selborne.”  Beresford won 
the day and was allowed to remain in command the extra month.118  But it was a 
dangerous precedent for fleet commanders to be quarrelling openly with the Admiralty, 
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and for Fisher matters became worse when Beresford was appointed Commander-in-
Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet later that year119 – the position from which Fisher had 
risen to head the Admiralty and the fleet in which Beresford, as second in command, had 
caused so much mischief with Arnold White in 1901. 
 From this point onward relations between the two most influential (and perhaps 
most egotistical) admirals in the Royal Navy were never more than officially cordial.  
Each believed that he could see directly through the other’s schemes.  Henry Oliver, 
serving in Beresford’s Mediterranean Fleet, recalled in his memoirs that “Beresford had 
been a political man for many years and crowds of M.P.s and newspaper men came to 
see him and it was difficult to get access to him about service matters.”120  He used this 
to his advantage early and often.  Beresford claimed that “the Press was used to delude 
the public as to the efficacy of certain reforms which were pressed through without 
debate, thought or consideration by Sir John Fisher, aided by […] espionage, 
intimidation and favouritism in order to silence Naval opinion in the Fleet on these mad 
schemes.”121  The irony that Beresford wrote this to John St Loe Strachey, editor of The 
Spectator, was apparently lost on him.  For his part, Fisher protested directly to the 
                                                 
119 Freeman, Great Edwardian Naval Feud, 99. 
 
120 James, Great Seaman, 100. 
 
121 Beresford to Strachey, quoted in Morris, Scaremongers, 123. 
 
  
162 
 
prime minister that he did not “want to be egotistical, but that blatant, boastful ass 
Beresford has been writing the most utter bosh I ever read in my life.”122 
 Beresford would continue to hound Fisher throughout his tenure at the 
Admiralty, but there was another more pressing threat to Fisher’s system in early 1905.  
An anonymous anti-Selborne Scheme article titled “A Retrograde Admiralty” appeared 
in the May issue of Blackwood’s Magazine.  Fisher, always curious as to who his 
opponents were, made inquiries as to the article’s author and was unpleasantly surprised 
to discover it had been written by Vice Admiral Sir Reginald Custance.  Although he 
was currently not assigned to a command, Custance was a high-ranking member of the 
Admiralty who had been second in command of the Mediterranean Fleet until the 
previous year and heavily involved in gunnery reform – another model navalist whose 
dislike of Fisher’s methods and reforms had turned him away from the Fishpond.  He 
was also still a serving vice admiral, and thus a much more relevant threat to Fisher’s 
reforms than a retired officer like Penrose Fitzgerald.123  There were also disciplinary 
issues inherent in publishing anonymous anti-Admiralty articles, although Fisher held 
back from any official reprimand on this point, perhaps wisely considering his own 
history with the same.  He did, however, initially dismiss Custance as merely another 
disgruntled subordinate who had not lived up to expectations: “Admiral Custance who 
wrote the Blackwood Article hates me like poison because I gave him a bit of my mind 
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when I was Second Sea Lord and capsized his apple cart.  He is not a Sea-officer he is a 
Quill-driver!”124  For his part, Custance had begun to collect allies.  He wrote to Admiral 
Sir Gerard Noel – whose position as Commander-in-Chief of the China Station had lost 
a great deal of influence with Fisher’s fleet reorganization – that “we shall get [Fisher] 
out of Whitehall before his five years expire if we only persist in exposing his methods 
and errors.  Single-handed it is hard work, but I hope that in time others will join in the 
hunt.”125 
 Fisher’s immediate response was to close ranks around his press and professional 
allies, trusting them to deflect any criticisms.  He wrote to Archibald Hurd that “they say 
the First Sea Lord will want all his friends but I have no fear with you and a few others 
‘to stand by the right’ regardless of the ‘Sanhedrin of Admirals’!”126  But his clandestine 
maneuvering could annoy subordinates.  When Captain Doveton Sturdee was sent to the 
Mediterranean Fleet as Beresford’s chief of staff in 1905, Fisher called Sturdee into his 
office with a request.  Sturdee recalled later how Fisher “specially told me to keep 
Charlie [Beresford] in order as he was inclined to be rash and rather wild in service 
matters, he asked me to write him privately about my Chief etc.  This request I never 
complied with, such a disloyal act was so obvious that it did not require any second 
thought….”  Fisher also asked Sturdee to leave a forwarding address in case he needed 
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to contact the captain personally through unofficial channels.  Later during Sturdee’s 
service in the Mediterranean, Reginald Bacon – well-known to be a strong Fisher 
supporter – arrived on station to captain a battleship.  According to Sturdee, it quickly 
became obvious that Bacon often communicated privately with Fisher; at one point 
many of the details Bacon sent back to the Admiralty appeared in the Globe, which “did 
not read well” to those in the Mediterranean Fleet who were not in the Fishpond.127 
 Fisher was also concurrently dealing with upheavals in the political climate.  The 
first was comparatively minor.  In March of 1905, Earl Selborne was replaced as First 
Lord of the Admiralty by Earl Cawdor; he had no prior naval experience, having become 
wealthy as a railroad director, and essentially served as a rubber stamp for Fisher’s 
policies during his short term in office.128  The second was major.  The Conservative 
Party had been in power since 1895, first under Lord Salisbury and since 1902 under his 
nephew Arthur Balfour – and there was no danger of a Conservative prime minister 
resigning in protest over naval estimates, as the Liberal Gladstone had the previous 
decade.  In December of 1905 Balfour resigned, hoping the ensuing election would 
                                                 
127 Doveton Sturdee, typed notes regarding service with Fisher [n.d.], Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill 
College, Cambridge, Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee Papers (hereafter CCA SDEE), 1/17; Sturdee would 
become a strong opponent of Fisher.  In his Great Edwardian Naval Feud Richard Freeman believes that 
Sturdee may have embellished his story but notes that Fisher also asked Bacon and Captain Ernest 
Troubridge to act as informants (106-107). 
 
128 Rhodri Williams, “Campbell, Frederick Archibald Vaughan, third Earl Cawdor (1847–1911),” Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, May 2006 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/view/article/32262, accessed 11 Aug 2015. 
 
  
165 
 
divide the Liberal Party over tariff reform and Ireland.129  Around the same time, 
Fisher’s term as First Sea Lord was set to expire; he would reach the mandatory 
retirement age of 65 in January 1906.  This concerned Cawdor, who wrote to Balfour in 
early December: “(1). What would be the effect just now if he went?  Would it not be 
considered a victory on the part of Charlie B.?  and might not that have a very bad 
effect?  (2). Who would we put in J.F.’s place?”130 
 Balfour and the Admiralty had a solution to the issue of Fisher’s impending 
retirement.  In December 1905 Fisher was promoted to Admiral of the Fleet.  In terms of 
actual influence the promotion meant little, as Fisher was already at the top of his 
profession.  But it carried with it an increased retirement age of 70.  Now Fisher was 
secure in his position as First Sea Lord – as long as he retained the support of the 
Admiralty and the government – until 1911.  It also meant that Beresford, who had long 
had eyes on the position, was effectively barred from the post (he would reach retirement 
age in 1911) unless Fisher could be removed.131  At the same time the Admiralty 
released a “Statement of Admiralty Policy,” known as the Cawdor Memorandum, which 
committed the Admiralty to the continuance of the Fisher reforms.132  Both promotion 
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and policy were announced during the short period of time between the official 
resignation of the Balfour government and the January 1906 election.133  If the 
Conservatives had won the next election, the awkward timing of Fisher’s promotion 
would have been a mere bureaucratic hiccup.  But when the Liberals won in a landslide, 
Fisher found himself caught between a new Liberal government intent on slashing naval 
budgets and a growing minority of Conservatives who were convinced another half-
decade of Fisher’s reforms would lead the Navy to ruin. 
 For those who were opposed to either the Fisher reforms or Fisher himself, to see 
him suddenly granted essentially a second term in office was a major blow.  Thus, 
around this time some of the anti-Fisher elements in both the press and the RN began to 
coalesce around a more defined goal to prevent Fisher from, as they saw it, damaging the 
Royal Navy for either personal or political reasons.  This group has come down to 
history as the ‘Syndicate of Discontent,’ which is rather unfair – it was Fisher’s term for 
anyone who disagreed with him.  Most were committed reformers themselves who 
disagreed with Fisher’s methods and his reliance on the press.  Still, the term Syndicate 
will be used, as it has become the common nomenclature.   
 Professionally, the Syndicate included many of the earliest navalists.  Besides the 
previously-mentioned C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald and Carlyon Bellairs, naval officers 
Cyprian Bridge, Sir Edmund Fremantle, Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton (who had been 
First Naval Lord himself in the late 1880s), Sir Frederick Richards (First Naval Lord in 
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the 1890s), and Sir William Henry White, former Chief Constructor of the Admiralty 
and designer of many British warships, were all retired (Bellairs was a special case, as he 
would be elected to Parliament in 1906).134  This made it relatively simple for Fisher’s 
allies to dismiss their criticisms as those of men who had simply been bypassed by 
progress.   
 More troubling from a professional standpoint were active officers who publicly 
spoke out against Fisher.  Beresford (when out of Parliament and on active service) and 
Custance were the leaders of this cadre, which also included high-ranking officers Sir 
Lewis Beaumont, Sir Arthur Moore, Sir Assheton Curzon-Howe, Sir Hedworth 
Lambton, and Sir Gerard Noel.135   
 There were also the Syndicate’s allies in the press – while not as numerous as 
Fisher’s supporters, they still controlled a respectable (and partisan – unlike Fisher’s 
circle, nearly all journalistic members of the Syndicate were staunch Conservatives) 
number of papers.  This group was comprised of both editors, chiefly John St Loe 
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Strachey136 of The Spectator, H. A. Gwynne of The Standard,137 and Leo Maxse of the 
National Review,138 and leader writers such as H. W. Wilson of the Daily Mail, Spenser 
Wilkinson of the Morning Post, Charles à Court Repington of The Times,139 and Leslie 
Cope-Cornford of The Standard.140 
 The Syndicate came together slowly, but Fisher treated its members as a threat 
from the beginning, as usual falling back upon his journalistic and governmental 
contacts for support.  With some acquaintances he was flippant.  He wrote to Archibald 
Hurd that he was “look[ing] forward to a big fighting year with huge delights and no 
doubt you will lead ahead in tackling the fossils!”141  Fisher contended that even though 
“the whole Press is being organized against me in particular & the Admiralty Policy in 
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general […] I hardly think it will be a success,”142 for “we have the country, Parliament 
& the Cabinet at our back.”143  He wrote to Arnold White that “I have been informed I 
am going to be ruined by the Cabal of Mandarins but I don’t fear. […] I told the King 
yesterday that these reforms in the Navy can no more be stopped than you can stop a 
glacier!”144 
 On other occasions he was more cautious.  Fisher warned Arnold White: 
“Bellairs has written a most insolent private letter” to the First Lord, “and in it he attacks 
you as having confidential documents sent you which you quote […] Please do not 
allude to this in any way, only it’s as well you should know.”145  He recommended that 
White not respond to anti-reform articles recently published in Blackwood’s Magazine, 
but noted “if you do – don’t sign your name as I was told the other day that you would 
sell your immortal soul to serve me so your witness on my behalf tainted [sic.] with the 
devil!”146  Fisher even wrote to the Prince of Wales anticipating an upcoming meeting 
between the two, where he hoped to discuss “the poisonous things being said.  For 
instance, Hedworth Lambton gently writes to me that I am working the Press – about the 
grossest calumny ever propagated. […] The British Public is on the side of the 
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Admiralty, and our triumph is assured, because the whole business, Sir, is common 
sense!”147  Besides, Fisher told the Prince, if he had been sending journalists information 
their articles would not have had so many errors in them.148  Essentially Fisher believed, 
as he wrote to Hurd, that “the enemies may be few but they are d—d noisy!”149 
 Still, the critics could be effectively silenced for the moment.  Fisher was in the 
midst of his last great reform – a new type of warship that would render every major 
fighting unit in the world’s navies unfit for front-line service in a naval engagement.  
Fisher had been appointed to the warship design committee in 1902, and his ideas were 
bearing fruit.  The first to appear in the builder’s yard was HMS Dreadnought, with an 
array of revolutionary design features.  The Dreadnought was the first all-big-gun 
battleship, mounting only a uniform armament of ten 12-inch guns as opposed to the 
mixed large- and medium-caliber armament of previous warships.  It also was the first 
large fleet unit to be powered by turbine engines, allowing the ship to steam at 21 knots 
(previous British battleships had not exceeded 18 knots).  Essentially, Dreadnought was 
faster and more powerful than any ship that had come before, and every similar 
battleship launched afterward would be known as a dreadnought.  Although Fisher did 
not create the all-big-gun battleship – the original concept was Italian and the U. S. Navy 
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was also known to be working on similar ships150 – his unique position as essentially a 
one-man approval board meant the Royal Navy was the first naval force with both the 
resources and the administrative will to see the project to fruition.151 
 Fisher took great pains to ensure the Dreadnought was constructed as quickly as 
possible.  It was laid down in October 1905, launched the following February, and 
commissioned in December 1906.152  The great ship’s launch, in February 1906, was 
accompanied by a calculated Admiralty press offensive.  Journalists of note were sent a 
pamphlet with details about the ship’s construction and an accompanying letter that read 
in part: “As the First Lord is anxious that the Press should be able to know something of 
the main features of this new development in warship building, he is glad to put this 
statement in your hands, but he particularly wishes that in commenting on it, you should 
not quote it or any part of it verbatim.”  It also specified the Admiralty’s desire to 
“prevent anything being published which has an official character;” to this effect, the 
warning “this statement is not for official publication, but to serve as a guide to the 
press, and is not to be quoted verbatim” was printed in bold on the pamphlet’s front 
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cover.153  Fisher seems to have given favored journalists even more details on the 
construction; he wrote to Archibald Hurd advising him not to mention any specific 
dimensions nor to “quote revelations” from any official reports.  However, Fisher was 
anxious that Hurd “rub it in against [William] White as slyly as you can as he deserves 
it” – the former naval constructor had already spoken out strongly against the 
Dreadnought – but he reminded Hurd “to let me see your article before being put in 
type.”154 
 To those who had already decided Fisher was recklessly damaging traditional 
British naval power with his reforms, the Dreadnought simply added fuel to the fire.  
Fisher was now coming under attack from various strategic and technical directions.  
But, due to the danger to one’s career that could result raising concerns through official 
Admiralty channels, most of these criticisms were disseminated through the press.155  
Cyprian Bridge wrote to The Times that he had “never known such elaborate attempts to 
influence the newspapers” as those being undertaken by pro-Fisher journalists,156 while 
                                                 
153 The pamphlet is dated 7 Feb 1906 and is quoted in Jan Rüger, “The Symbolic Value of the 
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Edmund Fremantle stated to the Daily Express that he was merely speaking out against 
the “chorus of Admiralty apologists” who had turned “those who are sounding a warning 
note” about reforming too quickly into “Cassandras, or political opponents of the present 
Government.”157  Officers on active duty had their own ways of avoiding what they saw 
as Fisher’s meddling.  Sir Arthur Wilson, C-in-C of the Channel Fleet, was a supporter 
of Fisher’s reforms but not of his journalistic allies.  He refused to allow newspaper 
correspondents on board his ships during the annual maneuvers, prompting an angry 
letter from Thursfield to Fisher: “I wonder where the Navy & the Admiralty would have 
been now if [Wilson’s] views had prevailed even since correspondents were first 
admitted to the manoeuvres in 1888.”  Thursfield believed that such a “large question of 
policy ought to be decided, not by this or that C in C, but by the Board of Admiralty 
itself [essentially, Fisher].  It was so decided in 1888 & decided in favour of the Press.  If 
that decision is now to be reversed I think Parliament & the country, to say nothing of 
the Press,” would need to have their own input on “a change of policy so unexpected & 
so questionable.”158 
 Members of the press also tried to pull others into pro- or anti-Admiralty camps.  
Syndicate supporter H. W. Wilson made various overtures to J. L. Garvin, editor of The 
Outlook, in late 1906.  “I began with faith in Fisher, but alas, have lost it long since,” he 
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began; “it is facts which have disillusioned me […] Fisher’s defenders as you say are 
passionate and honestly believe in him.  But their belief is idolatry, and many of their 
contentions are ridiculous.”  Wilson had spoken with the British naval attaché at Berlin, 
who “tells me this country is marching straight to defeat, and that there is great 
depression and uneasiness in the Navy outside the Fisher clique.”  But without the help 
of editors like Garvin “I am powerless to do anything, and Bellairs is probably in the 
same condition.  Our hand is weakened by those who agree with the new Admiralty 
policy, and we see with alarm the reduction of the fleet […] Fisher is doing what Peel 
and Balfour did, betraying his friends and supporters in the supposed interests of 
policy.”159 
 Wilson also contacted Arnold White, with whom he took a more conciliatory 
tone.  “It must be perfectly well known at the Admiralty that we who criticise have no 
axes to grind, and are not seeking to make political capital.”  He noted that if “men so 
dissimilar in their views” as himself, Strachey, Bellairs, Cope-Cornford, and Wilkinson 
all disagreed with the new Admiralty policies, there must be something amiss with the 
policies themselves.  White offered to arrange a meeting between Wilson and Fisher, but 
Wilson declined, for “I feel as I may have to continue criticising his policy it is better 
that we should not meet […] such a situation might be awkward on both sides.”160  
                                                 
159 Wilson to Garvin, 25 Oct 1906; 1 Nov 1906; 8 Nov 1906, HRC JLG R, Wilson.  Wilson also believed 
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Neither Garvin nor White proved a willing ear, and Wilson instead turned to Beresford, 
preparing a memorandum on naval weaknesses which he sent to the admiral.161 
 Beresford was so opposed to many of the ongoing reforms that he was again 
considering returning to Parliament.  After consulting with Sir Thomas Brassey, who 
had been parliamentary secretary to the Admiralty in the 1880s and had assured him that 
“J.F. would not remain in Office 48 hours if it was not for the King,” Beresford had been 
mulling another run.  “I am not at all sure that the present moment or next month would 
not be a very good time for me to go with a manifesto to the Country.  I do not want 
money so much as I want organisation, and to expose the wicked frauds that have been 
perpetrated on the Country by false statements and wrong deductions.”162  A promotion 
in late 1906 to Commander-in-Chief of the Channel Fleet mollified Beresford, who 
afterwards confined his agitation to writing angry letters to the First Lord.163  Still, as the 
anti-Fisher paper the Daily Express reported of Beresford, “rumour freely credits him 
with following Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord, and assuredly no selection would be 
more popular in the eyes of the nation.”164 
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 Fisher, meanwhile, was dealing with political as well as professional pressure.  
The Liberal victory in 1906 meant a new Prime Minister, Henry Campbell-Bannerman, 
and a new First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Tweedmouth.  Tweedmouth, like Cawdor, 
had no prior naval experience,165 and Fisher quickly won his support for the ongoing 
naval reforms.  Together the two defended the RN from large budget cuts in the face of 
Liberal retrenchment.  Fisher’s general argument was that his reforms were saving the 
country a great deal of money.  For all its revolutionary developments, the Dreadnought 
cost only £181,000 more than the previous generation of battleships.166  The estimates 
had gone down by £3.5 million in 1905, the last year of Conservative government, and 
the savings continued – a further £1.5 million in 1906 and £450,000 in 1907.167  These 
savings, attributable mainly to the scrapping policy and the nucleus crew system, 
prevented more onerous cuts, although one proposed battleship was dropped from the 
1906 estimates to the great dismay of the Conservatives.168 
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 Of course, Fisher always had backup plans for keeping the Navy solvent.  He 
supported Secretary of State for War R. B. Haldane’s reforms of the army, hoping to 
save money for the navy by keeping the army’s budget down.  He wrote to Arnold White 
his opinion of Haldane: “He is my friend and I want him supported by public pressure. 
[…] Don’t unwittingly betray me, but we want to get the Army Estimates down to 20 
millions […] and Arnold White & Co., if they will savagely go to work and rise, the 
Country will do it and the First Sea Lord can be a potent power, but he must be 
supported against the blatant asses that bray so loud….”169 
 Fisher also defended his latest reforms by accusing his opponents of 
partisanship.170  As he told the Prince of Wales: “Pure party feeling solely dictates the 
present press agitation, and the angel Gabriel would not be believed if he tried to 
convince the Tory press that the sole object of the Board of Admiralty was to increase 
the fighting efficiency of the Fleet and its instant readiness for war!”171  He also 
compiled an Admiralty memorandum entitled “Admiralty Policy -   Replies to 
Criticisms,” for internal use.  Besides collating a variety of pro-Admiralty newspaper 
articles, the memorandum pointed out that, first, the entire process of creating and then 
modifying the 1905 estimates had been carried out under both a Conservative and a 
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Liberal government, and, second, large ships had been removed from the estimates 
recently without a corresponding outcry: “but it seems that party spirit is too deeply 
engrained in some minds for them to see in these events, what they obviously point to, a 
continuous process of modification, due to strictly naval considerations, and quite 
unconnected with party politics.”172  It also contained a characteristically Fisher-esque 
defense of the Admiralty’s position worth quoting at length: 
The most brilliant preacher of our generations has said what a stimulus it is to have 
always some friends to save us from that ‘Woe unto you when all men shall speak 
well of you’!  When criticism goes, life is done!  You must squeeze the fragrant leaf 
to get the delicious scent!  Hence, it may be truly said that the Board of Admiralty 
should just now heartily shake hands with themselves, because Korah, Dathan, and 
Abiram173 (in the shape of the ‘National Review,’ ‘Blackwood’ and the ‘Daily Mail’) 
are trying to raise a rebellion, but the earth will now open and swallow them all up 
quick as in the days of Moses!  they and all their company, with their small 
battleships and their slow speeds, and their invasion fright and foreign shipbuilding 
houses of cards are each and all capable of absolute pulverization!  Why people don’t 
laugh at it all is the wonder! […] There is undoubted authority for stating that a 
skillfully organised ‘Fleet Street’ conspiracy aided by Naval Malcontents is 
endeavouring to excite the British public against the Board of Admiralty, but it has 
fallen flat.174 
 
 Accusations of partisanship did cause some of Fisher’s opponents to back down, 
for it was a gentler age of politics.  Fisher was also able to call on some of his 
Conservative allies for aid.  When Conservative politician George Wyndham spoke out 
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against the Admiralty in 1906, Fisher wrote to his old friend Balfour that Wyndham had 
done the Navy “a bad turn;” Wyndham subsequently retracted his statements.175  But 
admonishing one’s personal enemies for their supposed partisanship in a professional 
setting was not the way for Fisher to disarm any of his critics, and he was told so by one 
of the few friends to whom he would unfailingly listen.  Viscount Esher gave the 
embattled admiral some advice: “I deprecate, if you will allow me to say so, your 
method, in dealing with these opponents.”  They “should be answered – and argued with.  
Not by you personally, but by people properly coached to do it.  You need not fear ‘Fleet 
Street cabals,’ you will never go a la lanterne176 that way.  In a country like ours, 
governed by discussion, a great is never hanged.  He hangs himself.”  Fisher’s role, 
according to Esher, was to “be Machiavellian and play upon your delicate instrument 
with your fingers and not with your feet – however tempting the latter may be.”177 
 Fisher took this advice to heart, and backed away from direct denunciations of 
Syndicate members.  Instead, he returned to his traditional method of operating through 
journalistic allies.  Some he encouraged; Arnold White was told to “carry the ‘Fiery 
Cross’ through the British Empire!”178  Julian Corbett was again enlisted to pen a more 
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technical explanation of the new Admiralty shipbuilding policies,179 with Fisher’s 
assistance: “a mouse once helped a lion (vide Aesop’s Fables) so if I can be of any help I 
hope you will command me.”180  When Corbett’s article “Recent Attacks on the 
Admiralty” appeared in the February 1907 Nineteenth Century, Fisher called it “just the 
thing ‘to meet the present distress’, as St. Paul would say!”181  He asked Thursfield for a 
“Justification Paper” defending the Admiralty, and allowed Thursfield to show the 
official documents Fisher had lent him to George Buckle, editor of The Times: “trust him 
implicitly, show him everything, and let The Times prepare its own series of articles […] 
This infinitely better than any Admiralty minute or official exposé des motifs, and The 
Times is the only vehicle and the only authority that will be accepted….”182 
 Other Fisher allies were warned away from continued attacks.  The admiral 
complained that J. L. Garvin in particular “wouldn’t […] write conscientiously.”183  In a 
letter to Archibald Hurd, Fisher included a note of caution for a colleague: “If you see 
Arnold White you might warn him about Beresford who I think must be fought.”184  
Fisher even officially wrote to Beresford, in a conciliatory gesture, that “we must stamp 
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182 Fisher to Thursfield, 25 Dec 1906, in Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought II, 108; emphasis in 
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out any signs of antagonism or partizanship which I have regrettably noticed but have so 
far let pass.  We can’t have amateur Admiralties outside – nor the tail wagging the head 
– and in all these sentiments I know I have your cordial assent.”185 
 Essentially, Fisher was frustrated.  His reform program had been approved by the 
Admiralty and by successive governments of both parties, so why was it not meeting 
with universal acceptance? And he felt handicapped by having to operate under 
Admiralty regulations on dealing with the press.  A long selection from the “Admiralty 
Policies – Reply to Criticisms” memorandum perhaps best encapsulates Fisher’s feelings 
at this time: 
Bridge in the Glasgow Herald, Fremantle in the Express, FitzGerald in The Times, 
and Custance, in the most malignant and erroneous of all his articles in the January 
Blackwood’s (he was going to be such a good boy if he got an appointment!!!); one 
and all of these are rabid in their attacks. […] We don’t hit back, or if we do we 
apologise! (A negative attitude is never successful!  An attacks should always be met 
by a counter attack!)  We pander to traitors in our own camp; we subsidise our critics 
at the Royal United Service Institution, and we fawn on our foes and give them barley 
sugar instead of a black eye!  I am getting very sick of this ‘taking it lying down’ 
apologetic line of policy!  The Admiralty policy has not failed in any one single point 
and will not fail!  Success is absolutely assured!  But this timorous line of conduct is 
very disheartening!  There should be no doubt allowed to exist anywhere of our 
unflinching determination to have Admiralty orders obeyed and Admiralty policy 
cordially and even enthusiastically supported!186 
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 By 1907 Jacky Fisher had presided over a series of naval reforms that had, quite 
literally, revolutionized the Royal Navy.  In a five-year period he had instituted five 
major reforms – the Selborne Scheme of training, the nucleus crew system, the scrapping 
policy, fleet redistribution, and the launch of the Dreadnought.  All five had major 
impacts on British naval strategy, and it is no exaggeration to say the Dreadnought 
changed how the entire naval world approached warship design.  And while there is 
well-justified reluctance to engage in ‘great man’ history, these were Fisher’s reforms – 
he had himself appointed to the warship design committee, he increased the control over 
personnel decisions his rank as Second Naval Lord merited before the Selborne Scheme, 
and so on.  They were Fisher’s reforms because he purposely consolidated power in a 
manner not seen by any First Sea Lord before or since.187 
 Fisher was able to sway successive governments and First Lords to support his 
reforms; he was always a friend to Balfour, and essentially ran roughshod over Cawdor 
and Tweedmouth, neither of whom were naval experts.  He also owed a great deal to the 
support of King Edward VII and the Prince of Wales.188  To influence public and 
parliamentary opinion, he turned to his network of journalistic contacts.  The ‘Fisher 
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system’ was at its most extensive and most effective during this period.  Correspondents 
and editors whom Fisher considered trustworthy received information on upcoming or 
ongoing naval developments from the admiral; they in turn reworked official documents 
(often with Fisher’s notes to guide them) into broad policy overviews, while removing 
anything that would lead directly back to the Admiralty. 
 However, cracks were beginning to appear in Fisher’s system by 1907.  One 
issue was that journalists and editors were not duty-bound to obey Fisher as his 
subordinates were.  Sometimes they simply ignored him.  After Fisher asked Thursfield 
to compile a ‘Justification Paper’ on the Admiralty’s reforms, he wrote again to call the 
project off.  But Thursfield was hesitant, writing to his superior at The Times that he 
could not tell “whether [Fisher’s] reluctance is genuine or whether he thinks its 
assumption is likely to urge you on.”  Eventually Thursfield decided to continue the 
project without Fisher’s assent: “I think we should be doing a public service by going 
on. […] I don’t want to follow [Fisher’s] lead or to work upon his plan but his notes at 
any rate indicate the several directions in which to look for authentic information & his 
syllabus of topics to be discussed is both suggestive & instructive.”189  And journalists 
could abandon the Fishpond at any time.  H. W. Wilson wrote apologetically to Arnold 
White: “If Fisher is angry with us, I am sorry.  He is angry with those who might have 
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been, and were prepared to be, his best friends; who would have fought for him through 
thick and thin; and who believed in him two years ago as you do now.”190 
 The second major issue that had arisen by 1907 was the so-called Syndicate of 
Discontent.  Fisher characterized its members as malingerers, but that was an unfair and 
inaccurate exaggeration.  What they were was more dangerous to Fisher’s future plans: 
they were his colleagues.  Fisher had the government and an enviable percentage of the 
press on his side, but he had alienated the professional men – many of them committed 
reformers themselves – he should have numbered among his closest allies.  He had the 
Fishpond, but the majority of its professional members were junior officers he had 
appointed himself.  Serving officers in the Syndicate such as Beresford, Lewis 
Beaumont, Arthur Moore, Assheton Curzon-Howe, Hedworth Meux, and Gerard Noel 
had all achieved at least the rank of least rear admiral by 1905, and journalists eager for 
details of the RN’s inner workings were equally as happy to receive guidance from them 
as from Fisher.  Fisher’s ruthless reforming policy, undertaken in nearly every instance 
without the advice of his fellow admirals, had left him in the worst sense of the term a 
man without peer. 
 That was where the naval situation stood in early 1907.  Fisher was at the height 
of his official power; his reforms were creating a Royal Navy that was faster, more 
heavily gunned, more specialized, and still somehow cheaper than the RN of a mere five 
years earlier.  His network of sympathetic journalists and editors was being put to use 
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furthering a wide variety of navalist causes, but they were Fisher’s causes.  He had taken 
the system favored by the earliest navalists in the 1880s, personal covert communication 
between journalists and serving officers, to its logical extreme, but in the process he had 
created the Fishpond and inadvertently created the antagonistic Syndicate.  Navalism 
and the entire process of naval reform were becoming more personal and more political.  
Fisher confidently wrote to Esher before a meeting between the two that even though the 
“Admiralty is at a great disadvantage in dealing with its critics because limited to the 
truth & they are not […] we are not going to fail on a single point!”191  After the 
meeting, Esher revealed the reality of the situation to his son: “Jackie feels that he is 
standing on the edge of a precipice to which all great reformers are led, and over which 
they ultimately fall.  But, in spite of the numerous enemies whose darling wish is to hurl 
him down, it is essential that for a while he be kept up.  If he survives another year, the 
Navy will be safe.”192 
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CHAPTER V 
PARTISANS AND PRESSURE GROUPS, 1907-1908 
 In 1907 the Royal Navy appeared stronger than it had ever been during the 
navalist era, a condition attributed by most of its supporters to First Sea Lord Sir John 
Fisher.  Yet dissension within the Navy and its journalistic supporters was at an all-time 
high, as personal and professional feuds broke out on quarterdecks throughout the fleet 
and across offices on Fleet Street.  This chapter explores how such a conflict arose 
throughout 1907 and 1908.  Essentially, the three-tiered system of navalist agitation that 
had proven successful to this point – with two of the three groups of professional 
officers, politicians, and the press working together against the third for a specific naval 
cause – was fragmenting.   
 The Liberal government and its increasing focus on social reform led to a 
Cabinet torn between a pro-naval Admiralty and pro-retrenchment officials, notably 
David Lloyd George and H. H. Asquith; at the same time the Admiralty faced ever-
louder cries from opposition Conservatives that it was derelict in its duty to defend the 
nation.  Members of the press had their own difficult choices to make, especially the 
subset of Conservative papers that supported Fisher’s reforms.  Popular pressure groups 
also played a more significant role in the public discourse during this period, re-entering 
the political arena – and there were more of them, including the self-avowedly partisan 
and anti-Fisher Imperial Maritime League. 
 The most significant point of fracture was in the professional sphere.  During this 
period the Syndicate of Discontent launched an all-out assault on Fisher’s naval reforms 
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and on Fisher himself.  What had begun as a legitimate professional dispute over the 
efficacy of Fisher’s naval reorganizations soon degenerated into a personal contest 
between Fisher and Lord Charles Beresford, with various lesser luminaries as supporters 
of both men in the press, the Admiralty and the Cabinet.  By the last days of 1908 the 
system of directed navalist agitation so carefully assembled by Fisher throughout his 
career was nearing collapse. 
 The personal animosity between Fisher and Beresford dated to at least 1905 
when, as discussed above, Fisher had attempted to hasten Beresford’s removal from 
command of the Channel Fleet.1  In late 1906 Beresford raised such a fuss over the 
issuing of a pamphlet on the recent naval reforms to ships’ libraries that Fisher had to 
explain himself to the Board of Admiralty, which he did by downplaying the pamphlet 
and proceeding to denigrate Beresford severely: “The fact is that Lord Charles Beresford 
has consistently and persistently thwarted Admiralty Policy at every opportunity and 
hardly ever does he receive an order without some private or public representation on his 
part of an improper character.”  Fisher believed that the only reason Beresford had 
retained any level of high command was “for the simple reason that it has been rightly 
decided in the past that to take the proper steps would have been to make him a martyr,” 
and ended his letter to the Board with a summation of the view he would continue to 
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hold in regards to his troublesome subordinate: “It’s a sheer impossibility to administer 
the Navy efficiently or to control effectively the war organization of the Fleet if every 
single order emanating from the Admiralty is to be continuously criticized by an officer 
in the high position of Lord Charles Beresford with the inevitable effect already apparent 
of those below him evincing an equally insubordinate spirit.”2 
 Fisher’s frustration stemmed from a concurrent point of contention between 
himself and Beresford.  In late 1906 the latter had been appointed to the prestigious post 
of C-in-C of the Channel Fleet.  But between his initial acceptance of the command and 
his arrival on station, another of Fisher’s fleet reforms had greatly diminished the 
number of ships in the Channel Fleet from 66 to 21, infuriating Beresford.3  Beresford 
initially refused to take up his command, but a meeting with Fisher defused the situation.  
As Fisher wrote to the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, Sir George Lambert: “I had three 
hours with Beresford yesterday, and all is settled, and the Admiralty don’t give in one 
inch to his demands; but I had as a preliminary to agree to three things: I. Lord Charles 
Beresford is a greater man than Nelson.  II. No one knows anything about naval war 
except Lord Charles Beresford.  III. The Admiralty haven’t done a single d—d thing 
right!”4   
                                                 
2 Sir John Fisher, “Statement Explanation of Lord Charles Beresford’s telegram of Dec. 8. 1906,” National 
Archives, Kew, Admiralty Record Office Cases (hereafter KEW ADM), 116/3108. 
 
3 Richard Freeman, The Great Edwardian Naval Feud: Beresford’s Vendetta against Fisher (Barnsley, 
UK: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2009), 113. 
 
4 Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 
Doran & Company, Inc., 1929), II 33. 
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 Fisher had won the battle but lost this particular war, as Beresford took command 
of the Channel Fleet in April 1907 with his feelings towards the First Lord in no way 
mollified.  He had made public statements through Bellairs claiming that Fisher’s fleet 
reorganizations had left the Navy dangerously weak, and that Fisher’s Admiralty was 
purposely misleading the British public.5  Behavior this insubordinate could not be 
tolerated, and Beresford was summoned to a meeting with Fisher and Tweedmouth in 
July 1907.  Fisher minced no words and directly challenged Beresford’s recent behavior: 
“You talk in a very open fashion.  Do you mean to say you have not said to anybody that 
the Home Fleet is a fraud and a danger to the Empire?”  Beresford denied the 
allegations, claiming that “not privately or publicly have I ever said anything against the 
Admiralty, no, not even in my old days, when I had a much stronger fight on than now.”  
He characterized reports that he had been critical of Fisher as mere rumors, and 
pointedly remarked that Fisher had his own trouble with press speculation: “I am told an 
enormous lot of things that you say about me, but I never believe them – I have been 
much too long a public man to believe what people say.”6  This meeting, like the 
previous, did little to settle the issue. 
 The failure of the July gathering was due at least partly to the fact that Beresford 
had been less than forthcoming.  He had been in contact with the press.  Only a week 
before the meeting H. A. Gwynne, editor of the Standard, wrote to Beresford that in 
                                                 
5 Freeman, Great Edwardian Naval Feud, 115. 
 
6 Minutes of Admiralty Meeting between Tweedmouth, Fisher, and Beresford, 5 Jul 1907, KEW ADM, 
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Fisher “we are confronted with the most astute cunning devil who ever sat at the 
Admiralty,” and as a result “the campaign has now to be organised.  We must no longer 
beat the air with unnecessary questions but concentrate the whole of our efforts towards 
definite objects”7 – namely, Fisher’s removal.  Fisher eventually obtained evidence of 
the Gwynne-Beresford connection and wrote to King Edward VII that he now had “a 
nice exposé of our chief Admiral afloat in collusion with an organized journalistic attack 
on the Board of Admiralty,” and planned to use the information “to bring the matter to a 
direct issue at a meeting of the Board and flatten out Beresford once and for all.  [Sir 
Hedworth] Lambton said to me the other day, ‘Seize Beresford by the scruff of the neck 
and he will collapse like every Irishman who ever breathed – he is a blusterer.’”8  Yet 
this meeting never took place, as by late 1907 Beresford’s command of the Channel 
Fleet was embroiled in a new controversy involving a subordinate – one that also, as was 
becoming common with naval affairs, involved the press. 
 In October 1907 Beresford welcomed a new officer to the Channel Fleet, as Rear 
Admiral Sir Percy Scott arrived to take command of the first cruiser squadron.  Scott 
was already known as a gunnery reformer, a strong supporter of technological 
                                                 
7 Gwynne to Beresford, 28 May 1907, quoted in A.J.A. Morris, The Scaremongers: The Advocacy of War 
and Rearmament, 1896-1914 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), 132. 
 
8 Fisher to King Edward VII, 4 Oct 1907, in Arthur J. Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought: The 
Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape, 
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conjectural, as Lambton was a member of the Syndicate himself.  Fisher told the King he had received the 
information from an anonymous correspondent, which is likely not true – but whatever Fisher’s evidence 
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191 
 
innovation within the service, and a prickly personality who had no time for those who 
did not agree with his methods.9  None of these aspects agreed with Beresford, of whom 
a subordinate recorded that “by the year 1907 […] the peak of his curve of service had 
then passed.  He was sixty-two, and little but his famous personality remained to recall 
the ‘Charlie B’ of past days.”  Moreover, “the Channel Fleet High Command had not 
moved forward with the instruments it wielded, and its attitude was rather reactionary, 
and inclined to dwell upon past days.”10  Beresford and his second in command Admiral 
Reginald Custance were more concerned with their burgeoning feud with Fisher.  As 
Scott recalled, “it soon became apparent to me that the two senior Admirals were 
animated by a very hostile spirit towards the present Board of Admiralty.  The 
Commander-in-Chief thought fit at this time to convey to me his contempt for the First 
Sea Lord, and the necessity for his speedy removal.”  Scott turned down “certain 
overtures from Lord Charles Beresford to join in the campaign against the authorities at 
Whitehall,” and as a result soon realized “that an early attempt would be made to 
weaken my position and, if possible, replace me by an Admiral more in sympathy with 
the views held by my two Seniors.”11 
                                                 
9 Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B: A Biography of Admiral Lord Beresford of Metemmeh and Curraghmore, 
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 The first weakening of Scott’s position occurred in November 1907 when 
Beresford ordered all ships under his command to be freshly repainted before a state 
visit from the Kaiser.  Scott, whose cruiser squadron was undergoing gunnery trials, 
begrudgingly complied by signaling to his command that “paintwork appears to be more 
in demand than gunnery so you had better come in to make yourself look pretty.”  This 
was an insubordinate signal, and Scott must have expected a reprimand from Beresford.  
What he could not have expected was for Beresford to dress him down in front of the 
Channel Fleet’s flag officers and then send an open message to the entire fleet negating 
Scott’s “contemptuous” message.  This incident reflected poorly on both Scott and 
Beresford, but it was purely an internal Navy matter.  However, when the Channel Fleet 
returned to Portsmouth, a fleet’s worth of sailors – since Beresford’s condemnation had 
been transmitted openly to all ships under his command – now had scandalous evidence 
of internal division within Beresford’s command, and local naval correspondents 
provided a willing ear.12 
 Many newspapers published details of the Scott-Beresford feud, but one went 
further than a simple half-column notice.  John Bull, a jingoistic popular magazine run 
by the muck-raking Horatio Bottomley, published a full report on the incident titled 
“Grave Indictment of Lord Charles Beresford.”  Posters advertising the article appeared 
throughout Portsmouth, and copies were sent in sealed envelopes to every officer in the 
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Channel Fleet.13  There is no evidence that John Bull’s editor or reporters had any 
connection with Fisher or any ranking officers; the incident itself was common 
knowledge throughout the fleet, and Bottomley was a known eccentric with whom 
Fisher had no common reforming ground to justify any correspondence.  But Beresford 
was certain Fisher was behind the John Bull article.  He wrote to his lawyer, Sir Edward 
Carson, that there could be “no doubt it is one of the most determined, audacious, 
treacherous and cowardly attacks on me, inspired by the gentleman from Ceylon.”14  
Beresford considered suing John Bull for libel,15 and when he was advised against such a 
course of action by both the Admiralty16 and his political supporters17 he took sick (some 
of his critics, Lord Esher in particular, doubted the veracity of his illness)18 and retired to 
London. 
 This was not the last time Scott and Beresford would find themselves at odds.  In 
July 1908, while on a routine training cruise, Scott countermanded an order from 
Beresford on the grounds that he believed it would have led to a collision between two 
                                                 
13 Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914 (New York: David 
McKay Company, Inc., 1974), 76-177; Richard Hough, Admiral of the Fleet: The Life of John Fisher 
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ships.  This was certainly less dramatic than the previous impasse between the two.  But 
soon after the fleet’s return to port, an anonymous article appeared in The Times 
concerning the “Strange Occurrence in the Channel Fleet.”  It praised Scott for saving 
two ships from Beresford’s dangerous order, and was followed the next day by a second 
article that claimed Beresford had “set a deplorable example of indiscipline and 
insubordination to the Fleet” and “must be confronted with the historic alternative se 
soumettre ou se démettre.”19  This French phrase, calling for Beresford to ‘submit or 
resign,’ was a favorite of Fisher’s.20  Beresford, who had blamed Fisher’s influence in 
his previous feud with Scott when there was no evidence, reacted angrily.  He wrote to 
Ralph Blumenfeld, editor of the Daily Express, that it was known in London that Fisher 
had met with “Thursfield of the TIMES” the day before the article appeared; it had 
obviously been planted in a manner “worthy of the time of the assassins of the Doges of 
Venice.”21 
 This second Scott-Beresford incident had a much longer life in the press than the 
first.  Any issue originating in a paper as influential as The Times was fair game for 
public debate, and soon pro- and anti-Beresford letters and editorials appeared in various 
periodicals.  Each side accused the other of manipulating the press.  John Bull, again of 
its own accord, pilloried Beresford for “the multiplication of cliques, naval camarillas, 
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cabals, disputes, insults, fights, and every variety of bad blood” in a Navy “hopelessly 
divided against itself,” which the periodical blamed on Beresford’s “press bureau.”  The 
author ended by claiming that in a previous era Beresford might have been shot.22  More 
reputable papers also came out against Beresford, including the Observer, for which 
Fisher halfheartedly rebuked its editor J. L. Garvin: “You’ve ‘struck oil’ for the 
‘Observer’ but you’ve brought a hornet’s nest [i.e. accusations of influencing Garvin] to 
my door!  Never mind.  I Forgive you!”23 
 Beresford’s supporters were also taking to the newspapers.  The Globe called The 
Times “guilty of a wretched piece of sensation-mongering.”24  Harold Fraser Wyatt, a 
navalist whose involvement in the Imperial Maritime League will be discussed later, 
wrote to the Morning Post demanding an immediate investigation into the Admiralty for 
allowing such “Asiatic” attacks, another pointed reference to Fisher.25  He blamed Fisher 
directly for the leak of Scott’s signal, calling the First Sea Lord “the autocrat of the 
Admiralty, and of the Admiralty press bureau;” Fisher and Scott were both accused of 
being “mortal foes of Lord Charles Beresford.”26 
                                                 
22 “Prisoners at the Bar,” John Bull, 1 Aug 1908, CCA FISR, 11/14; there is no evidence that Fisher ever 
contacted Bottomley, though he like the article enough to preserve it in his files. 
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 For his part Fisher denied knowing anything of the incident.  He wrote to both 
the First Lord and the Board of Admiralty repudiating any “knowledge of [the article] 
whatever till I saw it in The Times, any contact with Thursfield,27 and any personal 
contact with either Scott or Scott’s wife28 – although Scott later said in a speech that 
Fisher had encouraged him “to twist Charlie B.’s tail.”29  Fisher’s explanation mollified 
the Board, and he was never under any suspicion of collusion.  Privately, he fumed to 
Garvin: “Beresford says he hopes to prove I sent the signal incident to the ‘Times’ […] 
also he hopes to prove I dictated the ‘Times’ leading article!!! I think he’ll at last hang 
himself!”30 
 The biggest loser in the Scott-Beresford feud was Scott, who by the end of both 
incidents found himself little more than a proxy for the growing conflict between two 
men very much above his pay grade.  Scott attempted to defend himself against the 
Syndicate’s accusations of disloyalty, but when he came to the First Lord for help he 
was merely told that it was “dangerous to get mixed up with the Press, Admiral”31 – a 
tacit admission that the First Lord believed at least part of Beresford’s claims that Scott 
and Fisher had leaked the signals.  Scott’s career would not recover; he was immediately 
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detached from the Channel Fleet to lead a goodwill cruise to South Africa and was not 
offered another command after his tenure with the Channel Fleet ended in early 1909.32  
He could not attempt a vindication until after his retirement, although he would 
eventually pen a piece for the British Review summarizing his thoughts on the matter: 
“Calumny is rather a strong expression for Lord Charles Beresford to use against the 
Press, simply because they adversely criticised him; it was only natural that they should 
fall on him with a heavy hand when they discovered how he had misled them.”33  As to 
whether Scott and Fisher had conspired to plant anti-Beresford articles in The Times, the 
evidence remains strong. though only circumstantial.  Fisher would have had access to 
Scott’s official communiques, including reports of signals, and he was certainly a 
frequent correspondent of Thursfield’s – but The Times’ use of Fisher’s distinctive 
phraseology merely indicates that Thursfield and Fisher had been in contact, not that 
Fisher had instructed Thursfield to write the article.  The end result was plausible 
deniability for Fisher and a ruined career for Scott, who joined a growing list of officers 
whose reluctance to choose sides was proving detrimental to their prospects as the Navy 
grew ever more polarized. 
 For Fisher the two clashes between Scott and Beresford were little more than a 
sideshow, although Beresford’s complaints of an ‘Admiralty press bureau’ would 
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resurface in the future.  Fisher was concerned mainly with continuing his reforms and 
maintaining his relationship with the press.  His latest reform was the battlecruiser, the 
first of which was HMS Invincible, launched in April 1907.  The battlecruiser was a 
development of the revolutionary dreadnought class of battleship, intended to be even 
faster and carry even larger guns at the expense of nearly all armor.34  The technological 
development of the battlecruiser is beyond the scope of this project, but from the 
standpoint of naval-journalistic relations it put Fisher back in the role of promoter.  
Julian Corbett’s 1907 article “Recent Attacks on the Admiralty,” discussed above, was 
one result of this collaboration and contained a justification of the battlecruiser policy as 
well as a defense of Fisher against those who were “crying out that the constitution of 
the Admiralty has been turned into a dictatorship.”35 
   Fisher’s acceptance of this role as unofficial Admiralty publicist expanded during 
this period, as the First Sea Lord began to put journalists and editors he considered 
reliable in touch with each other.  Sir James Knowles, the editor of Nineteenth Century 
and After, asked Fisher if Garvin would write him an anti-Syndicate article.  That 
Knowles came to Fisher rather than the other way around is telling, and Fisher 
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encouraged Garvin to take up the offer: “don’t imagine I wish to influence you but of 
course I agree with Knowles that 3 pages from you would sink the Adullamites with red-
hot shot and no doubt of course dear old Knowles want [sic.] to magnify his Magazine 
with your name.”36  When Garvin agreed, Fisher rushed to Knowles’ home and turned 
the elderly editor out of his hammock to present him with the good news, later 
apologizing to Garvin for his forwardness: “of course I don’t understand Journalistic 
Etiquette.”37  Such blatant communication did not go unnoticed.  The veteran navalist H. 
O. Arnold-Forster, by this time retired from the position of Secretary of State for War, 
complained to Fisher’s long-time supporter Arthur Balfour that “Sir John has put himself 
entirely in the wrong by his methods, his newspaper log-rolling, his ‘confidential’ 
documents communicated under the seal of secrecy to the Town Crier!”38  He raised the 
issue with Fisher, whose only rejoinder was that he found himself “absolutely compelled 
to use the press so as to get public opinion with him to carry through such far-reaching 
reforms.”39 
 Through all the pro- and anti-Admiralty commotion Fisher remained certain that 
his ‘far-reaching reforms’ were both improving the navy and saving the nation a great 
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deal of money, which had been a major factor in his initial appointment as First Sea 
Lord: the same year the Invincible was launched he wrote that “lavish naval expenditure, 
like human high-living, leads to the development of latent parasitical bacilli which prey 
on and diminish the vitality of the belligerent force.”40  He wanted the navalist press to 
focus on increasing efficiency, not tales of hidden enemy fleets and unprepared 
dreadnought crews.  Yet the attitude of many of Fisher’s governmental and journalistic 
supporters was shifting on the financial aspects of his reforms.  Saving money was 
taking on negative political connotations, particularly in an age of naval scares and 
continued pushes by the Conservative Party for increased naval budgets. 
 Fisher annoyed his budgetary critics with one of his few public speeches, given 
at the London Guildhall in late 1907.  He ended his short remarks on naval 
improvements by calling for “my countrymen” to “sleep quiet in your beds […], and do 
not be disturbed by these bogies – invasion and otherwise – which are being periodically 
resuscitated by all sorts of leagues.”41  The Syndicate of Discontent was predictably 
unimpressed by the speech; Harold Frazer Wyatt wrote to the Standard that “all those 
who love their country and know her peril are now entitled to make Sir John Fisher the 
mark for public scorn.”42 Even Fisher’s closest supporters were unsettled by the 
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admiral’s apparent blindness to naval threats.  Arnold White wrote to Fisher that his 
speech “makes me shudder.  It is not that it was flippant or that it was untrue, but, 
speaking for the average d—d fool in the street, I must say that you seemed wholly to 
misunderstand what it is that your countrymen want from the Head of their Navy.”43  
Fisher bemusedly replied that he was “extremely sorry I’ve disappointed you because I 
do know all you have done for me & all you have sacrificed but what is it I’ve done 
wrong?”44 
 The First Sea Lord was also facing financial pressure from the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, which found itself increasingly concerned with demands for increased 
military funding in general.   In 1907 the CID established a subcommittee to examine the 
evidence behind the increasing press outcry over a supposed planned German invasion.  
Fisher blamed anti-Admiralty journalists for the latest scare, particularly Charles à Court 
Repington of The Times.  Fisher asked his Committee colleague Sir George Clarke to 
“fire a broadside at Repington,”45 but Clarke demurred: “I fear I can’t fight again just 
now […] R.’s influence with the ‘Times’ is much too great.”46  Fisher sent copies of his 
correspondence with Clarke to another member of the Committee, Lord Esher.  One of 
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the only men willing to rebuke the admiral directly, Esher wrote in return that Fisher was 
missing an opportunity by attempting to stamp out the latest invasion scare: 
You may think your time wasted in discussing what to you is the obvious with 
[…] Repingtons.  But you are wrong.  It is the discussions which keep alive 
popular fears and popular interest upon which rest the Navy Estimates.  A Nation 
that believes itself secure, all history teaches, is doomed.  Anxiety, not a sense of 
security, lies at the root of readiness for war. […] An Invasion Scare is the mill of 
God which grinds you out a Navy of Dreadnoughts, and keeps the British people 
warlike in spirit.  So do not be scornful, and sit not with Pharisees!  Your functions 
are not only to believe that you possess a Navy strong enough to defeat the 
Germans at all points, but to justify the belief that is in you, whenever and 
wherever required!  Tiresome perhaps but part of your day’s work.  So don’t be 
querulous!47 
 
 A hurt Fisher replied that it was difficult to harness naval scares for his own ends 
with journalists such as “Mr. Leo Maxse gibbet[ing] Sir John Fisher every month in the 
National Review [sic.] as a traitor to his country and a panderer to Germany & who 
‘ought to be hung at his own yard arm’!”48  This prompted a second verbal lecture from 
Esher, who pointed out a serious flaw with Fisher’s style of directed navalism: 
You very naturally believe that Sir John Fisher can rule the Navy and secure this 
country against invasion, without assistance from outside the walls of the 
Admiralty.  But are you so confident about Sir John Fisher’s successors?  i.e. Lord 
Charles Beresford and C. Bellairs?  Invasion may be a bogey.  Granted.  But it is a 
most useful one, and without it, Sir John Fisher (Captain Fisher as he then was) 
would never have got the Truth about the Navy into the heads of his countrymen. 
[…] Was it the Board of Admiralty, or the [Pall Mall Gazette] that got Mr. 
Gladstone’s Cabinet to increase the Navy?  Your pitfall is that you want to carry 
your one man rule from War into Peace, and all history shows the fatal track along 
which One Man has walked to disaster.  Over and over again I have said to you 
that Sir John Fisher requires the support of about half a dozen men – and no more 
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– but that these are indispensable.  Newspapers, politicians, mobs, all these are 
useful enough.  But the support of the half dozen men or so – who count – is 
vital.49 
 
 Esher’s missive, besides demonstrating that Fisher’s role in the “Truth about the 
Navy” campaign was no longer a secret, raised salient points.  Fisher, whose initial 
navalist agitations and journalistic connections had been undertaken with a cadre of like-
minded officers in the 1880s, was by his tenure as First Sea Lord in an opposite role as a 
committed defender of Admiralty policy.  The more he dug his feet in on preserving his 
reforms, the more his opponents within the Royal Navy clamored for their removal – and 
they would inevitably be in power at some point.  Esher’s emphasis on finding a small 
group of those ‘who counted’ to counteract his opponents implicitly meant that Fisher 
would have to work with these allies (Esher certainly counted himself among them), 
which would mean co-opting naval scares and Committee defense debates for his own 
ends.  Fisher refused to do so, to his continued detriment.  By the time the CID 
subcommittee on the invasion threat wrapped up in 1908, those present at the meetings 
noticed that “J.F. was getting more and more outrageous and harder to control,” and “all 
the ministers laughed” at the admiral behind his back.50  His increasing isolation among 
his professional peers would remain an issue.  But in late 1907 and early 1908 Fisher 
was dealing concurrently with two other major developments – a newly-created and 
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avowedly partisan anti-Fisher naval pressure group and another change in both the 
national and Admiralty political landscape – that would soon occupy much of his time. 
 As discussed in an earlier chapter, the Navy League had pulled back from direct 
involvement in the political sphere after its botched involvement with Beresford’s 
parliamentary campaign in 1902.  The League was still a national force in terms of its 
membership, with 20,000 members in 1908.51  However, the League had obtained many 
of these members through small-scale local activities – public lectures on naval history, 
trips to local dockyards, sea training offered to children and the like.52  Despite the 
League’s healthy membership, many of its more involved associates were becoming 
uneasy about their organization’s future by the Fisher era.  They were concerned – 
perhaps myopically, as the League did a great deal of work with the young and could not 
expect overnight results – that the general public was as apathetic as ever about the 
importance of popular navalism to keeping the Royal Navy adequately funded. 
 As early as 1904 the League was soliciting advice as to its future direction.  That 
year saw the publication of a pamphlet entitled Our Silent Navy: Is It Forgotten? that 
asked well-known navalists their thoughts on how to foster “amongst the General Public 
                                                 
51 Frans Coetzee, For Party or Country: Nationalism and the Dilemmas of Popular Conservatism in 
Edwardian England (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 138. 
 
52 Gerald Jordan, “Admiral Nelson and the Concept of Patriotism: The Trafalgar Centenary, 1905, in 
Naval History: The Seventh Symposium of the U.S. Naval Academy, general editor William Cogar 
(Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1988), 148; Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German 
Antagonism 1860-1914 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980), 375. 
 
  
205 
 
a real interest and sympathy towards the Navy.”53  Some respondents contended that the 
League’s current policy of focusing on public outreach did not go far enough.  Naval 
correspondent Archibald Hurd believed the Navy League “has done a splendid work, but 
its operations have hitherto been on a very small scale, and the mass of ignorance has not 
been very appreciably lessened.”  Although “the work of the Navy League in arranging 
lectures and prize essays at the public schools is admirable,” it did not reach “the lower 
middle and lower classes, and it is these sections of the community who should be 
reached.  How this is to be done I fear I cannot suggest….”54 
 Many of the navalists featured in Our Silent Navy – particularly those who were 
journalists themselves – saw continued use of the press as one way for the League to 
attract attention.  The editor of United Service Magazine wrote that “it seems to me that 
the Press fails lamentably in its patriotic duty to the United Services.  Knowing the 
apathy of the public, the Press devotes itself rather to meeting the demand for so-called 
‘news,’ than to attempting to cultivate in its readers an intelligent interest in” policy 
matters.55  A correspondent for The People found it “astonishing how few newspaper 
editors and proprietors are patriotic enough to yield up a column, or even half a column, 
of their space to either naval news or popular comment on naval matters.”  He preferred 
a push to place naval stories in as many periodicals as possible: “the more newspapers 
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there are to open their columns to such contributors the more general will be the naval 
knowledge diffused, and the more will be the sympathy and interest created in naval 
matters.”56  Even the Marquess of Graham, who commanded a division of the navy’s 
volunteer reserve force, believed “it only remains with the Press and the pen-men to 
keep the people posted up with material for intelligent study.”57 
 The lack of press support was not due entirely to League indifference.  In 1906 a 
proposed meeting between representatives from the periodical press and the staff of the 
Navy League Journal on how best to promote the navy was cancelled after only the 
Standard and Carlyon Bellairs agreed to appear.  More naval journalists were invited, 
but according to League documents many, including James Thursfield, Julian Corbett, 
and Archibald Hurd, “begg[ed] us not to go too far” with any naval agitations.  League 
representatives then “had an hour with Fisher at Admiralty […] & J.F. was able to 
convince our Chairman that there is at present no need” for further public action in 
support of the RN.58  Thus Fisher’s Admiralty was attempting to clamp down on 
unsanctioned navalist action, although the general membership of the League would 
have been unaware of these meetings.  Other branches of the British government were 
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equally unhelpful.  By 1908 the Metropolitan Police would not even allow League 
musicians to commemorate the death of Nelson in Trafalgar Square, writing in an 
internal memorandum that “everyone can reverence the memory of Nelson and Trafalgar 
without the assistance of a brass band.”59 
 It was true that the League dissuaded its more enthusiastic members from 
organizing their own navalist activities.  When a small group proposed sending letters to 
chambers of commerce and mayors offering to bring in speakers on naval topics, the 
League voted their plan down.  The rather dejected minutes of the Executive Committee 
Meeting where the plan was vetoed record that “our formal opinion carries next to no 
weight.  It will carry none whatever if Mr. Horton-Smith and Mr. Wyatt have their way 
and keep us in a chronic state of puerile agitation.”60  This was the internal dilemma 
facing the League after 1902, and it only became more pressing during the Fisher era at 
the Admiralty.  The League was certainly effectively working towards one major aspect 
of its constitution: its supporters were spreading navalist ideas “by lectures, by the 
dissemination of literature, by meetings, and by private propaganda.”61  But what about 
its other constitutionally-defined objective, “to urge these matters on public men, and in 
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particular upon candidates for Parliament?”62  By 1907 many influential League 
members contended that “though it is of high importance to train the children of Britain 
in patriotism and in the principles of sea-power, that work is entirely subsidiary to the 
chief purpose of the League, which is (as expressly in its Constitution declared) to 
influence National Policy.”  That policy “is not fulfilled by lantern lectures to school-
children.”63 
 A related impasse for the League was how to approach political agitation after 
the Liberal victory of 1906.  The League was avowedly non-partisan, and had 
rededicated itself to this philosophy after 1902.  This was perfectly acceptable to some of 
its branches: the Liverpool office believed that the support of both Liberals and 
Conservatives was necessary for any effective “patriotic, charitable and educational 
work.”64  And it must be remarked upon that the League’s political supporters were not 
all Conservative.  In 1908 114 sitting MPs were League members, and 36 of these were 
Liberals.65  The League even praised the Liberal foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey at an 
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annual meeting, pronouncing him “a worthy guardian of the rights and honour of the 
country.”66  The closest it came to direct criticism was a threat that if the Admiralty 
reduced the number of battleships in commission the League would be forced to protest 
a policy “likely to prove disastrous to the service and the country” – but even then “in 
the absence of any official confirmation of this rumoured new departure, the Navy 
League withholds comment.”67 
 Yet as both the Liberal government and the Fisher Admiralty continued in office, 
partisanship became a larger issue.  Many members cynically felt that neither party 
could be trusted to adequately fund the navy.  Leo Maxse, no friend to the Liberal Party 
or Fisher, nevertheless opined at the League’s 1907 annual meeting that “either front 
bench, when in power, whatever may be their vigorous protests in Opposition, always 
try to sneak a battleship or to steal a pound from the Navy whenever they think the 
public is not looking.”68  However, a vocal subset of the League was increasingly 
coming to believe that any official support of a Liberal government was by definition a 
betrayal of the navy – and that the League could not remain nonpartisan and continue in 
good conscience to exist.  As historian Anne Summers writes, Conservative members of 
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the League began to contend that “tacit support for the Liberal naval programme was in 
itself a party political act.”69  F. T. Jane spoke for these emerging hardliners when he 
declared that “every man, whatever he may call himself […] who cuts down the Navy is 
to be regarded as a public enemy, and should be treated as such.”70 
  Those who asserted that the League had to re-enter the political arena did have 
press support, notably from League member Leo Maxse and his National Review as well 
as the Standard.  But using these connections could be difficult as both publications 
were Conservative, which laid “open every impartial critic of the naval policy of the 
Government to the accusation of being inspired by partisan motives.”71  This was not a 
tightrope that could be walked effectively for long; there were certainly no Liberal 
outlets that felt the Navy was underfunded, and if the Conservative press was the 
League’s only option to increase its public influence, then so be it.  By late 1906 this 
more politicized splinter group, though still small, was beginning to coalesce around the 
activist navalists Harold Frazer Wyatt and L. Graham Horton Horton-Smith. 
 The League’s original founders had not been politicians, and both Wyatt and 
Horton-Smith fit that mold; they were lawyers who had been heavily involved with 
League business almost from its beginning, and sat on its executive committee.  But they 
had been disillusioned by the League’s hands-off approach to politics since 1906, when 
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Wyatt wrote to the Standard calling for the Board of Admiralty to resign in protest at 
naval budget cuts and despairing that “never was there a time when there was greater 
need for the arousing of public sentiment in regard to the Navy than the present.”72 
 In May 1907 the two men announced their resignations from the League’s 
leadership as a protest “against the apathy of the Executive Committee” and to rally 
support for an amendment to the League’s constitution they had put up for a vote at that 
month’s annual general meeting.73  The Wyatt and Horton-Smith amendment - which 
was also heavily backed by League members and navalist journalists Leo Maxse and H. 
W. Wilson – was essentially a laundry list of increased funding demands for the Royal 
Navy, capped off with a call “that the Navy League throughout the United Kingdom 
should do its utmost by every kind of legitimate agitation to rouse British citizens to a 
sense of the danger involved in these economies.”74  When Wyatt took to the pages of 
the Standard to explain his proposed amendment further, it became clear that his goal 
was also to move the League towards open political agitation.  Despite the recent 
reductions in naval expenditure, he wrote, “no endeavour has been made by the League 
as a whole to call public meetings to discuss this great and vital question.  This inertness 
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on the part of the League becomes the more strange when we remember its past.  In the 
days when a Unionist Government was in power, the League never shrank from public 
criticism and public agitation.”  But since 1906 “the League’s failure boldly to resist 
measures by a Liberal Government […] contrasts ill with its readiness to oppose the acts 
of Unionist Administrations in former days.  This contrast must inevitably bring upon 
the League in an acute shape the very reproach which it has previously striven most 
carefully to avoid, namely, that of being influenced by ‘party.’”75 
 Wyatt and Horton-Smith’s amendment proved contentious.  Although H. W. 
Wilson dropped his support of the plan – which Wyatt and Horton-Smith attributed to 
outside pressure from the rest of the executive committee76 – the large role that both the 
National Review and the Standard played in supporting the amendment led to charges 
that the League was becoming a tool of the Conservative press.77  Leo Maxse attempted 
to neutralize these accusations by sending an open letter to the League’s annual general 
meeting wherein he claimed “the main issue, of course, is […] whether the Navy League 
is to remain what it used to be, a vigilant, independent, and critical association […] or 
whether it shall become a semi-official echo of Whitehall, with the motto, ‘The 
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Admiralty, right or wrong.’”78  But he was not widely believed, and at the general 
meeting both League president (and former Conservative MP himself) Robert Yerburgh 
and Arnold White, whose navalist credentials were impeccable, denounced the 
amendment, which was duly voted down.79 
 This failure to politicize the League’s mission, however, produced a very 
important unintended consequence.  Wyatt and Horton-Smith’s cadre of supporters had 
initially been careful to explain that, while certainly more politically-oriented than the 
League in general, they were against the government as a nebulous entity rather than 
against any specific Cabinet or Admiralty figures.  This was the argument advanced by 
Maxse in his letter to the executive committee, and by the veteran navalist Fred Jane in a 
London speech: “It is not the business of the Navy League to say whether Admiral 
Fisher is good or bad.  The general opinion in the Navy is that he has done very well 
with the money provided.  The Navy League’s duty is to fight the economists and not to 
bother about Admiral Fisher.”80 
 Following the defeat of Wyatt and Horton-Smith’s amendment, those in favor of 
more direct political action began to launch personal attacks against the Admiralty and 
against Fisher in particular – and here it must be emphasized that Wyatt and Horton-
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Smith’s press supporters were avowed members of the Syndicate of Discontent.  A 
series of opinion columns and open letters appeared in newspapers hostile to the 
Admiralty.  The Observer believed “the Navy League, the proper guardian of our 
interests, is lulled to sleep by the siren, Sir John Fisher, and economy seems a weightier 
argument than patriotism.”81  A letter to the Standard specifically mentioned Arnold 
White’s conduct at the League’s general meeting, writing that his “defence of the Board 
of Admiralty, has, as appears inevitable with every defender of Sir John Fisher and his 
colleagues, strayed away from the paths of rectitude….”82  The Morning Post 
editorialized that “the Navy League at its recent annual meeting anathematised those of 
its members who expressed uneasiness and proclaimed its mission to be to stand 
between the Admiralty and its critics […] the Navy League has become nothing but a 
soporific to the public doubts.”83 
 The most vehement critic of Fisher was Leo Maxse, whose veneer of nonpartisan 
navalism was shed almost immediately after the general meeting.  Maxse’s National 
Review blasted Fisher’s Admiralty two months in a row.  In a June 1907 article entitled 
‘”Nobbling” the Navy League,’ Maxse referred to Fisher as “deus ex machina of the 
Admiralty and supreme boss of two Governments,” who had “hypnotised a series of 
Parliamentary politicians belonging to both political parties” and “practically reduced 
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Parliamentary criticism to silence, save for the plucky persistence of Mr. Carlyon 
Bellairs […] Now apparently the Navy League has succumbed to the charmer.”84  Maxse 
denounced Fisher and praised his own journalistic allies to an even greater degree the 
following month in a revealing article: 
At last there are signs that the […] eyes of the purblind public, who have refused 
to see what they did not want to see, are being gradually opened to the danger of 
the present naval administration.  Sir John Fisher, who has done good work in his 
time, for which he deserves and has received full credit, has grown altogether ‘too 
big for his boots.’  He has become dazzled and demoralised by social success, and 
has been so long on shore as to have forgotten of the sea.  He has fawned on the 
great, and has ingratiated himself with the politicians of both parties by 
anticipating their craving for cheeseparing, while he bamboozles his journalistic 
dupes by a judicious mixture of swagger and flattery.85 
 
 Alongside this press campaign, Wyatt and Horton-Smith were able to convince 
the League’s executive committee to call an extraordinary general meeting in July 1907.  
Its purpose, in the eyes of the two rebels, was to free themselves from what Wyatt called 
the committee’s unfair belief “that my Amendment was really aimed against the 
Admiralty and Sir John Fisher.”  He used the second general meeting to deliver an 
impassioned speech declaring that it was the Liberal government which truly deserved 
the League’s condemnation: “I recognise behind Sir John Fisher and behind the 
Admiralty another force, and a potent force.  It is the force of party spirit, the force of the 
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whole Government, of a Government which has been returned to power not seriously 
believing in the possibility of war.” 
 Wyatt did not hide that his political views were more radical than the majority of 
the League. “The Navy League is generally, alas! erroneously, regarded as representing 
the extreme forward party in regard to naval policy of this country.  I wish that were 
true.  It is not.”  Rather, by not speaking out against Admiralty reductions in expenditure, 
the League was “stifling public opinion.  It is stifling those who might otherwise have 
succeeded in airing their views.”  Wyatt then accused the League’s executive committee, 
by “declaring that its principal aims should be educational,” of having “thrown 
overboard the main aims of the League [….] I would therefore charge them […] with the 
most tremendous error, with the most lamentable weakness, with utter failure to carry 
out the ends for which the League was founded as defined in its Constitution.”86 
 Wyatt’s ardent speech was followed by another from Fred Jane upbraiding the 
League for its reluctance to engage in political attacks: “They do not want to step on 
anybody’s toes or hurt anybody’s feelings.  But that is not the duty of the Navy League.  
Their duty is to hurt people’s feelings and to fight little Englanders in every possible 
way.”  Jane then nearly incited a riot within the hall by comparing the League to the pro-
Boers of the previous decade. 87  The end result was the same for the supporters of Wyatt 
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and Horton-Smith: the League refused to modify its constitution, and would continue to 
stand apart from politics.   
 After being rebuffed for the third time in less than a year, Wyatt and Horton-
Smith came to the conclusion that there was no longer a place for them in the League.  
Shortly after the second general meeting of 1907 the two officially split from the League 
and formed a competing navalist pressure group known as the Imperial Maritime 
League.88  They did so, as they claimed in the sympathetic Morning Post, because “anti-
militarism and anti-patriotism are at this present moment raging like the veritable breath 
of pestilence throughout Britain.  They are putrefying the very springs of our national 
life.  They are killing that love of country which is at the root of all noble self-sacrifice 
for country’s sake.”89 
 The Imperial Maritime League was openly political from its founding.  Its 
mission statement laid out the short- and long-term goals of the organization.  In the long 
term, the IML strove to “set an example of courage before public men” by “call[ing] the 
spawn of ‘little-England,’ whether Radicals or Socialists, or a nauseous mixture of the 
two, by their proper names, and to hold them up to contempt.”  Its short-term goal was 
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more specific: to defeat “Sir John Fisher and the ‘little-England’ government of which 
he has made himself the tool.”  The IML believed that “whatever changes, for good or 
ill, have been effected in the Navy during the period named [since 1904], are the product 
of two forces, and two forces only – (1) Finance; (2) Sir John Fisher.”90 
 The nascent Imperial Maritime League quickly found allies among both other 
navalists dissatisfied with the League’s response to contemporary political issues and 
journalists more directly opposed to both the Liberal government and Fisher’s 
Admiralty.  Fred Jane and Rudyard Kipling, both well-known public figures, defected 
from the Navy League to become early supporters of the IML.91  The IML’s greatest 
strength was its support in the periodical press.  Besides Leo Maxse’s National Review, 
which had backed Wyatt and Horton-Smith from the beginning, the IML received 
favorable coverage from Spenser Wilkinson in the Morning Post, H. A. Gwynne and 
Leslie Cope-Cornford in the Standard, and Ralph Blumenfeld in the Daily Express.92   
 Many of these journalists were merely continuing a campaign against the 
Admiralty begun much earlier under the guise of supporting the IML.  The Standard 
printed a letter from an anonymous naval officer purporting to uncover “a system of 
espionage” that had “grown up in the British Navy […] since the present First Sea Lord 
has been at the Admiralty. […] I believe that the methods of Sir John Fisher are ruining 
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the tone and moral of that corps.”93  Maxse disdained Fisher’s “unspeakable contempt 
for ‘scaremongers,’” for the First Sea Lord “would hardly deny that the present British 
Navy, which ex hypothesi is nulli secundus, owes its existence exclusively to the efforts 
of ‘scaremongers.’”94 Wyatt and Horton-Smith themselves struck a hard blow at the 
Admiralty by accusing Fisher of the “indefensible practice of providing organs of the 
Press with Admiralty briefs, which are then published, not as mere emanations from 
authority, but as representing the unbiased thoughts of editors.”  The two founders of the 
IML concluded that “this application to Britain of the method of the late Prince 
Bismarck, though it has been repeatedly denounced, has yet gone unpublished”95 – and 
they made it their goal to find and publicize evidence of Fisher’s contact with journalists, 
which would come to haunt the First Sea Lord. 
 However, Wyatt and Horton-Smith struggled to find MPs and other political 
personages willing to back their cause.  The Navy League’s dedication to 
nonpartisanship proved more attractive to Conservative MPs (the IML made no attempt 
to attract Liberal politicians) than a new rival organization that from its very formation 
called for an official inquiry into Fisher’s tenure as First Sea Lord96 and declared its 
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purpose was “to use the Navy as a stick for the present Government’s back.”97  Unionist 
MP and former secretary of state for war, H. O. Arnold-Forster, was sympathetic to the 
IML but asserted that the “incompetence of the leaders” of the Navy League was 
counterbalanced “by the violence and want of judgement shown” by Wyatt and Horton-
Smith.98  Even IML assurances that Conservative MPs who agreed to join would be 
“unburdened with any work” proved fruitless.99 
 This is not to say that the IML had been lax in attempting to win over both 
political and naval figures.  Wyatt and Horton-Smith dispatched a flurry of 
correspondence to those they believed could be enlisted in the fight against Fisher’s 
Admiralty.  Most of it was returned brusquely, and many of those contacted by the IML 
brought the matter to Fisher’s attention.  Julian Corbett let Fisher know that “these two 
weak-headed gentlemen pestered me with their application till at last I too was moved to 
reply […] I trust they did not find there pleasant reading.  They have no following of any 
account & are too hair-brained [sic.] even for Bellairs.”100   
 Lord Redesdale dryly thanked the IML for its “invitation to join a League which 
considers itself to be capable of teaching the Board of Admiralty, with Sir John Fisher as 
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their chief adviser, their business.  Until further advised as to your superiority to that 
distinguished Officer I much prefer putting my trust in him.”101  Redesdale sent a copy 
of his reply to Fisher, who passed it along to editor of the Observer Gerard Fiennes.  
Fiennes reassured Fisher that the press remained on his side.  Fisher’s “enemies, reckless 
of anything but their spite, do not hesitate to belaud certain malcontents in the Service 
while they vilify you.”  In contrast, Fiennes and “your friends who write in the Press 
cannot adopt a similar course, because they are, in the main, people of sober judgement 
[….] But Hold-fast is the best doing in the end, and the triumphant vindication is 
perfectly sure.”102  J. L. Garvin was so aggravated by the IML’s anti-Fisher stance that 
he joined the Navy League and was appointed to its executive committee.103 
 Yet the IML’s greatest error was inviting Lord Esher to join its campaign against 
the Admiralty.  Esher was willing to criticize Fisher in private, but publicly he stood 
firmly behind the First Sea Lord.  His reply to Wyatt and Horton-Smith as sent was 
actually milder than the first draft, which included the following: “What harm is there, 
gentlemen, and would it not be more straightforward, if the admission were boldly made, 
that the object of the ‘Maritime League’ is to upset Sir John Fisher […] Then we know 
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exactly where we are.”  But it was still severe, and concluded with a wholesale 
denunciation of the new Maritime League: 
The Board of Admiralty may occasionally make mistakes, but that they have by 
word or act appeared to doubt the vital necessity for Naval supremacy, or that they 
would stoop to subordinate the Naval superiority of this country to any personal or 
political exigency does not require to be proved by a ‘public enquiry’.  There is not 
a man in Germany from the Emperor downwards who would not welcome the fall 
of Sir John Fisher.  And for this reason only, apart from all others, I must beg to 
decline your invitation to join the Council of the Maritime League.104 
 
 Esher’s reply would have been scathing enough had the viscount merely sent it 
privately to Wyatt and Horton-Smith.  But for reasons known only to himself – he 
certainly did not consult Fisher on the matter – Esher also sent his reply to The Times, 
which published it in February 1908.105  The resultant commotion prompted various pro- 
and anti-Fisher missives to both Esher and the periodical press.  The retired Admiral Sir 
John Hopkins congratulated Esher: “I don’t think the existence of the Imperial Maritime 
League will be of any duration, but it’s a good thing for men like yourself to open fire on 
it before it deludes others who don’t know. [...] The dead set made at Fisher is simply 
disgraceful.”106  Admiral F. S. Inglefield was still serving afloat, and wrote directly to 
Fisher of his views on the Esher letter. “I am of opinion that should this mischievous 
campaign against yourself and the Admiralty continue, it will in time become serious 
and dangerously undermine the authority of the Admiralty […] Agents of the 
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‘Insubordinates’ will gather round them disciples from amongst the ‘Discontents’!”  This 
was exactly what Fisher wanted to hear in his ongoing battle against the Syndicate of 
Discontent, particularly when Inglefield added that “the antagonistic attitude of Lord 
Charles Beresford may be partly due, possibly, to the fact that he is at heart more of a 
politician than a Naval Officer!”107 – a mortal sin to an old admiral of the Victorian 
Royal Navy. 
 The IML did reply to Esher in an open letter sardonically thanking him for 
proving at least one of their points, that Fisher was solely responsible for all changes at 
the Admiralty since 1904 and was thus guilty of “a degree of autocratic authority 
exceeding anything hitherto suspected.”108  However, the most unexpected voice to 
weigh in on the Esher letter was the most influential.  For the Kaiser himself, angered at 
Esher’s assertion that there was ‘not a man in Germany from the Emperor downwards’ 
who would not welcome the fall of Fisher, wrote a personal letter – not to Esher, but to 
First Lord of the Admiralty Lord Tweedmouth – calling Esher’s letter “a piece of 
unmitigated balderdash.” 109  With this direct correspondence between the German 
Emperor and Fisher’s administrative superior the press controversy stirred up by the 
formation of the Imperial Maritime League suddenly became a political issue, where it 
joined a number of other political developments that were bedeviling Fisher. 
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 Fisher’s ability to enact major reforms while still keeping the annual naval 
estimates low had enabled him to remain in office during the transition from 
Conservative to Liberal rule, but by 1907 he was beginning to face pressure from both 
sides of the aisle.  The dominance of the Liberal Party after the 1906 election meant 
there were many traditional anti-armament and pro-retrenchment Liberals in Parliament, 
chief among them President of the Board of Trade David Lloyd George and Chancellor 
of the Exchequer H. H. Asquith.  This voting bloc was determined to reduce naval 
expenditure; in November 1907 more than 130 Liberal MPs petitioned the prime 
minister to cut military funding in general,110 and the following February a further 82 
called for additional cuts to the naval budget.111 
 At the same time Fisher was under attack from Conservatives, who – while they 
were certainly less vehement than their more radical associates in the Imperial Maritime 
League – believed that the Admiralty was violating the spirit if not the letter of the 1905 
Cawdor Memorandum.  As discussed in the previous chapter, this document committed 
the Admiralty to carrying out the full Fisher reform program.  It also implicitly 
authorized the Admiralty to construct up to four new dreadnought battleships (including 
battlecruisers) per year.  Under the Liberal government, the Admiralty had laid down 
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three in both 1906 and 1907 and were planning to lay down two in 1908.112  Liberals 
argued the four ships per year were a theoretical maximum, while Conservatives 
believed the Cawdor Memorandum established a minimum benchmark for new 
construction.  Fisher was able to thread this particular needle.  He placated Liberals by 
pointing out that the naval estimates had gone down by over £5 million during his tenure 
in office,113 and Conservatives conceded that only two new battleships would be 
acceptable for 1908, as they would both be dreadnoughts.114 
 The fragile naval funding situation nearly caused an open revolt within both the 
Admiralty and the Cabinet during debates over the 1908 estimates.  In late 1907, the 
initial Admiralty proposal had been for an increase of more than £2 million, which was 
unacceptable to Asquith in his role as chancellor of the exchecquer.  By early 1908 it had 
been trimmed to an additional £1 million,115 despite protests from a vocal subset of the 
Liberals who demanded a complete cessation to new dreadnought construction, although 
even this increase led to threats of resignation from the entire Board of Admiralty.  But 
the deal had been struck with Campbell-Bannerman, and as the prime minister was 
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progressively incapacitated by a series of heart attacks it was removed from the table.116  
Asquith made the majority of executive decisions from late 1907 onward, though 
Campbell-Bannerman did not officially retire until April 1908.  
 In early February 1908, Fisher was called to an urgent meeting with Liberal MP 
Lewis ‘Loulou’ Harcourt.  Harcourt informed the First Sea Lord that his agreement with 
Campbell-Bannerman was no longer valid, and that the estimates for 1908 were to be 
reduced by £1.3 million.  Fisher immediately protested: the estimates had already been 
approved, and only Campbell-Bannerman’s illness had prevented their being put to the 
required parliamentary vote.  Harcourt flatly stated that if Fisher would not accept the 
revised estimates the entire Board of Admiralty would be allowed to resign.  If the Board 
chose this drastic step, the new First Sea Lord would almost certainly be Lord Charles 
Beresford, who had already agreed to accept the position if it was offered.  Fisher, 
observing that the Cabinet “seem to have settled it all, and […] I can do no good here,” 
returned to the Admiralty.  He was visited in his office by Lloyd George, who threatened 
him further with the possibility of a Beresford-run Admiralty and informed him that 
Beresford had promised to reduce the estimates to an even greater degree.117  But Fisher 
stood his ground, and eventually – without any further input from the Board of 
Admiralty – the Cabinet accepted £900,000 of the original £1 million increase.118 
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 The 1908 estimates satisfied no one.  Liberals had to comfort themselves with the 
mere two dreadnoughts and the idea that the estimates had not increased even further.119  
The thoughts of many Conservatives on the matter can best be summed up by the Daily 
Mail, which believed “the time has come to remind the Admiralty and the Government 
that the nation gave no mandate to weaken its Navy for the sole purpose of providing 
funds for doles to its Socialists.”120  The entire incident severely damaged Fisher’s 
relationship with the more radical elements of the Liberal Cabinet.  He was in contact 
with his journalistic allies throughout the brief crisis, and although this was not a matter 
that could be discussed openly in the periodical press, Fisher made no secret of his 
displeasure.  As he wrote to Garvin: “I believe Harcourt is lying to bounce me into 
surrender.  If he is not lying than ineptitude beyond words in Cabinet Ministers thus 
bargaining with Beresford – but here every day I get conclusive evidence of his pursuing 
a path of Absalomic cunning in feasting journalists & parliamentarians to make him 
King….”121 
 The private clash over the 1908 estimates took place nearly simultaneously with 
Esher’s public denunciation of the Imperial Maritime League.  An Admiralty facing 
internal turmoil was not adequately prepared to deal with the additional external 
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attention that arose from the Kaiser’s letter to the First Lord, Lord Tweedmouth.  The 
political climate was rapidly made worse when the First Lord chose to respond directly 
to the Kaiser in a second private letter.  Officially, Tweedmouth only informed Foreign 
Secretary Grey, who in a lapse of judgement compounding Tweedmouth’s, authorized 
the First Lord to reply to the Kaiser – and to include in his reply copies of the 1908 naval 
estimates, which had not yet been published.  Unofficially, Tweedmouth was delighted 
to receive correspondence directly from the German emperor.  He was not shy about 
showing the letter to interested parties, including journalists; Rowland Blennerhassett, 
correspondent for the National Review, wrote to Garvin: “I fear Tweedmouth has been 
talking about the letter all over London.”122 
 There was an unspoken agreement among the London press not to publish details 
of either the Kaiser’s letter or Tweedmouth’s reply.  But one influential journalist, 
Charles à Court Repington of The Times, chose to bring the matter to the public’s 
attention despite a strong effort by Esher to dissuade him.123  Repington had his reasons.  
He was a dedicated supporter of the British Army in its constant battle for funding with 
the Admiralty and was involved with Lord Roberts’ conscription movement, which 
Fisher had disparaged at Committee of Imperial Defence meetings.124  Repington’s 
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“calculated indiscretion” in publicizing the First Lord’s correspondence was intended to 
make Tweedmouth “regret his impertinence […] and his description of our little party as 
a ‘ring of wild and self-convinced alarmists.’”125  In any event the First Lord’s breach of 
protocol was a serious enough matter that he was quietly asked to retire, with the public 
explanation of a Cabinet shuffle under the new Asquith administration given to assuage 
any hurt feelings.126  His loss was not mourned; Esher, who had begun the furor with his 
letter to the IML, felt it “was well worth all this bother (not very much of that) to have 
done anything however little for the Navy.”127 
 Tweedmouth’s replacement as First Lord of the Admiralty was Reginald 
McKenna, who had served under Asquith at the Treasury and was thus expected to 
support naval retrenchment.  Whatever McKenna’s initial thoughts on naval funding – 
like his predecessors he had no prior naval experience – after his first three-hour meeting 
with Fisher he was committed to maintaining the estimates at a healthy level.  McKenna 
would become a valuable ally of Fisher, as the latter continued to prove adept at working 
with his political superiors.  McKenna also adopted two major aspects of Fisher’s 
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personal administrative style: a rapid distrust of Beresford128 and an appreciation for the 
value of the press.  Soon after taking office he wrote to J. L. Garvin to reassure the editor 
“as regards my views on the Navy it is perfectly safe to say that I mean to be in every 
sense Minister for the Navy [and] to maintain the unconditional supremacy of the 
Navy.”  However, the new First Lord added a warning: “while these are my views I 
should not like to be quoted as having expressed them, nor do I understand you to mean 
that you wish to write as one who has been in communication with me.  Expressions of 
opinion by ministers for communication to the Press are against all precedent in this 
department.”129 
 Fisher himself had not curtailed his journalistic correspondence during the recent 
political reshuffles.  He was still on the lookout for new recruits to the Fishpond.  When 
he read an article in the Naval and Military Record criticizing Syndicate member Gerard 
Noel, he contacted Archibald Hurd at the Daily Telegraph with a request: “I should love 
to know who the writer is so that I could give him ‘a leg up’ without his ever knowing 
it!”130  But as previously evidenced by his meeting with James Knowles, Fisher was 
having to go further and further to effectively spread his message.  He briefly considered 
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anonymously contributing his own articles to the Observer, only to conclude “I should 
be found out as I can’t disguise.”131  Instead Fisher focused on circulating articles he 
found useful.  He sent copies of the Manchester Guardian and the Westminster Gazette 
to Sir William May, C-in-C of the Home Fleet, and instructed May to forward them to 
Director of Naval Intelligence Sir Edmond Slade to aid in “refut[ing] the arguments” 
against naval spending in Parliament.132 
 Fisher’s political allies did their best to aid his cause.  When The Times was for 
sale in early 1908, London rumor tabbed founder of the Daily Express Arthur Pearson as 
the prospective buyer.  Esher brought Pearson to Fisher’s office, where the First Sea 
Lord and the press magnate had a long meeting on naval policy.133  Esher explained his 
reasoning for introducing the two in his diary: “It is important that The Times, under new 
management, should take the right line about naval affairs.  Why should any patriot wish 
to upset Jackie?  Only the old-fashioned fogey, the personal foe, or the political wrecker 
would want to destroy him.”134 
 The First Sea Lord was also concerned with securing promotions for those he 
considered his closest allies.  By 1908 he had built a strong working relationship with J. 
L. Garvin of the Observer; the latter’s children often visited the Admiralty, where Fisher 
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sent them home with small gifts and confidential papers for Garvin.135  After Arthur 
Pearson declined to purchase The Times, Fisher asked Garvin’s permission to speak with 
Lord Northcliffe, the venerable newspaper’s next potential owner, on the subject of 
hiring Garvin.  Garvin reluctantly agreed, which was for the best as Fisher both already 
knew that Northcliffe had acquired the paper and had already been in contact with the 
latter, suggesting that Northcliffe go so far as to install Garvin as editor.136  Although 
Northcliffe declined Fisher’s advice, it demonstrated the lengths to which the First Sea 
Lord would go to support his journalistic associates.137 
 These backroom maneuverings did not go unnoticed, particularly by the 
Syndicate of Discontent.  Beresford’s brief attempt to sue Fisher for libel over the John 
Bull article of January 1908 has been previously discussed, but one of Beresford’s stated 
aims was to “subpoena the Editors of papers who have not been got hold of by the 
Admiralty and who I find are prepared to swear that they were shewn State Papers of 
most confidential and secret nature in order to bias them to write up the Admiralty and 
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Admiralty methods.”  He intended to bring to light both “the criminally wicked, 
treacherous, mean and cowardly action that has been taken with regard to several 
officers of the Service [i.e. himself] by the inspired Press” and “proof that official secrets 
have been given to the Press in order to make them support the Admiralty methods for 
the last two or three years.”138  The admiral was discouraged from pursuing legal action 
by Earl Cawdor, who wrote privately to Balfour that while “Fisher is, I think, unwise in 
the way he sends about confidential documents […] nothing can justify CB’s 
disloyalty.”139 
 Rebuffed by his political compatriots, Beresford dropped the possibility of a 
lawsuit – though he portentously wrote to Cawdor of his “wish that I was free and that 
this was not a personal question” so he could “thoroughly swab the floor of the House of 
Commons with Fisher & Co.”140 – and turned elsewhere for acolytes in his latest 
crusade. He was certainly sympathetic to the aims of the Imperial Maritime League, 
though exactly how closely he worked with the organization remains unclear,141 and the 
IML sent an open letter to 100 British newspapers in 1908 decrying “the secret press 
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bureau which that instrument of the present Government, the First Sea Lord, Sir John 
Fisher, has practically established at the Admiralty.”142  Beresford preferred to deal with 
his naval colleagues or the press.  He complained to Walter Kerr, Fisher’s predecessor at 
the Admiralty and no fan of Fisher himself, that the “system created in the last 4 years of 
working the Press” had “ruined the Service.”143  Beresford took a different tack with 
Ralph Blumenfeld of the Daily Express, claiming the First Sea Lord was merely a 
creature of the newspapers: “He has altered his policy times innumerable through the 
Press making him do so – in fact, the Press has dictated his policy for sometime [sic.], 
these constant changes causing great expense.”144 
 Beresford’s most vocal supporter in his push to expose the Admiralty was Leo 
Maxse of the National Review.  In a series of letters to J. L. Garvin, Maxse claimed to 
have “had absolutely no prejudice against Fisher” until the latter had abandoned the 
Cawdor Memorandum, a common Conservative argument.  Maxse attributed Fisher’s 
supposed failings as First Sea Lord to his “simply trying to please a particularly 
contemptible clique of politicians,” and believed “the wicked bombast which he talks on 
all occasions encourages the English in their besetting sin of self-complacency, and 
makes him a great danger, especially as the servant of a Radical Government.”  Fisher, 
according to the editor had, used his “very able friends in the Press” to serve the “apathy 
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and indifference of a cheeseparing Admiralty […] against such forms of insanity the 
Gods fight in vain.”  A disillusioned Maxse did “not know where to look for help,” as 
Fisher was “so damned cunning in nobbling the Press.  He has got the ‘Times’, the 
‘Daily Telegraph’, more or less the ‘Daily Mail’, several Service journals, and of course 
the whole Liberal press, who don’t care 2d. about the Navy, in his pocket […] all done 
by nauseating flattery, ours being the vainest of all the professions.”145  Maxse’s belief 
that his National Review was nearly alone in the fight against Fisher’s Admiralty led the 
editor to support both Beresford and the Imperial Maritime League. 
 Fisher, as he had done successfully since coming to the Admiralty, painted his 
detractors as mere unsuccessful subordinates and story-chasing journalists who were 
rapidly running out of ammunition to use as Fisher’s reforms proved successful.146  But 
the public criticism of Fisher was becoming so vocal and so frequent that the highest 
levels of the Admiralty and the government were forced to respond.  Parliamentary 
members of the Syndicate of Discontent interrogated McKenna soon after his 
appointment as First Lord on the question of “who sees Press representatives at the 
Admiralty” and “whether special information is verbally given to the representatives of 
some papers which is not imported to those of others, and whether Sir John Fisher gives 
interviews to Press men of persons taking part in public controversy respecting naval 
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matters.”147  McKenna could only reply that as far as his office was concerned, it was 
“always desirable to avoid communication with the Press.”148 
 Concern over both the specific breakdown of cordial relations between Fisher 
and Beresford and the general increasing politicization of navalist journalism reached the 
highest echelons of the British government.  Fisher had maintained a connection with 
King Edward VII throughout his service as First Sea Lord, but when the King “said 
something of how I worked the Press […] I didn’t follow that up,” as Fisher later 
recalled to Esher.  Instead Fisher “did venture a humble remark to the King ‘Has anyone 
ever been able to mention to Your Majesty one single little item that has failed in the 
whole multitude of reforms in the last 3½ years’ No! he said no one had!  So I left it 
there.”  Confidentially, however, Fisher wrote to Esher that “no one knows except 
perhaps yourself that unless I had arranged to get the whole force of public opinion to 
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back up the Naval Revolution it would have been simply impossible to have carried it 
through successfully for the vested interests against me were enormous….”149 
 Yet Fisher was finding it more difficult simply to dismiss all of his critics.  
Although Fisher had concentrated an immense amount of personal authority around 
himself as First Sea Lord, he was still directly subordinate to one man – the First Lord of 
the Admiralty.  While Fisher generally enjoyed good relations with both Tweedmouth 
and McKenna, they had a responsibility to investigate any claims of leaked information 
from the Admiralty.  Surreptitious disclosures of information could be explained away, 
but blatant misuse of classified information could not.  During the brief crisis over the 
naval estimates in early 1908, most of the internal debate over naval funding was kept 
private – but in February a series of anonymous articles containing details on the 
Admiralty’s planned expenditures appeared in J. L. Garvin’s Observer.  This was no 
accident.  The previous month Garvin had asked Fisher to provide details on the year’s 
estimates, and Fisher had readily complied, despite reservations: “There is not the 
slightest difficulty in providing you with clear – explicit – and convincing statements 
                                                 
149 Fisher to Esher, 19 Apr 1908, CCA ESHR, 10/42.  This letter was reprinted in full in Fisher’s memoirs, 
published in 1919.  The specific word choice of “public opinion,” as opposed to any reference to 
journalists or newspapers, may be why Fisher considered this letter fit for publication.  Lord Fisher, 
Memories (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1919), 185. 
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[…] My one difficulty is – how about my contravening Cabinet secrecy and trust in 
me?”150 
 The First Sea Lord was right to be nervous.  When the Observer articles appeared 
it was obvious to both Tweedmouth and the King – who sent copies to the Admiralty 
with a request to find the “writers of the navy-news” – that they had been written with 
the assistance of internal documents.  Fisher would only say that “he could not quite tell” 
who had written them, but he knew Garvin had an experienced staff at the Observer 
when it came to naval reporting.151  The First Sea Lord also, in a brazen admission, told 
both the King and the Prince of Wales that as Garvin also had run articles involving 
classified material under the purview of the Committee of Imperial Defence, that was 
where the government should begin its search for leaks152 (of course any CID material in 
Garvin’s possession would have been given to him by Fisher, but the maneuver 
deflected attention from an Admiralty source).  The admiral then invited Garvin to his 
home for discussion of “a vital matter please keep secret that you are coming to see 
me.”153 
                                                 
150 Fisher to Garvin, 24 Jan 1908, quoted in Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 38.  Fisher supported 
Garvin, as he could “see your difficulties and don’t want to embarrass you.”  This may be a reference to 
Garvin’s assuming the editorship of The Observer, a position he had held for less than a month; Fisher 
attempted to aid Garvin multiple times during his career, as previously seen with the case of The Times’ 
editorship. 
 
151 Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 41-43; Fisher wrote to Garvin that some of his colleagues 
believed the First Sea Lord had written the articles himself. 
 
152 Fisher to Garvin, 10 Feb 1908, HRC JLG R, Fisher 3. 
 
153 Fisher to Garvin, 4 Feb 1908, HRC JLG R, Fisher 3. 
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 No record has survived of the meeting between Fisher and Garvin, but historian 
Alfred Gollin believed it was an occasion for the two to corroborate their accounts.  This 
explanation carries a great deal of weight, for the next week the Observer ran a public 
letter from Fisher to Garvin that inquired “(1) Who wrote the articles? (2) Who inspired 
them? (3) What papers were placed at the writer’s disposal?”  Fisher wrote that “as the 
inference is that the writer of these articles has been given secret and confidential facts, 
improperly obtained, and been given the fullest information in regard to private 
discussions and decisions at the Admiralty, I hope you may see your way to transgress, if 
necessary, any journalistic rules to the contrary” and publicly reveal the author.154 
 Garvin immediately responded to Fisher’s letter with a public response addressed 
to both Fisher and Tweedmouth.  The editor claimed sole responsibility for both 
conceiving of and writing the articles, and claimed that he had seen no confidential 
material: “I am much amazed by the suggestion that they reflect ‘private discussion and 
decisions of the Admiralty.’  That, if I may respectfully say so, is not only a mistaken, 
but a fantastic inference.”  Instead, wrote Garvin, “every statement I made with respect 
to official opinions and intentions can be substantiated by data accessible to anyone who 
has my privilege of being in close touch with three or four of the ablest naval experts not 
within the Admiralty nor upon active service….”  Garvin concluded with a broader 
denigration of the Admiralty’s attempt to search for leaks: “The extent to which 
newspapers of standing are dependent upon official sources of information is very 
                                                 
154 The Observer, 9 Feb 1908, quoted in Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 44, 47. 
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commonly exaggerated.  What is thought at first to be the disclosure of official secrets is 
very often the result neither of inspiration nor divination, but only of great care in sifting 
facts.”155 
 The public reply to Fisher’s letter mollified Tweedmouth and the Admiralty.  It 
also appeased much of the press.  The Morning Post, which was no fan of the Admiralty 
and had called for an inquiry into the Observer articles, “venture[d] to congratulate Lord 
Tweedmouth upon the complete removal of any suspicion of what we thought would 
have been ‘not playing the game’.”156  The radical Daily News went so far as to rebuke 
Fisher, as “it is emphatically no business of any First Sea Lord to write to newspapers 
demanding the source of the information they publish.”157  Fisher likely happily accepted 
this criticism as the cost of neutralizing the possibility of a deeper investigation into his 
journalistic connections. 
 Thus, Fisher had escaped the possibility of official censure and had saved a 
valuable ally from the same.  But the incident had apparently taught him nothing about 
covering his tracks.  The First Sea Lord made light of the incident; he suggested 
Tweedmouth take up a career as a business agent, since the First Lord’s attention had 
driven up the Observer’s circulation.158  He certainly did not cease his communication 
                                                 
155 Garvin to Fisher, 5 Feb 1908. Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin: James Louis 
Garvin Papers, letters collection (hereafter HRC JLG L), Fisher. 
 
156 Morning Post, 10 Feb 1908, qyoted in Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 50. 
 
157 Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 50. 
 
158 Fisher to Garvin, 7 Feb 1908, quoted in Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 45. 
 
  
241 
 
with Garvin, and went as far as to privately thank the editor: “You certainly have 
manipulated the Tweedmouth letter in a masterly manner.  The ‘Beresford Boomerang’ I 
call it now as I have ascertained that it was through him Tweedmouth so ill-advisedly 
wrote me the letter he did - & how it has recoiled!!! […] Indeed all round it’s heavenly 
& I hope the circulation of ‘Observer’ will go up a million!”159  Within a week, as the 
political situation in the Cabinet developed, Fisher was sending Garvin additional 
information on the estimates.  “My mission is to keep you from pitfalls,” he reassured 
the editor.  “I will enclose a suggested paragraph which you can put into your own 
lovely words, and will keep up your spreading fame….”160 
 The change in First Lords from Tweedmouth to McKenna did not prevent further 
suspicion from falling on Fisher’s press correspondents.  Running an article in July 
1908, “Disunion in the Navy,” The Times cast doubt upon Beresford’s ability to lead the 
Channel Fleet.  Beresford suspected the article to have been written by James Thursfield 
and inspired by Fisher and wrote McKenna requesting an investigation into the matter.161  
His press allies used stronger language; the Morning Post demanded McKenna discover 
                                                 
159 Fisher to Garvin, 10 Feb 1908, HRC JLG R, Fisher 3; here is no evidence that Beresford had anything 
to do with the incident.  Emphasis in original. 
 
160 Fisher to Garvin, 14 Feb 1908, HRC JLG R, Fisher 4; a portion of this letter is quoted in Gollin, The 
Observer and J.L. Garvin, 53. 
 
161 W. Mark Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy: Methods and Organization of British Navalist 
Propaganda, 1889-1914 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986), 249.  This article appeared in the 
same newspaper the same week as the anonymous exposé on the second Beresford-Scott feud, previously 
discussed. 
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who wrote the article “and to punish him so as to make it probable that the like offence 
will not be committed again.  The public wants the cur dragged to light and whipped.”162   
 Unlike Garvin, Thursfield replied to McKenna’s initial questions privately, but 
he minced no words: “It is quite true that I did see Sir John Fisher at the Admiralty in the 
forenoon of July 7 and had a conversation of some duration with him.  There is of course 
nothing unusual in this.”  Thursfield noted that “for many years past I have been in the 
habit of going to the Admiralty to obtain such information as I needed about naval 
affairs […] very frequently calling on Sir John Fisher with whom I have been on 
intimate terms for many years.”  But Thursfield would not claim authorship of the article 
(he had indeed written it), and he was adamant that Fisher had not shared confidential 
information.  He ended by warning McKenna about Beresford: “I am quite at a loss to 
understand how Lord Charles Beresford can pretend to know what passed at an 
interview at which no one was present but Sir John Fisher and myself. […] If Lord 
Charles Beresford’s allegations were allowed to pass unnoticed by me they might easily 
operate very greatly and very unjustly to my discredit.”163  Thursfield sent a copy of the 
letter to Fisher, letting the First Sea Lord know that he should be free of suspicion: “You 
will see that it commits no one but myself.”164 
                                                 
162 “Entire Vindication of Lord Charles Beresford, “Morning Post, 31 Jul 1908, quoted in Wyatt & 
Horton-Smith, Passing of the Great Fleet, 433. 
 
163 Thursfield to McKenna, 14 Aug 1908, CCA FISR, 3/2. 
 
164 Thursfield to Fisher, 14 Aug 1908, CCA FISR, 3/2. 
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 Thursfield’s proactive reply satisfied McKenna, who essentially apologized to 
the journalist for his trouble: “I have always regarded you, and since my experience at 
the Admiralty have known you, as the soul of discretion.”165  This did not satisfy 
Thursfield, who came to Fisher “in a great state of mind at wild accusations circulating 
against him;” the First Sea Lord unsympathetically replied that he “was a hundred times 
more maligned” than the journalist.166  Fisher and his supporters in the press had once 
again escaped censure.  But the inquiries and official questions were becoming more 
frequent, and the outside pressure more adamant.  Clandestine emergency meetings were 
not an efficient way to run the Admiralty.  In 1908, Fisher was not concerned for his own 
position as First Sea Lord, despite increasing calls for an investigation into his reforms.  
There were, however, two related issues attracting his attention.  First, Fisher was 
expending a great deal of effort to keep his journalistic connections free from suspicion 
or official reprimand.  With tensions between Fisher’s supporters and the Syndicate of 
Discontent running high, Fisher cautioned many of his press allies to refrain from 
publishing navalist articles for the time being.  To Julian Corbett: “I think absolute 
silence is the best.”167  On Thursfield: “I’ve declined to see Thursfield & many others 
much higher who are seeking me so as to be absolutely beyond suspicion of giving any 
                                                 
165 McKenna to Thursfield, 18 Aug 1908, KEW ADM, 116/3108. 
 
166 Fisher to McKenna, 20 Aug 1908, CCA MCKN, 3/4. 
 
167 Fisher to Corbett, 22 Jun 1908, CCA FISR, 1/6. 
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information.”168  On W. T. Stead: “Stead came to see me last night full of blood & fury 
on my behalf (Bless him!) but I begged him to keep quiet.”169  Fisher would not even 
write to Arnold White directly, but informed him through his secretary “how important it 
is at this stage to use the greatest discretion, because (no doubt with good reason!) 
everyone associates you with the support given to Sir John in his campaign of the last 
four years.”170  He also warned Garvin, Garvin’s colleague at the Observer Gerard 
Fiennes, and even the imperial navalist F. T. Bullen away from publishing any articles or 
sending any editorials on his behalf.171 
 The second aggravation affecting the First Sea Lord, as it had been for some time 
by 1908, was Charles Beresford.  Beresford’s skill in both working towards his own 
agenda at the Admiralty and corralling his press associates has been much maligned by 
historians – Arthur Marder calls him “the acknowledged leader of the ‘Syndicate of 
Discontent’, though hardly the brains”172 – but the C-in-C Channel was adroit at 
internalizing the lessons learned from both his own failed attempts at journalistic 
                                                 
168 Fisher to Garvin, 24 Dec 1908. , HRC JLG R, Fisher 5. 
 
169 Fisher to Garvin, 31 Jul 1908 [corrected by archivist to 31 Aug], HRC JLG R, Fisher 5. 
 
170 Fisher’s secretary [W.F. Nicholson] to White, 6 Jul 1908, NMM WHI, 76.  Fisher was finding it 
difficult to restrain White.  White was not effectively rewriting material Fisher sent to him: “Any d—d 
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172 Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought II, 39. 
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alliances early in the century and the growing public suspicion of Fisher’s.  Press notices 
regarding possible leaks and Admiralty probes were becoming commonplace, which 
gave Beresford carte blanche to maintain his own journalistic connections.  When 
Beresford himself was questioned regarding Channel Fleet memoranda which had 
appeared in the press, he replied to the Admiralty that “the editors of newspapers should 
be aware that the publication of such matter is prejudicial to the country, but I do not 
think that the press can be blamed after the encouragement it has received of late years 
in publishing really important documents, apparently with official sanction.”173  If Fisher 
could make an open secret of his dealings with journalists and avoid Admiralty 
condemnation, so could other high-ranking officers.  And Fisher could not discipline or 
sanction them without opening himself up to a variety of accusations from favoritism to 
misuse of official documents. 
 Beresford was most successful at antagonizing Fisher in this manner during the 
1907 fleet exercises.  Fisher offered Beresford the opportunity to sail with members of 
the press: “Will you let me know, in view of inquiries now being made at Admiralty, 
whether you see any objection to Correspondents being put on board the various ships 
[…] I see no objection myself.”  Fisher also assured Beresford that he “could arrange for 
any degree of censorship you deemed desirable.”174  Nevertheless, Beresford vehemently 
rejected the Admiralty’s offer and banned correspondents entirely from his fleet during 
                                                 
173 Beresford to the Admiralty, 20 Jan 1908, in “Secret. Extracts from Official Correspondence, &c, 
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the maneuvers.175  One can imagine Fisher’s surprise when Beresford was found to have 
invited his journalistic allies as personal guests, not as reporters.  As Fisher grumbled to 
Arnold White, Beresford had “proceed[ed] to fill up the ships, so far as we can gather, 
with his own friends – not as correspondents of course but as private friends!  And not to 
report on the manoeuvres, presumably, but to assist in a big agitation afterwards!”176  
The First Sea Lord briefly considered sneaking White aboard a ship at the Firth of Forth 
so as to have a sympathetic journalist on board during the exercises,177 but settled for 
directing the Board of Admiralty to “send a peremptory note to Lord Charles that all 
‘guests’ & civilians &c are to be disembarked from all his ships before the manoeuvres 
commence;” he hoped that “either the order will be disregarded by Lord C.B., and the 
crisis precipitated, or else a dirty low game is foiled & the players will be deposited in 
the reeds of Norway.”178  Beresford’s gamble had not paid off, but he had demonstrated 
to Fisher that he was willing to use Fisher’s tactics to his own advantage. 
 By the end of 1908 Fisher was losing control of his carefully-maintained system.  
This is not to say that it had entirely ceased to function.  The First Sea Lord had built 
upon the dreadnought with the launch of the Invincible-class battlecruiser.  He had 
rapidly developed a successful relationship with the new First Lord of the Admiralty 
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McKenna, and had managed to save the majority of his naval budget from diminution at 
the hands of Lloyd George and other economizers in the Cabinet.  Most importantly for 
the continuation of his system, he had survived enquiries into the conduct of his 
journalistic friends and professional colleagues without ever being directly implicated in 
any way (and support from Fisher could certainly help the accused themselves – vide the 
case of Percy Scott, who received no assistance from the Admiralty and whose career 
was essentially ended by his feud with Beresford). 
 The Fisher system still existed, but it was becoming ever more fragile and ever 
more personal.  The Fishpond had been intended to ensure the success of Fisher’s naval 
reforms within the Admiralty and publicize them in the periodical press.  By 1908 Fisher 
was directing his press allies to attack the Syndicate of Discontent, particularly 
Beresford, rather than to promote any ongoing Admiralty reorganization – although it 
must be said that many, particularly Arnold White, were perfectly happy to attack the 
Syndicate of their own accord.  Beresford and the Syndicate were following his example.  
Suspicion of clandestine contact between the press and the Admiralty had devolved into 
what amounted to open paranoia on both sides; this chapter has featured multiple 
examples of Beresford blaming Fisher and Fisher blaming Beresford for any published 
work criticizing them in any way.  The covert cooperation between naval officers and 
journalists that had defined Fisher’s rise had vanished entirely, and each additional 
barely-averted inquiry brought the system closer to collapse.  Professionally, the First 
Sea Lord was spending more and more time attempting to get his political superiors 
from McKenna to the King to remove Beresford from active duty and very little time at 
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all concentrating on further reform.179  Fisher had lost sight of the goal; instead of 
fighting to save the Royal Navy from its enemies in Fleet Street and Parliament, he was 
fighting to save himself.  Arnold White reassured Fisher that the growing public support 
for Beresford was merely an illusion: “The mob is fickle but not the people who always 
remain faithful to a silent worker […] the public dearly love a man who is against the 
powers-that-be […] & C.B. works this for all he is worth.”180  He conveniently failed to 
remember that standing against the ‘powers-that-be’ was exactly how Fisher had come 
to the Admiralty in the first place. 
 However, it was not only Fisher who had conflated himself with the Admiralty.  
His opponents had as well.  Any group with a professional, personal or political axe to 
grind with the Royal Navy or the Liberal Cabinet could frame its conflict through the 
lens of Fisher and his ‘Admiralty press bureau.’  David Lloyd George, Charles 
Beresford, and the Imperial Maritime League viewed the issues of Liberal governance 
and naval funding very differently, but found themselves allies in name if not creed 
against the Fisher system.181  That the name ‘Fisher’ is nearly synonymous with the 
                                                 
179 It should be noted here, as in the conclusion to the previous chapter, that Fisher had few allies among 
his professional colleagues in the Admiralty.  His Fishpond system was designed to create like-minded 
subordinates who would eventually continue Fisher’s system, but would have required years to fully come 
to fruition. 
 
180 White to Fisher, 15 Nov 1908, CCA FISR, 3/2; emphasis in original. 
 
181 One of the most striking examples is the 1908 estimates crisis, when the staunch Conservative 
Beresford struck a deal with Lloyd George to cut naval funding if he was made First Sea Lord. 
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concept of navalism itself during this period speaks both to the possibilities of and 
inherent danger within the over-centralization of reform around a single figure. 
 The increasing politicization of navalism was another issue that Fisher could not 
hope to control.  The First Sea Lord disdained politics entirely, and refused to commit 
himself to either of the major parties.182  Personally this proved a great success, and 
allowed Fisher to work easily with successive Conservative and Liberal governments.  
But the political climate of Britain in 1908 was not the same as it had been in 1904.  
Each party – though it must be said the Conservatives in particular suffered from this 
malady when it came to navalism – was becoming more radicalized.  Striking a middle 
ground between Conservative calls for greatly increased naval spending and Liberal calls 
for heavy retrenchment was seen as a failure by both sides, not an acceptable 
compromise. 
 Despite all these setbacks, Fisher believed that he could still maintain control of 
his journalistic and political networks.  He retained the all-important support of King 
Edward VII: “I’ve just had 2 hours with the King telling me to hang on like grim death 
no matter what the calumnies public or private!”183  Behind the scenes, he was also 
working on a plan to remove the threat Beresford posed to his position.  Through his 
assistant he cautioned Arnold White “that at the present juncture it is very vital that there 
should be no further press controversy on the Beresford question, if a satisfactory 
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solution is to be arrived at.  Things are proceeding well, and I think the end is in 
sight.”184  But unlike previous years, when Fisher confidently approached the challenges 
ahead, he found himself “getting really wearied out with all the flabby ‘blue funkers’ all 
around one […] I am getting sick and mediating a sudden and unexpected departure à la 
Elijah.”185 
 Fisher’s concern was justified, though the latest threat to his standing at the 
Admiralty came from an unexpected source.  As 1908 turned to 1909 internal Foreign 
Office and Admiralty documents were showing an alarming increase in the number of 
foreign, particularly German, dreadnoughts under construction.  They were kept secret – 
but Fisher’s entire career had demonstrated that ‘secret’ was a nebulous term within the 
British government.  By October 1908 there were whispers in the London dailies that the 
Royal Navy was being surpassed by its German competition.  In January 1909, the entire 
Cabinet was officially informed that there were grave concerns about British 
shipbuilding rates.  When the proposed 1909 naval estimates were brought before 
Parliament in March, Asquith was forced to admit publicly the “fatal and most serious 
fact” that the estimates would either have to be greatly increased or the navy would find 
itself greatly outnumbered over the next five years. 186  The result was an immediate 
national panic that swept up both major parties, Beresford and the Syndicate of 
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Discontent, nearly the entirety of the British press, including many of Fisher’s oldest 
supporters, and both the Navy League and the Imperial Maritime League.  Their furor 
was directed at the man who had spent half a decade installing himself as the sole 
professional representative of the Royal Navy.  It would mark the beginning of the end 
for Jacky Fisher.
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CHAPTER VI 
DEFEATS AND VICTORIES, 1908-1914 
 The years 1909-10 marked the high point of public and private naval agitation in 
Britain.  The great naval scare of late 1908 and early 1909 was followed by an official 
governmental inquiry into Sir John Fisher’s tenure at the Admiralty.  The result was the 
apparent end of Lord Charles Beresford’s and Fisher’s professional careers and the 
conscious expansion of partisan navalism.  After 1910, the ‘Fisher system’ of directed 
journalistic-official navalism was severely curtailed, with political navalism as a 
campaign strategy, particularly with the first general election of 1910, rising to replace 
it.  Nonpartisan naval agitation in the Navy League mold also enjoyed a resurgence after 
the 1909 panic, with Admiralty efforts being redirected towards public relations.  This 
increased the general popularity of the Royal Navy greatly, but at the expense of the 
traditional directed navalist support networks involving professionals, politicians and the 
press.  British navalism was more widespread than ever in the final years before the First 
World War.  It was also less directed, more partisan (with important exceptions), and 
less effective at actually influencing Admiralty policies. 
 The political turmoil within the Admiralty through 1908 had remained for the 
most part an internal governmental issue; only Tweedmouth’s letter to the Kaiser had 
prompted a major newspaper response.  After the appointment in 1908 of Reginald 
McKenna as First Lord of the Admiralty, Liberal politicians worked to quiet any further 
political navalist pressure.  MP Lewis ‘Loulou’ Harcourt publicly disparaged 
organizations such as the Imperial Maritime League as springing from the “diseased 
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imagination of inferior minds.”1  Winston Churchill, then President of the Board of 
Trade and a staunch economizing Liberal, gave a series of speeches denigrating “the 
braggart call for sensational expenditure upon armaments” caused by the “Dreadnought 
fear all school” as “a false lying panic started in the party interests of the Conservatives.”  
Churchill declared that the Liberal Party would “stand as a restraining force against an 
extravagant policy” and “keep a sour look for scaremongers of every kind and size,” 
never “wasting the public money upon armaments” proposed by the “windy actions of 
ignorant, interested and excited hotheads.”2    
 Churchill’s views of ‘scaremongers’ were supported publicly by colleagues such 
as long-serving Liberal MP John Brunner, who believed the Liberal Party should also be 
prepared to formulate its own naval strategy without the aid of public policy specialists 
such as Julian Corbett and the Colombs; the government “should be strong enough to 
keep the experts quite out of sight and prevent them from dropping confidential 
documents about and popping in and out of newspaper offices.”3  Privately, Prime 
Minister Asquith warned McKenna that he wanted the party to have nothing to do with 
the “propaganda of extravagance.”4 
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 However, as early as May 1908 the Admiralty was beginning to receive 
intelligence that the German shipbuilding program was quietly and rapidly increasing.  
Initially, corroborating accounts of German acceleration proved difficult; most 
originated from unofficial sources and vested interests, and were not immediately given 
credence by Admiralty officials.5  Ignored by the Admiralty, they then appeared in the 
London papers, including The Times.6  Eventually Fisher, who knew more about the 
inner workings of the periodical press than most in the Cabinet, expressed concern over 
the reports; as they came from “steady and consistent” newspapers like the Westminster 
Gazette and not unreliable publications such as the Standard or the Morning Post, they 
were not likely part of a larger scheme to undermine the Admiralty and should be taken 
seriously.7 
 Concern over the German program became a Cabinet-wide issue during the 
debate over the 1909 naval estimates in January.  While the 1908 estimates had been 
acrimonious, the proposed 1909 expenditures opened a major fissure within the Liberal 
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Party.  The largest sticking point turned whether the Admiralty would lay down four 
dreadnought battleships for the 1909 fiscal year – the plan favored by Churchill and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George – or six, as recommended by 
McKenna and Fisher.  The Admiralty’s fear of German acceleration caused Fisher to 
demand a further increase to eight major ships while the issue was under consideration.8 
 Lloyd George and Churchill were convinced the call for eight dreadnoughts was 
a ruse.  “I feared all along this would happen,” wrote Lloyd George to his colleague.  
“Fisher is a very clever person and when he found his programme was in danger he 
wired Davidson9 for something more panicky – and of course he got it. […] Frankly I 
think the Admiralty are procuring false information to frighten us.”10  Lloyd George also 
blamed McKenna, who “feels his personal position and prestige is at stake,”11 for calling 
for the eight ships to rescue his career at the Admiralty.  Churchill and Lloyd George 
threatened to resign if additional dreadnoughts were approved but were talked from the 
precipice by Lord Esher: “I pointed out to them that the great majority of the country is 
                                                 
8 Morris, Scaremongers, 175. 
 
9 Likely Sir Arthur Davidson, assistant private secretary to King Edward VII. 
 
10 Lloyd George to Churchill, 3 Jan 1909, quoted in Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race: The Anglo-
German Naval Rivalry, 1900-1914 (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1974), 204.  Lloyd George 
even recommended contacting the German Embassy for further information on their dreadnought building 
program, which was not seriously considered. 
 
11 Lloyd George to Churchill, 3 Jan 1909, quoted in Farr, Reginald McKenna, 155. 
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against them. […] To resign upon the point would ruin them.  No one has ever resigned 
with personal triumph on a negative policy.”12 
 The Chancellor of the Exchequer may have thought that he had been misled by 
the Admiralty, but his response during the Cabinet-level budgetary meetings did nothing 
to endear him to Fisher or McKenna.  When Fisher explained that increased German 
shipbuilding was behind the proposed additional warships, Lloyd George responded that 
“it shows extraordinary neglect on the part of the Admiralty that all this should not have 
been found out before.  I don’t think much of any of you admirals, and I should like to 
see Lord Charles Beresford at the Admiralty, and the sooner the better.”13  Fisher was 
incensed.  He broke off relations with Lloyd George’s principal colleague Churchill, 
especially after the latter revealed in Cabinet meetings that he was supporting the smaller 
four-dreadnought program on the advice of Reginald Custance and William White, two 
longtime members of the Syndicate of Discontent.  Fisher immediately suspected a 
conspiracy: “The baseness of that is that they (Custance & White) know that only 4 
Dreadnoughts would compel my resignation!  That is the object & not the safety of the 
country.”14  He also expressed his displeasure directly to Churchill: “I never expected 
you to turn against the Navy after all you have said in public and private (et tu, 
                                                 
12 Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Gretton, Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy (New York: Coward McCann, 
Inc., 1969 [1968]), 27-28. 
 
13 John Jellicoe to McKenna, 24 Jan 1909, quoting Lloyd George, quoted in Frederic Dreyer, The Sea 
Heritage: A Study of Maritime Warfare (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1955), 68-69. 
 
14 Fisher to Garvin, 17 Feb 1909, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas at Austin: James Louis 
Garvin Papers, recipient collection (hereafter HRC JLG R), Fisher 7; emphasis in original. 
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Brute!).”15  The First Sea Lord immediately prepared for battle and told his journalistic 
allies to be ready.  “I will let you know how things go,” he wrote to J. L. Garvin of the 
Observer.  “I feel like winning in both Dreadnoughts & Beresfords.”16 
 Politically, the clash over the 1909 estimates put Asquith in a bind.  Lloyd 
George reminded the prime minister of “the emphatic pledges given by all of us before 
and at the last general election to reduce the gigantic expenditure on armaments,” and 
raised the legitimate concern that “the discussion of the Naval Estimates threatens to re-
open all the old controversies which rent the party for years and brought it to impotence 
and contempt.”17  But his position was becoming less tenable as other Cabinet members 
were swinging towards Fisher’s call for eight new warships, or at least the compromise 
of six.  Foreign Secretary Edward Grey admitted to Asquith that although he “like others 
advocated retrenchment at the last election […] I always excepted the Navy from my 
promises, and in any case promises must be subordinate to national safety.”18  With the 
naval estimates due before Parliament in March, Asquith and the Liberal Party had 
quickly to cobble together a workable budget for the Royal Navy and present it to the 
nation. 
                                                 
15 Fisher to Churchill, 28 Feb 1909, quoted in Admiral Sir R. H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of 
Kilverstone, 2 vols. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1929) II, 90; emphasis in 
original. 
 
16 Alfred Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 1908-1914: A Study in a Great Editorship (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1960), 71. 
 
17 Lloyd George to Asquith, 2 Feb 1909, quoted in Morris, Radicalism Against War, 151. 
 
18 Grey to Asquith, 5 Feb 1909, quoted in Ibid. 
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 Asquith offered his solution to Parliament on March 16, 1909.  It was not 
optimistic.  McKenna was forced to declare the government “do not know, as we 
thought we did, the rate at which German construction is taking place.”19  Asquith 
followed by revealing “the fatal and most serious fact” that Germany was thought to be 
able to construct warships faster than British shipyards.20  The proposed estimates were a 
compromise.  Officially, they included only the four dreadnoughts supported by Lloyd 
George and Churchill – and even this meant an increase of £3 million over the previous 
year.21  But a mere four dreadnoughts would mean that by 1912 Britain would have 
twenty dreadnought battleships – by now the only class of warship considered effective 
in the line of battle – to a theoretical seventeen German.  Former Conservative prime 
minister Arthur Balfour then rose and announced his calculations predicted twenty-one 
German dreadnoughts and a numerically inferior British fleet by 1912.22  The naval 
estimates had accounted for this possibility; though they provided for only the four 
capital ships, an additional four (for a total of eight to be laid down in 1909) would be 
                                                 
19 Quoted in Kenneth L. Moll, “Politics, Power, and Panic: Britain’s 1909 Dreadnought ‘Gap’,” Military 
Affairs 29:3 (Autumn 1965): 140. 
 
20 Morris, Radicalism Against War, 156-157. 
 
21 Morris, Scaremongers, 177; ‘Dreadnoughts’ included both dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers. 
 
22 Moll, “Politics, Power and Panic,” 140.  Balfour’s projection was based on the most pessimistic 
estimates from the January Cabinet discussions and information received from the previously mentioned 
H.H. Mulliner.  Morris, Scaremongers, 178. 
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immediately begun “if required.”23  The 1909 estimates passed easily on their first 
vote.24  The public debate that immediately followed turned on whether or not the nation 
required the four contingent ships, and how effectively navalists and economists could 
plead their case in the matter.25 
 Liberals who favored a smaller shipbuilding program registered their displeasure 
at the possibility of an eight-ship fiscal year.  Liberal MP Thomas Lough contended the 
nation was “being continually alarmed” by the latest agitations.26  Grey found “plenty in 
the press to make people anxious – plenty which ought never to be there, for the attempt 
to fix the Navy estimates by press controversy, in which each side inspires its own 
journalists, is not dignified.”27  Asquith himself spoke out against the “unscrupulous” 
and “unpatriotic […] absurd and mischievous legends” raised by Conservatives 
                                                 
23 Morris, Scaremongers, 177.  Arthur Marder points out the creative accounting of the contingent four 
ships: if they were required, regardless of when they were laid down, their cost would be automatically 
applied to the 1910 estimates. Arthur J. Marder, ed., Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of 
Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952-59) I, 207. 
 
24 Moll, “Politics, Power and Panic,” 140; the actual vote was 322-83 in favor. 
 
25 It must also be noted that neither the four- nor eight-ship plans included two Dominion dreadnoughts, 
already funded by Australia and New Zealand – thus the debate was really six versus ten.  Phillips Payson 
O’Brien, “The Titan Refreshed: Imperial Overstretch and the British Navy before the First World War,” 
Past & Present 172 (August 2001): 163. 
 
26 18 Mar 1909, quoted in W. Mark Hamilton, The Nation and the Navy: Methods and Organization of 
British Navalist Propaganda, 1889-1914 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1986), 342-343; Lough 
also blamed the current panic on the Navy League. 
 
27 Grey to Henry Newbolt, 10 Feb 1909, quoted in K. G. Robbins, “The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, 
Parliament and the parties,” in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, edited by F.H. Hinsley 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 11, 548. 
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regarding Britain’s supposed naval deficiencies.28  Liberal backbenchers accused 
Asquith of “walk[ing] into the trap of the Daily Mail,” believing the German 
shipbuilding increase was merely a creation of the partisan press.29  The Times took a 
more resigned tone, recognizing that navalist panics could be accurately dated by the 
release of each year’s estimates: “The public always goes like this in March.”30 
 For Conservatives, the fight for eight dreadnoughts was immediately politicized.  
Conservative MP Arthur Lee accused Asquith’s government of wasting time with 
“pilgrimages to The Hague and in travelling through Elysian fields dreaming of 
universal disarmament.”  Asquith’s reply in Parliament, which further antagonized the 
Lloyd George-Churchill wing of his party, was to declare “the first care of every British 
statesman who is worthy of the name is to maintain intact, unassailable, unchallengeable, 
that naval supremacy on which our independence and our freedom depend.”31  This did 
not stop Balfour from calling for a vote of censure just days after the estimates were 
announced, accusing the Liberal government of dereliction of duty; when it failed, 
                                                 
28 22 Mar 1909, quoted in Rhodri Williams, Defending the Empire: The Conservative Party and British 
Defence Policy 1899 – 1915 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 166-167. 
 
29 The Economist, 20 Feb 1909, quoted in Howard Weinroth, “Left-Wing Opposition to Naval Armaments 
in Britain before 1914,” Journal of Contemporary History 6:4 (1971): 109. 
 
30 22 Mar 1909, quoted in Morris, Scaremongers, 168. 
 
31 17 and 23 Mar 1909, quoted in G.J. Marcus, “The Naval Crisis of 1909 and the Croydon By-Election,” 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 103 (Nov. 1958): 504.   
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Conservatives in Parliament loudly demanded a national election.32  A second 
parliamentary motion calling for additional warship construction also failed, albeit with 
the ominous portent that a group of Navy League-associated Liberals voted with the 
Conservatives against Asquith’s wishes.33  Soon the national rallying cry for any 
disapproval of the 1909 estimates was the one coined by Conservative MP George 
Wyndham: “We want eight, and we won’t wait.”34 
 The Admiralty and those in the government who supported Fisher were initially 
very supportive of the ‘we want eight’ campaign.  Viscount Esher, whose political views 
were always difficult to categorize but was no die-hard Conservative, had been in 
contact with Balfour and recorded in his diary that “We have done well with the Navy.  
And we shall get our ships.”35  Esher believed Lloyd George and Churchill’s insistence 
on the four ships would lead to their political destruction; for his part he told his son he 
was “going to try and put the fear of God into Jackie […] unless the B. of Admiralty get 
their 8 ships ordered at once they ought to be hanged.”36  Fisher himself, who had no use 
                                                 
32 Moll, “Politics, Power and Panic,” 140-141; Marcus, “The Naval Crisis of 1909,” 511. Marcus’ article 
deals with a by-election immediately following the introduction of the 1909 estimates where a 
Conservative candidate won on a platform of increased dreadnought construction. 
 
33 Matthew Johnson, “The Liberal Party and the Navy League in Britain before the Great War,” Twentieth 
Century British History (2011): 150. 
 
34 Morris, Radicalism Against War, 159.  W. Mark Hamilton notes that while the Navy League took credit 
for the slogan, there is no evidence the League played any role in its creation.  W. Mark Hamilton, “The 
‘New Navalism’ and the British Navy League, 1895 – 1914,” Mariner’s Mirror 64:1 (1978): 42. 
 
35 28 Mar 1909, in Maurice V. Brett, ed., Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher, 2 vols. 
(London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1934) II, 378. 
 
36 Esher to Francis Knollys, 5 Apr 1909; Esher to Maurice Vyner Brett, 18 Mar 1909, in Brett, Journals 
and Letters II, 377, 380. 
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for an undirected agitation, was willing to use the 1909 scare to his advantage: “There is 
no necessity for panic really and yet panic has its uses as we have advantageously 
experienced – we all think now in Dreadnoughts!  It’s odd how unrecognized is our gain 
by this!”37  Although “the Radicals swear I engineered it to ‘dish’ them,” Fisher 
“welcome[d] this scare! […] The Public wants pepper always to make them wake up!”38  
The First Sea Lord wrote to J. L. Garvin that although “I myself feel secure […] I don’t 
want to allay the deep feeling in the public mind of the immensity of all that is at stake – 
we have engineered 8 Dreadnoughts this year, they can’t be prevented!  We have 
engineered the great radical majority into an obedient flock.”39  Garvin agreed, and 
recommended a measured response to the panic to the powerful newspaper proprietor 
Lord Northcliffe: “The only course is to defend Admiralty interests […] and to denounce 
all political hanky-panky in connection with the Navy.”40 
                                                 
37 Fisher to Arnold White, 18 Mar 1909, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, 1st 
Lord Fisher of Kilverstone Papers (hereafter CCA FISR), 15/2/1/5.  Rhodri Williams believes Fisher’s 
goal was to use the 1909 scare to force the government to accept the contingent 4 ships over the objection 
of Liberal backbenchers (Williams, Defending the Empire, 164).  This is supported by a letter from Fisher 
to Garvin, 11 Mar 1909, where Fisher assured the editor the country would get its 8 ships despite how “the 
Government to blind their own extremists […] cloud the new Dreadnoughts in Estimates….”.  Quoted in 
Gollin, The Observer and J.L. Garvin, 73.  However, Matthew Seligmann believes the Admiralty 
information on German shipbuilding was accurate and the ‘we want eight’ campaign was a measured 
response to a legitimate crisis.  Matthew Seligmann, “Intelligence Information and the 1909 Naval Scare: 
The Secret Foundations of a Public Panic,” War in History, 17: 1 (2010): 37. 
 
38 Fisher to Arthur Davidson, quoted in William Jameson, The Fleet that Jack Built: Nine Men who Made 
a Modern Navy (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962), 127. 
 
39 Fisher to Garvin, 19 Mar 1909, HRC JLG R, Fisher 7; emphasis in original. 
 
40 Garvin to Northcliffe, n.d. [16 Mar 1909], quoted in Morris, Scaremongers, 177-178; emphasis in 
original. 
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 What Fisher and his allies within the government did not anticipate was the 
immediate partisan reaction to the estimates from the Conservative press.  Privately, 
many Conservatives agreed with Fisher that the additional four ships would come in 
time; when Austen Chamberlain told Admiral Sir William May, C-in-C of the Home 
Fleet, that waiting out Liberal opposition was the correct strategy, he received a note 
from Fisher within the hour promising to wait “till Hell freezes.”41  The public reaction 
was a great deal more spirited.  Editor of the National Review Leo Maxse personally sent 
Lloyd George a £200 check for his share of the four additional dreadnoughts, which the 
chancellor promptly returned.42  Fisher also received his share of press abuse.  The Daily 
Express blamed the admiral for British construction lapses: “The time for shilly-
shallying and soft speeches has gone.  We must have the eight Dreadnoughts, and we 
must have much more.  Sir John Fisher must go, and all that Fisherism means.”43  Fisher 
was “responsible for the starving of the Navy during the last three years,” the paper 
claimed.  “We arraign Sir John Fisher at the bar of public opinion, and with the 
                                                 
41 Fisher to Chamberlain, 23 Feb 1909, quoted in Morris, Radicalism Against War, 153.  Fisher was not 
concerned about Radical opposition, and thought his previous money-saving efforts at the Admiralty 
would make him “a real asset with the Little Navy Party!  They look on me as a heavenly cheese-parer!” 
Moll, “Politics, Power and Panic,” 143. 
 
42 Lloyd George thanked the editor for his “good faith” and “willingness to bear your share of the burden,” 
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imminent possibility of national disaster before the country, we say again to him, ‘Thou 
art the man!’”44  The Imperial Maritime League attributed the lack of naval construction 
to the “presence and omnipotence of Sir John Fisher,” and returned to its familiar call for 
political change: “The present Government has betrayed the nation, and […] there is but 
one organisation in the country which may possibly yet be able to save it, and that is the 
Unionist party.”45 
 As was becoming common with navalist agitation, supporters of both the four- 
and eight-warship programs each accused the other of leaking confidential material to 
the press – and with good reason.  Fisher was certainly supplying his journalistic allies 
privileged information, as will be seen, but Lloyd George was also suspected of using 
classified figures to bolster his case for four dreadnoughts.  Asquith believed both Lloyd 
George and Churchill had been using “combined machinations” to turn the Liberal Daily 
News and Daily Chronicle against the Admiralty.46  The prime minister warned Lloyd 
George that he “greatly deplore[d] the leakages into the press…of matters which at this 
stage ought clearly to be kept under the seal of the strictest confidence.”  Lloyd George 
impertinently agreed, observing it was indeed deplorable that the Conservative 
Observer, Daily Telegraph and The Times “seem to have been fully informed as to what 
                                                 
44 20 Mar 1909, quoted in Geoffrey Penn, Infighting Admirals: Fisher’s Feud with Beresford and the 
Reactionaries (Barnsley, UK: Leo Cooper, 2000), 220. 
 
45 “The Crisis: Its Cause and Its Remedy,” Open letter from Wyatt and Horton-Smith to the press, 7 Apr 
1909, British Library, London, Imperial Maritime League pamphlets (hereafter BL IML), 08805. 
 
46 Asquith to Margot Asquith, 20 Feb 1909; Asquith to Haldane, 5 Feb 1909, quoted in Farr, Reginald 
McKenna, 156. 
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was going on inside the Cabinet weeks ago […] most unfortunate.”47  More seriously, 
McKenna informed the King that he suspected Lloyd George of purposefully sending 
Charles Beresford classified information in an effort to remove Fisher from the 
Admiralty.48 
 Yet it was Fisher, whose reputation preceded him, who came under the most 
suspicion.  In early 1909 it was his relationship with Garvin and the Observer that was 
under investigation, and from a most unwelcome source – not McKenna and the Board 
of Admiralty but Edward Grey and the Foreign Office.  Garvin had been attempting to 
win assurances from Fisher that the large dreadnought building program was safe since 
the beginning of the year.  In February, when the internal Cabinet debate was between 
four or six ships, Fisher assured the editor the nation would have its dreadnoughts: “Well 
you want me to tell you ‘May I assume absolutely that the six are secured’?  Yes you 
may!  I have had to hunt for the red ink so as to emphasize that!  I nearly wrote it in my 
own blood!”49  The First Sea Lord also offered Garvin advice on how to present the still-
private material to the press: “I suggest to you on consideration to leave out the words 
                                                 
47 Asquith to Lloyd George, 8 Feb 1909; Lloyd George to Asquith, 8 Feb 1909, quoted in Morris, 
Scaremongers, 176. 
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‘Cabinet inspired’ in my proposed words to you because though true, it gives me away 
as of course what you say will unfortunately be put down as emanating from me.”50  And 
before the option of an eight-ship program had even been put before Parliament, Garvin 
had been alerted to the possibility: “Secret.  We shall build 8 if necessary when next 
March comes!”51 
 To this point, Garvin had written nothing publicly objectionable about the 1909 
estimates.  He was careful to hide Fisher’s words as the admiral had requested, and the 
Observer had not been the first paper to report on the issue of the proposed larger 
program.  It was when the debate shifted to the ‘we want eight’ campaign that the 
relationship between Fisher and Garvin became a matter of concern to the government.  
In late March 1909 the Observer ran an article claiming that Grey, who was known to 
support the four contingent ships, was prepared to resign if they were not approved by 
the Cabinet.  This was true – but it was also manifestly privileged Cabinet-level 
information.  Grey had not spoken with any journalists on the matter, and he was 
determined to find out who had leaked the information to Garvin.52  On 22 March 
Garvin received a portentous dispatch from Fisher, which contained an ominous letter 
sent to the latter earlier that day by Grey:  
                                                 
50 Fisher to Garvin, 5 Feb 1909, HRC JLG R, Fisher 7; Fisher also requested that Garvin omit references 
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52 Morris, Scaremongers, 180. 
 
  
267 
 
It is reported to me that Garvin is telling people that he has it direct from you that I 
shall insist on the second four ships being ordered this year.  I don’t think this can 
be true, & if so it is very unfair to you, & Garvin should be made to retract the 
statement.  As to the substance […] I very much resent any individual member of a 
Cabinet making his own opinions public before the Cabinet has come to a decision 
& I should resent […] my own opinions being published, even if they were 
correctly given.  I haven’t seen Garvin, so he hasn’t got anything from me: if he is 
making a sheer guess he may be kept to himself, but he must be brought to book 
on the statement that he got it from you.53 
 
 Fisher immediately realized the danger posed by the foreign secretary’s 
accusation.  “Here is a letter from Grey which is very awkward indeed,” he wrote the 
editor.  “I have replied to him that I am sure you will disclaim any idea of quoting me to 
anyone in the sense he mentions. […] Perhaps you could kindly send me a letter to Sir E. 
Grey to disclaim me as an authority for your statements.”54  Of course, Fisher had been 
the authority behind the statements.  The previous week he had seen a draft of the 
Observer article, for which he congratulated Garvin: “I think your article just the thing!  
You have unwittingly used exact phrases of mine to Grey & the Prime Minister – 
They’ll say ‘collusion’! – I shall reply ‘the coincidence of common sense’! […] Burn 
this & don’t give me away!”55  But the foreign secretary could not know.   Grey’s letter 
posed another difficulty for both Garvin and Fisher – who had told Grey of their 
meetings?  Garvin readily admitted to Grey that he had both spoken with Fisher and told 
two journalistic colleagues of their meeting.  One was Lord Northcliffe, whom both 
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Garvin and Fisher considered above all reproach in terms of maintaining confidence.  
The other was Valentine Chirol, head of The Times’ Foreign Department.56  Chirol 
believed that Fisher had been aware of the German threat for months, and had previously 
written privately to Garvin that Fisher “is not to be trusted as the head of the Navy […] 
what makes his responsibility exceptionally heavy is the exceptional position which he 
enjoyed & which no other Sea Lord before him enjoyed – coupled with the exceptional 
support he had secured for himself from the chief organs of public opinion.”57  Fisher 
had likewise already warned Arnold White to be “more on your guard against making 
any covert allusion to anything in our conversation or any mention whatever of Sir E. 
Grey as I last night discovered that a scoundrel called Chirol who I don’t know but is 
influential on the ‘Times’ management is trying to get me wrong with Sir E. Grey.”58  
Yet Garvin either did not appreciate or ignored Chirol’s hostility towards Fisher and 
openly discussed Fisher’s take on high-level Cabinet meetings with the Times 
correspondent. 
 Fisher and Garvin believed the best defense was a good offense.  The First Sea 
Lord mildly rebuked the editor, pointedly writing to “remember Chirol is false […] well, 
I told you so!”  But the more pressing issue was cleaning up the mess that had been 
created: “It looks as if we were going to have a repeat of the famous Tweedmouth 
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correspondence when I had to write to you to smash up a lie!”59  Garvin replied to 
Grey,60 acknowledging that he had been in communication with Fisher but claiming any 
breach of professional or journalistic etiquette lay with Chirol; Garvin had spoken with 
the latter “in the most strictly confidential intercourse, upon the assurance of both 
[Northcliffe and Chirol] as a matter of honour and the public interest that confidence 
would be absolutely kept.”  In return Chirol had severely misrepresented Fisher’s 
argument – particularly the idea that Grey had threatened resignation – to the foreign 
secretary.  Garvin ended on an aggrieved note: “The report to you is an outrage really 
unexampled of its kind in my experience; and when even you write in such terms upon 
such evidence I feel as though the air in these difficult circumstances was getting filled 
with a mania for prejudgment.  If you can communicate to me the name of your 
informant I shall know how to deal with him.”61 
 Essentially, Garvin was deflecting any blame from himself by openly admitting 
that he had spoken with Fisher, but claiming the First Sea Lord had spoken only of his 
own thoughts on the contingent ships; if Garvin had successfully deduced Grey’s 
motives it was due entirely to his knowledge of Grey’s “character & all the 
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circumstances of this crisis.”62  Surprisingly, this aggressive approach worked.  Grey 
apologized to the editor, hoping that the incident would not “make mischief between you 
and anyone else.”  He did warn Garvin that it was “intolerable” for the “confidential 
relations” of “a man in a position of responsibility” to be bandied about in the press.  “If 
that rule breaks down the safe conduct of public opinion by the men entrusted with them 
becomes impossible.  That is why I wanted to clear the matter up at once as between 
Fisher and me; and it could only be done by his clearing it up as between you and 
himself.”63  This was a victory for Garvin, but a much more tenuous triumph for Fisher.  
He believed that he had earned the enmity of Chirol, and for some months afterwards 
warned Garvin, Arnold White and James Thursfield to beware the sinister machinations 
of the foreign correspondent.64  He had angered Grey much more demonstrably.  As 
Fisher wrote to Garvin, “I fear [Grey] & I are estranged but it can’t be helped […] the 
lukewarm and the waverers will now cast in their lot against me.”65  Each internal 
investigation Fisher survived weakened his ability to deflect or handwave away future 
inquiries, and the circumstantial evidence of his mishandling classified information was 
growing ever stronger. 
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 Still, Fisher and the Admiralty were able to win battles on the field of public 
opinion.  The Admiralty got its eight ships in April when the four contingent 
dreadnoughts were approved, ostensibly in response to accelerated warship construction 
by the Italian and Austro-Hungarian navies.66  Fisher had one last major personal victory 
with the early dismissal of Charles Beresford from command of the Channel Fleet in 
March 1909 at the height of the ‘we want eight’ crisis.  Beresford’s dismissal was not 
directly related to the 1909 estimates; Fisher had been pushing for it for nearly a year to 
high-ranking ears.  In June 1908 he informed King Edward VII that Beresford and his 
supporters in the press were creating a “pronounced attitude of antagonism to Admiralty 
policy and administration” that “rendered it impossible for the present state of affairs to 
continue.”67   
 Fisher wavered on whether he preferred Beresford afloat or at home.  He initially 
told Francis Knollys, the king’s private secretary, that it would be better to have 
Beresford “in the Mediterranean than in Parliament.  In the Mediterranean we can sit 
upon him – in Parliament no one can!”68  Yet a month later he complained to Esher that 
Knollys had requested a lighter touch with Beresford: “It’s impossible!  You can’t let 
                                                 
66 Moll, “Politics, Power and Panic,” 140-141; how concerned the Admiralty was about increased 
shipbuilding in the Mediterranean is debatable, particularly after the Entente Cordiale.  A cynical observer 
might see Austro-Hungarian naval construction as a useful excuse to bow to public pressure for more 
British ships. 
 
67 Fisher to McKenna, 15 Jun 1908, CCA MCKN, 3/4. 
 
68 Fisher to Knollys, 8 Sep 1908, quoted in Richard Freeman, The Great Edwardian Naval Feud: 
Beresford’s Vendetta against Fisher (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Maritime, 2009), 170.  Freeman notes 
that Fisher was incorrect; Beresford commanded the Channel Fleet, not the Mediterranean. 
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authority be flouted as he continually flouts the Admiralty.  Daily he is doing something 
traitorous and mutinous.”69  Fisher also worked to shore up opposition to Beresford 
within the Admiralty.  Vice Admiral Francis Bridgeman, C-in-C Home Fleet, had 
written to Fisher complaining of Beresford’s high-handed anti-Admiralty behavior.  
Fisher agreed with Bridgeman in his reply, stating that he had “seen the First Lord and 
my colleagues and they all greatly resent Beresford’s line of conduct in criticising the 
management of any part of your command.”  Fisher recommended Bridgeman send an 
official letter to the Admiralty, as opposed to private correspondence, expressing his 
displeasure with Beresford’s “disparaging and unsubstantiated criticisms and reflections 
[…] which may lead to serious consequences.”  He also reassured Bridgeman that 
McKenna would support such a letter, noting the First Lord “told me to tell you privately 
that he […] would have told Beresford ‘to go to hell.’”70  In late 1908 an official 
decision was made on Beresford’s future employment.  It was not per se a forced 
resignation, but Beresford’s tenure as C-in-C of the Channel Fleet would last two years 
instead of the traditional three.71 
                                                 
69 Fisher to Esher, 8 Oct 1908, in Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought II, 43; emphasis in original. 
 
70 Fisher to Bridgeman, n.d. [1909], CCA FISR, 15/2/1/5; emphasis in original.  Fisher would gain an ally 
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 Beresford knew his command would be terminated prematurely by September of 
1908, and he had no doubts as to who was behind the resolution.  Arthur Pollen, a naval 
author and inventor who was friendly with the admiral, wrote him agreeing that “those 
who knew you and the facts knew that there was only one condition on which the 
hatchet could be buried, and that is that our Oriental friend had surrendered to you and 
not you to him.”72  Beresford refused to surrender, choosing to wait out the remaining 
six months of his seagoing command.  Although he feared that remaining with the 
Channel Fleet instead of making a show of early retirement would only give Fisher, with 
his “unlimited control of the Press,” more control over naval policy,73 Beresford decided 
to “stick to my post as Commander-in-Chief until I was relieved.”  As he told his 
colleague and like-minded officer Rear Admiral Doveton Sturdee, “if I had gone 
voluntarily […] I should have had the whole of the Fisher press pointing out that I 
thought I knew more than the Admiralty, the Cabinet, and both Front Benches, all of 
whom I should have had against me to fight single-handed.”74  
 Beresford used his remaining months to plan his future in politics and public life 
in London.  He made no secret that he would spend the majority of his time harassing 
Fisher.  Such vehemence made some of his potential political allies uncomfortable.  
                                                 
72 Pollen to Beresford, 7 Sep 1908, quoted in Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: 
Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 181. 
 
73 Beresford to John de Robeck, 6 Aug 1908, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, 
Admiral Sir John de Robeck Papers (hereafter CCA DRBK), 3/26. 
 
74 Beresford to Sturdee, 21 Oct 1910, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, Admiral 
Sir Doveton Sturdee Papers (hereafter CCA SDEE), 3/2. 
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Conservative politician Walter Long, while he was “indignant at the treatment 
[Beresford] had received” at the hands of the Admiralty, believed the “public mind” 
found “your views, however well founded, […] probably too much coloured by your 
personal opinion of Sir J.F.”  He informed Beresford that the Conservative Party was 
“determin[ed] to do nothing” on the admiral’s behalf “which is calculated to drag the 
Navy into the whirlpool of Party politics or to weaken us in our efforts to bring the 
country to a true appreciation of the [naval] situation.”75  Former foreign secretary Lord 
Lansdowne warned Arthur Balfour, leader of the Conservative Party, that “it would not 
surprise me if Beresford were to break openly with the Admiralty.  He […] cannot 
expect to do much more afloat but he probably looks forward to a brilliant spell of 
notoriety at home.”  Although Beresford was known to have “very intimate relations 
with the Press,” Lansdowne would “not like to have him as an ally.”76  Thus warned, 
Balfour would not have been surprised when Beresford came to him requesting 
assistance early in 1909.  Still, the former prime minister could not have anticipated the 
admiral’s demands.  Beresford expected that the Liberal government would presently 
fall, and in exchange for the position of First Sea Lord under a theoretical Conservative 
ministry he would agree to abstain from publicly attacking Fisher.  Without such a 
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promise from Balfour, Beresford threatened to “stump the country and agitate” against 
the Admiralty.77 
 Major figures in the Conservative Party were not overly enthusiastic about 
Beresford’s post-command plans, but the popular admiral maintained a broad base of 
support among both the press and, importantly, portions of the Admiralty.  Captain 
David Beatty, commanding a battleship in the Atlantic Fleet, was part of a growing 
group of younger officers not in the Fishpond who welcomed any attempt to knock 
Fisher off his pedestal at the Admiralty.  Beatty expected Beresford would quickly return 
to politics, where he would “be a sore thorn in Jacky Fisher’s side, which won’t be any 
harm.”78  Beatty wrote to his wife that “old J.F. has not a bed of roses in front of him, 
and C.B. intends to stir him up properly before he has finished with him.  And I think, in 
consequence J.F. will likely go before it gets too hot.”79  This suited Beresford’s press 
allies.  When he officially hauled down his flag in March 1909, the admiral was greeted 
by cheering crowds on his return to Portsmouth.80 The Standard declared Beresford had 
                                                 
77 Richard Hough, Admiral of the Fleet: The Life of John Fisher (New York: Macmillan Company, 1969), 
290-291. Balfour declined Beresford’s offer, and in any event the Liberal government did not fall.  
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78 Beatty to Ethel Beatty, 13 Feb 1909.  Quoted in Chalmers, W.S.  The Life and Letters of David, Earl 
Beatty (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951). 92. 
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been forced into retirement “because he has fearlessly told the truth.”81  The Imperial 
Maritime League, with the assistance of Leo Maxse, held a “Public Demonstration 
against the Passing of our Naval Supremacy and The Dismissal of Lord Charles 
Beresford.”82  The festivities included naval shanties and musical accompaniment; 
Fisher sent a copy of the program to McKenna, warning the first lord that it would 
“make you shake in your shoes!”83 
 Fisher, who had shrugged off attacks against his policies so many times 
previously, was mistaken to be so indifferent towards Beresford’s departure from active 
service.  As an acquaintance of Beresford had written the previous year, the admiral had 
remained afloat until his forced departure because “his one object (and he has been 
working up to it from a boy) has been the command of the Channel Fleet.”  With this 
opportunity taken from him, Beresford was free to publicly express his views on the 
state of the navy – and he “would hold himself a traitor if he cannot bring home to the 
Country the demoralisation and dry-rot which has set in and is ruining the Navy.”84  
Balfour had declined to offer Beresford the position of First Sea Lord at their previously 
                                                 
81 24 Mar 1909, quoted in Geoffrey Bennett, Charlie B: A Biography of Admiral Lord Beresford of 
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83 Fisher to McKenna, 27 Feb 1909, in Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought II, 225. 
 
84 Unknown correspondent to Garvin, 16 Jan 1908, CCA FISR, 3/2; the letter’s author was attempting to 
set up a meeting between Garvin and Carlyon Bellairs to discuss ways the two could support Beresford, 
but Garvin was not interested. 
 
  
277 
 
discussed meeting; when Beresford then claimed he would begin a public campaign 
against the Admiralty, Balfour suggested he at least raise his concerns about naval 
effectiveness to Asquith first.  In late March 1909, less than a month after leaving the 
Channel Fleet, Beresford and Asquith spent a long meeting discussing the latter’s 
thoughts on the state of the navy.  Surprisingly, Asquith was of a similar mind – 
Beresford’s charges were legitimate enough to “call for prompt and thorough 
examination.”  The Committee of Imperial Defence would conduct an investigation of 
Fisher’s tenure at the Admiralty to ensure the navy’s resources were being effectively 
utilized.85  Officially, it was the “Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence 
appointed to inquire into certain questions of Naval Policy raised by Lord Charles 
Beresford.”86  The public knew it as the Beresford Inquiry. 
 The Inquiry met sporadically from April to July 1909.  The actual proceedings, 
which have been ably covered in great detail in multiple monographs, are beyond the 
scope of this study.  Most contemporary observers concluded (1) that it was somewhat 
biased towards Beresford – he was allowed to submit his own list of serving officers to 
be called in support of his claims, and they included such avowed members of the 
                                                 
85 Morris, Scaremongers, 192.  Beresford was also able to get Esher removed from the investigation, as the 
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Syndicate of Discontent as Reginald Custance and Doveton Sturdee, while Fisher was 
barred from speaking with the committee unless in response to questioning – and (2) that 
Beresford made a poor impression regardless, repeatedly forgetting details of his own 
service history when faced with McKenna’s pointed inquiries.87 
 Fisher initially regarded the inquiry in the same manner as the earlier 
investigations of his contact with the press – as an unnecessary annoyance that would 
nevertheless be quickly overcome.  He realized the power the Committee of Imperial 
Defence held, however, and did not engage in any schemes with his journalistic allies.  
Instead he counseled calm, even though – as he wrote to W. T. Stead – “the atmosphere 
of this enquiry is pro-Beresford! […] The Admiralty being dislocated & the Navy in 
revolution because fearful of a windbag!”88  Still, as Fisher told Arnold White, “silence 
is the thing – throw a stone at a yelping cur & he only barks the more!”89  He was 
determined not to let the inquiry affect him; as he declared to Julian Corbett, “I will not 
flee.  I will not be kicked out!”90 
                                                 
87 This paragraph is compiled from the most detailed account of the inquiry, chapter 9 of Richard 
Freeman’s The Great Edwardian Naval Feud (175-220); however, Freeman is a strong supporter of Fisher 
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 Many of Fisher’s press allies supported this plan of campaign, and they kept both 
Fisher and one another privately informed as to progress of the investigation while 
refraining from alarmist leading articles.  Arnold White wrote to Garvin that Beresford’s 
“balloon is deflating and is nearly on the ground.”91  Garvin was an extremely 
enthusiastic supporter of Fisher during the inquiry, and wrote multiple letters of support 
to the First Sea Lord: “You are stronger on the whole than you have been for three years 
and after July [when the inquiry was predicted to conclude] you will become a popular 
legend.  That is what is required to get rid once for all [sic.] of the music-hall myth that 
has given so much trouble.”  Garvin confessed that it was “a personal happiness for me, 
my dear Admiral, to feel that things have turned, and the wicked imp in me that is 
always watching everybody, even myself, rolls over with fun to think of solemn persons 
who will now explain they were with you all the time.”92  As the inquiry wound to a 
close the editor suggested a dinner in support of Fisher, with himself, Esher, Stead, 
White, and Thursfield among the guests;93 as for those within the Admiralty who would 
disagree with Fisher’s inevitable vindication, Garvin suggested finding “some means of 
                                                 
91 White to Garvin, 13 May 1909; White continued that Beresford was so near defeat he felt it would be 
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cashiering every officer who will not accept the Inquiry as final and who tries in any 
way to keep up mutiny.”94 
 Some of Fisher’s oldest allies did express concerns about the increasing calls for 
an investigation into Fisher’s Admiralty and the national feeling it represented.  In a 
reversal of the usual contact between the two, James Thursfield warned Fisher: “I don’t 
want any information you get from me to go beyond yourself.”  If the correspondence 
between the two men was discovered, worried Thursfield, the only result could be both 
men’s dismissal; while Fisher would find “an asylum in the House of Lords […] if I 
were kicked out there would be nothing but the Workhouse or an Old Age Pension.”95  
Just before the Beresford Inquiry – which could only have confirmed his views on the 
matter – Arnold White sent Fisher a long letter in which he attempted to explain to the 
admiral why many influential voices in parliament and the press wanted a change: 
For some years you have been the Navy.  Your personality has dominated minds 
of every type, from the metaphysician to the schoolmaster, from the tenant farmer 
to the professional politician.  People trusted you because you compelled their 
trust.  Latterly, however, Custance & Co have made a breach in this trust, mainly 
because the public do not understand the violent contrast between the almost 
theatrical claims to supremacy at sea with which they have been regaled and the 
facts of recurrent scares.  I am not speaking of your enemies, but of the solid and 
weighty opinion, deliberately formed and, when formed, acted on with resolution.  
The fact that the drawing rooms and the clubs are chiefly against you is 
immaterial.  What is not immaterial is the abiding sense of some of the best minds 
of our time that you have far too much power, and that you have not used your 
                                                 
94 Garvin to Fisher, n.d. [1909], HRC JLG L, Fisher. 
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power well.  If I could use one word that sums up the opposition to you of 
impartial and serious men, it would be their belief in its ‘theatricality.’ […] To 
grasp all is to lose all, and I am afraid that a very determined effort will be made to 
recover the Admiralty from your strong grasp.  The English always pull up their 
seeds to see how they are growing and they don’t mind crucifying their Christs in 
any walk of life.  If you have read this far without anger at such presumption let 
me entreat you not to be driven from office, but to leave as Elijah left with his 
policy established and his cloak on the shoulders of his Second in Command.96 
 
 Arnold White was to be proven correct.  The Beresford Inquiry, even while still 
underway, opened the floodgates of Fisher criticism from journalistic, professional and 
political sources.  With Fisher’s tenure at the Admiralty now officially under 
investigation, anyone who had reason to speak out against the First Sea Lord could tell 
their story publicly – including naval officers.97  By total coincidence, almost 
simultaneously with Beresford’s demand for an investigation came another accusation of 
the First Sea Lord.  George Armstrong, editor of the Globe, was running for Parliament 
as a Conservative.  Part of his campaign was a focus on cleaning up the Admiralty, and 
to this end he claimed to have documents proving that Fisher was running essentially a 
network of informers within the Navy.  Unfortunately for Fisher, Armstrong had 
evidence backing up his claims; a series of letters between Fisher and Captain Reginald 
Bacon in 1905 and 1906 (discussed previously) had fallen into Armstrong’s hands. 
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 It is unclear how Armstrong obtained the Fisher-Bacon correspondence, or even 
if he had copies at all.  If he did it was due to Fisher’s poor judgment in having them 
printed and circulated for internal Admiralty use.98  Fisher saw the entire incident as yet 
another conspiracy to remove him from power, particularly as Armstrong had served in 
the Royal Navy in the 1890s and had been dismissed after a vague run-in with Fisher.99  
He was confident that any investigation into the matter would not resonate with the 
general population: “I don’t think my countrymen will stand the blackmailer & publisher 
of private letters […] I think the public will go on the big issue & forgive the abundance 
of the heart in my private letters however hot & imprudent but I don’t remember writing 
one word I regret!”100  And he was right.  Although McKenna was forced to admit in the 
House of Commons that Fisher and Bacon had indeed maintained a correspondence, he 
and Fisher both maintained that it was entirely professional, and no further action was 
taken.101   
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 Yet the Armstrong controversy occurring simultaneously with the Beresford 
Inquiry made Fisher’s Admiralty, in the eyes of many, seem untrustworthy.  There were 
other, lesser incidents, some of which involved serving naval officers who had become 
disillusioned with Fisher’s leadership.  Captain John de Robeck, a Beresford ally posted 
to the Channel Fleet, accused Fisher of sending confidential material to the Naval and 
Military Record.102  Fellow captain Herbert Richmond wrote in his diary that Fisher was 
dealing with the inquiry by bringing an entire yacht’s worth of journalists along to a fleet 
review: “Fisher must have the Press men to himself: he must be the centre of the show: 
he must get his réclame [advertisement].  He was disgusting[;] there he was, right in his 
element in the middle of the mob of people none of whom knew anything about the 
Navy […] entertaining them prodigiously I have no doubt.”  Richmond found “the 
whole show disgusting, & a degradation of the office of the 1st Sea Lord.”  Significantly, 
he was not perturbed by Fisher’s dealing with the press.  Rather, he took issue with 
Fisher “so lowering himself as to think it necessary that he alone should [be] the one & 
only star in the firmament: that his colleagues are nothing: that all attention must be 
attracted to him, as though his office was not high & dignified enough without these 
adventitious aids to attention.”103   
 This was a complaint that Fisher could not have foreseen – that young officers 
who should have been comfortably in the Fishpond would accept the methods but reject 
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the man.  It was echoed by David Beatty – who sincerely felt that if the Inquiry “will 
only make a scapegoat to stamp out this accursed spirit of espionage, jealousy, and time-
serving initiated by Fisher, they will earn the gratitude of the country as a whole and the 
Navy in particular”104 – and Captain Rosslyn Wemyss, who less charitably believed 
Fisher was “blending his own and the Services’ interest to his detriment of his powers 
[…] I really think the whole lot of them should be put in a sack and drowned.”105 
 As the Inquiry proceeded throughout the spring and summer, the majority of 
Fisher’s journalistic allies followed his advice and maintained a stoic silence.  The 
Syndicate of Discontent was bound by no such rules.  Beresford claimed at regular 
intervals that he was out to “expose the most powerful Press bureau in the world” and 
“call evidence as to who [Fisher’s] friends are in the press,”106 and he made sure that 
news of these threats made it back to Fisher.  This was a bluff, but Beresford did 
pressure H. A. Gwynne of the Standard for aid in tying Beresford’s personal dislike of 
Fisher to the larger Conservative debate over naval administration.107  Beresford’s other 
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press allies needed no urging to agitate.  The Imperial Maritime League released a series 
of pamphlets calling for a wholesale reorganization of the Admiralty and the removal of 
Fisher, “the evil genius of the Navy.”108  Leo Maxse’s National Review had always 
strongly supported Beresford, but Charles à Court Repington still chastised the editor: 
“you have scarcely gibbeted Fisher sufficiently.”  Repington helpfully offered to aid 
Maxse by sending him an article on “the hypnotism which Fisher continues to exercise 
upon politicians & much of the press.”109  It was obvious to attentive observers that “a 
large proportion of the Press, including the stolid & correct Times, appear to be waking 
to the conclusion that they in general, and the Navy in particular, have had about enough 
of John Fisher […] it is quite extraordinary that a man who has jumped and bounced 
himself into such a position should have derived so much notoriety of an objectionable 
character.”110 
 The final report of the Beresford Inquiry, after nineteen meetings, was released in 
early August.  It was extremely technical, and none of Beresford’s supposed insights into 
the ‘Admiralty press bureau’ were represented.  Fisher and his allies were optimistic that 
the report would nullify all of Beresford’s claims.  Garvin was sure the result would be 
“the bursting of the biggest of all recorded gasbags” and the end of the “flatulent mass of 
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self-contradictory humbug” that was Beresford.111  Yet the committee’s findings 
satisfied neither side in full upon their publication.  Essentially, the Inquiry found that 
the vast majority of Beresford’s accusations as to the state of naval preparedness were 
unfounded; the real issue was that the Admiralty had become splintered into cliques, led 
by Fisher and Beresford, that had not been communicating effectively with each other 
for some time (this carried with it an implicit criticism of Beresford for not accepting the 
authority of his superior officers).  Fisher was mildly censured for not maintaining an 
effective naval war staff, which had been a favorite project of Beresford’s since the 
1880s.112 
 Due to the climate of suspicion and finger-pointing becoming ever more 
prevalent within the Admiralty, a report that could really only be taken at face value as a 
minor victory for Beresford became a major defeat for Fisher.  By not squelching all of 
Beresford’s criticisms, the committee had allowed him to continue his anti-Admiralty 
campaign unabated – although to be fair to the committee it could not have effectively 
reproved Beresford to a greater degree, as he had already been forced to give up his 
command.  Fisher was not officially reprimanded in any way, and the King reiterated his 
strong support for the First Sea Lord.113  But Fisher knew, as he wrote to his assistant T. 
E. Crease, that anything less than total victory left the door open for Beresford’s 
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continued agitation: “I am bitterly disappointed by the Committee’s report.  It’s a most 
cowardly production […] I am very sick about it all, considering what each member of 
the Committee had previously said to me.”114  To the Committee of Imperial Defence’s 
secretary, Charles Ottley, Fisher complained that the committee, by “not squashing 
Beresford when they had the chance,” had “given Beresford a fresh leash of 
insubordination.”115 
 Beresford almost immediately proved Fisher’s fears justified.  In October he 
published his correspondence with Asquith dating back to early in the year, which dealt 
mainly with what he called the “intimidation on the one hand and favouritism on the 
other for which the Admiralty have of late years been notorious,” in The Times.116  His 
reason for doing so, as he wrote to both his political and naval allies, was to “prove […] 
by the correspondence that blackmail was going on in order to enable the mulatto to 
carry out his autocratic and dangerous administration […] it is this system of blackmail 
that has enabled him, or as I shall say, the Board, to put the Navy into its present position 
of complete disorganisation….”117  He was joined by Syndicate supporters like the 
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retired admiral and veteran navalist C .C. Penrose Fitzgerald, who wrote to Leopold 
Maxse that he had also been a victim of Fisher’s favoritism, as Fisher had “blighted and 
embittered the last five years of my service on the active list […] because I refused to be 
one of his jackals.”  Fitzgerald asked Maxse not to quote him by name as his sons were 
serving naval officers, but suggested to the editor that if he searched out others who 
“could speak up you could get dozens of letters.”118 
 Beresford knew that attacking Fisher through press channels would not lead to 
the First Sea Lord’s dismissal; still, he was determined “to let the country know the 
mischievous cowardly scoundrel [Fisher] is.”119  His solution was to return to 
Parliament.  In November 1909 Beresford announced his candidacy as a Conservative 
for a by-election at Portsmouth one of the traditional homes of ‘members for the Navy.’  
Fisher was not prepared to face a barrage of Parliamentary questions from Beresford.  
He asked Garvin to write Balfour and attempt to have the Conservative Central Office 
refuse to certify Beresford as a candidate, forcing him to run as an independent and 
barring him from accepting party funds.120  Balfour demurred, responding through his 
secretary: “don’t make our headquarters position difficult.  Remember where the 
decision as to candidate really rests, and on party grounds don’t make C.B. 
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impossible.”121  Thus thwarted, Fisher turned to the naval reformer Lionel Yexley.  
Yexley was dedicated to improving the lot of the common sailor, and ran the lower-deck 
journal The Fleet; Fisher seems to have promised him privileged information on areas of 
emphasis for his journal and increased Admiralty attention towards his personal causes if 
Yexley would run against Beresford at Portsmouth.  Yexley turned down Fisher’s offer, 
although he remained a correspondent of the admiral; in any event the Portsmouth by-
election never took place due to the general election of January 1910.122 
 Beresford did win the Portsmouth seat as a Conservative in January.123  By the 
time he took office, however, his great battle had already been won.  Fisher never 
recovered from what he viewed as the betrayal of the Beresford Inquiry.  Although he 
maintained the support of McKenna and the king, he was devoting more and more of his 
time in office to fighting rearguard actions and less to further naval developments; it had 
been nearly four years since the launch of the Dreadnought, and Fisher believed even the 
king’s confidence was ineffective if Asquith refused to deal directly with Beresford’s 
continued agitations.124  His support among his press allies was wavering; although 
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Garvin remained dedicated, Thursfield, White and Corbett were having serious doubts as 
to his continued ability to remain effective as a reformer in office.  The entire idea of the 
Fishpond had collapsed into internal politics before it had a chance to mature into a 
functioning system.  Fisher decided quietly to retire.   
 Though he had been a fanatic writer of letters during his career, Fisher managed 
to maintain a relatively discreet silence as to both his decision and his motivations.  A 
surviving message from Fisher to W. T. Stead casting aspersions on Asquith – who was 
“reaping the fruits of his cowardice in failing to flatten out Beresford” as the latter began 
his latest campaign against the Admiralty – sheds some light on his decision,125 as does a 
confession to Arnold White that he was “getting tons of kindly advice.  I am invited to 
perform hara-kiri!”126  By late October 1909 he had agreed to accept a peerage, 
becoming Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, and announced his retirement on 25 January 1910, 
his sixty-ninth birthday.127  The Fisher era was over. 
 News of Fisher’s impending retirement was met with an outpouring of public and 
private support from his allies.  W. T. Stead, Fisher’s oldest backer in the press, 
compiled a frankly hagiographic pamphlet on Fisher’s career.  “No man has been more 
fiercely assailed,” wrote Stead of Fisher.  “The most monstrous accusations were hurled 
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against him by men who were not worthy to black his boots.”  And yet these “envious 
libellers and unscrupulous traducers are serviceable in creating a background of shadow 
against which the radiant central figure of the hero stands out in clearer relief.”  Stead 
also pointedly observed that Fisher had been failed by Campbell-Bannerman, Asquith, 
and Edward Grey, who “ought to have insisted upon trying by court-martial those 
officers who during the whole period of his administration did their best or worse to 
organise mutinous discontent in the Service over which he presided.”128  Fisher 
considered having a similar summary of his career (which he had written and Thursfield 
had edited) published in The Times, but was dissuaded from doing so when Thursfield 
informed him it would have to be printed under his own name and not anonymously.129 
 Navalists too privately congratulated Fisher on his tenure in command.  
Historians often quote the anonymous friend of W. T. Stead who felt “as if Nelson had 
stepped down from his monument in Trafalgar Square,” but he was not alone.130  Naval 
journalist F. T. Bullen believed that “history would record” Fisher’s services to his 
country “despite the incessant and malignant attacks of envious homunculi unworthy to 
be your errand boys.”131  Julian Corbett also spoke of the judgement of history: “What a 
glorious command it has been!  No one, I think, has ever had such a five years […] it 
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will mark an epoch as clearly and indisputably as Nelson did his.”132  Archibald Hurd 
merely hoped he had been “of any slight service […] I owe to you so much.  I was a 
child in naval matters until you educated me.”133  Fisher accepted the thanks of many 
with aplomb, but he had no time for blandishments from anyone who had opposed his 
tenure at the Admiralty or his reforms.  When he received a congratulatory letter from 
Admiral Sir George Egerton, he scribbled in the margin that it had come from “Admiral 
Egerton Judas Iscariot.  He sold me to Beresford for 30 pieces of silver.  In reply to this 
letter I told him to hang himself.”134 
 The Syndicate of Discontent saw Fisher’s retirement as a major victory.  Captain 
Oswald Frewen was happy to see the “Fisher regime, damn it, totter […] to its fall.”  Leo 
Maxse’s National Review declared that Fisher, now a civilian, was “entitled to the 
nearest lamp post” for endangering the nation.135  Naval journalist Fred Jane was more 
succinct: “Thank God he is gone.”136  Beresford himself was unable to attend the 
celebratory dinner held by his supporters, but suggested a suitable toast via telegram: 
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“To the death of fraud, espionage, intimidation, corruption, tyranny, self-interest, which 
have been a nightmare over the finest service in the world for four years.”137 
 Many of Fisher’s allies encouraged him to take a page from Beresford’s book 
and use his retirement to conduct a public campaign against his political and naval 
enemies.  Esher, Thursfield, and Arnold White all pushed him to speak in his own 
defense, which Fisher refused to do; White went further and recommended Fisher 
“consult those who love you, like Garvin and myself, as to the effect on public opinion 
of what you say” before reaching out to the populace.138  There was a personal 
motivation for White; he had also written to John St Loe Strachey, editor of the 
Spectator, asking that the paper refute its previous accusations as to the very existence of 
an ‘Admiralty press bureau,’ as they “had wounded me to the quick […] I think in this 
way oblique light will be thrown on the fact that the support you have received from the 
Press has been not corrupt but disinterested and legitimate, and this will make people 
think of the true dimensions of your work.”139  Strachey did not reply, but Fisher did, 
offering a final justification of his methods over the previous twenty-five years: “I can 
truthfully say I never sought the Press, but I recognized it as the one and only engine that 
could effect the vast revolution […] as without the Press it could not all have been done.  
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It may not be politic to say this, but it is true.”  But Fisher purposely separated himself 
from those who “gave dejeuners [lunches] to the Press like Beresford and Co at 
Claridge’s or in [his] flagship.”  Fisher had maintained a correspondence with White for 
decades, but he believed he had nothing to apologize for: after all, they had lunched 
together only twice.140  Fisher claimed that he had used facts, not bravado and glamor, to 
win the press over to his side, which made all the difference. 
 Fisher sought to reassure his journalistic allies that although he was gone, his 
reforms would continue.  He was still involved with the Committee of Imperial Defence 
(he confidently assured Thursfield that he had turned down their offer of the committee’s 
presidency so as not to attract undue attention), but “my mission as I once told you is 
that of the mole – my existence only to be known by upheavals.”141  He also made vague 
allusions to his future return.  “I am buried for a year,” he wrote to Arnold White.  “But 
in the tomb I am not wasting time.”142  At the Admiralty, Fisher confidently assured 
Garvin “my 4 sea friends on the Board of Admiralty are not going to let things down!  
I’ve left a memo […] that no Cabinet would dare to see published if they tried to let 
things down.”  He ended with a reminder to the editor that at the end of the day it was 
the Royal Navy’s administration that had pushed for the warships that were defending 
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the nation: “Who got the 8?  Do you really believe that any outside pressure did it?  but 
let it be thought it did!”143 
 Would Fisher’s successor at the Admiralty indeed live up to his legacy?  The 
incoming First Sea Lord was Admiral Sir Arthur Knyvet Wilson.  He was not the 
youthful protégé that Fisher had hoped for; in fact he was only a year younger than the 
departing admiral, and his tenure could not be long.  But he was a firm believer in 
Fisher’s reform program, and was purposely chosen to ensure the Fisher reforms would 
endure.144   
 Arthur Wilson may have been dedicated to Fisher’s program, but he was not 
willing to maintain the same contact with the press that had been so essential to the 
public relations success of Fisher’s Admiralty.  The press noticed.  Arnold White wrote 
to Fisher that Wilson was “running a serious & dangerous risk both in switching off 
public interest from the Navy, and in leaving the formation of public opinion to men like 
Sir G. Armstrong & Co.”145  Garvin worried that due to Wilson’s lack of self-promotion 
“the country has forgotten again that there is a First Sea Lord.  It is this utter lack of 
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present interest in naval personalities and things that I don’t like.”146  Fisher stressed to 
his supporters that none of his reforms were in danger, but he was concerned as well. 147  
He wrote to Gerard Fiennes, assistant editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, that Wilson had 
just informed him the annual maneuvers had gone quite well.  Wilson had not informed 
the London papers, which had reported the fleets had struggled: “the natural 
consequence of an unintelligent ban on the Press,” Fisher believed.148  Characteristically, 
he bolstered his allies’ spirits not by emphasizing Wilson’s fitness for the position but by 
reassuring them that “if there was war I should be back.”149 
 Even in retirement, Fisher was determined to keep the navy in the public 
consciousness.  With Wilson proving to be an unhelpful ally, Fisher turned to McKenna, 
who remained as First Lord of the Admiralty after Fisher’s departure.  Fisher respected 
McKenna as “a born fighter and a good hater,” and was determined to keep him from 
being toppled either at the hands of Conservatives or Radicals.150  He encouraged his 
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supporters in the press to throw their weight behind McKenna, for example in this letter 
to Garvin: “I have just had a visit here from McKenna. […] He has had clear notice that 
Lloyd George & Winston are going to do their utmost possible to Jonah him.  So 
agitation must not cease.”151 
 The former First Sea Lord also put McKenna into direct contact with many 
prominent navalists.  He had introduced McKenna to Lionel Yexley shortly before his 
retirement, and Arnold White met with McKenna of his own accord.152  After his 
departure from the Admiralty, Fisher set up meetings between the First Lord and the 
naval journalists John Leyland, Gerard Fiennes and Archibald Hurd.  His letter to Hurd 
typifies how these connections were made.  Fisher had spoken highly of Hurd to 
McKenna, and recommended that Hurd “go on & cultivate him as he will be a very 
useful & valuable friend for you to have.”153  McKenna also made his own contacts, 
                                                 
151 Fisher to Garvin, 4 Aug 1910, HRC JLG R, Fisher 9.  Similar letters went out to Thursfield, Stead, and 
Hurd.  Fisher to Thursfield, 21 Jan 1911, CCA FISR, 1/27; Fisher to Stead, 4 Aug [n.y.], CCA STED, 
1/27; Fisher to Hurd, 8 Aug 1910, Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, Sir 
Archibald Hurd Papers (hereafter CCA HURD), 1/14.  It is interesting to note that Fisher specifically 
asked Thursfield to shield McKenna from the radical criticism of F. W. Hirst (editor of the Economist) 
and Henry Massingham (editor of the Nation). 
 
152 Carew, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 16; White to Fisher, 1 Feb 1911, CCA FISR, 3/5. 
 
153 Fisher to Hurd, 19 Jun 1910, CCA HURD 1/14; Fisher to Leyland, 12 Oct 1910, CCA FISR, 15/3/2/4; 
Fiennes to Fisher, 19 Jan 1911, CCA FISR, 3/4.  Fisher had spoken of Hurd to McKenna as early as 
February: “I won’t deny I played card for you with McKenna.  Keep the ball rolling with him it will repay 
you.” Fisher to Hurd, 10 Feb 1910 [dated 10 Jul by archive], CCA HURD, 1/14. 
 
  
298 
 
including working with journalists such as Charles à Court Repington who had held no 
influence in the Fisher administration.154 
 The journalists favored by McKenna were grateful for their continued access to 
Admiralty information; Gerard Fiennes vowed to “do my utmost to support [McKenna] 
against the attacks made upon him by his own side.”155  But navalism was a two-way 
street, and McKenna was not as willing to disclose privileged information as Fisher had 
been, even when pressed; Garvin, for example, wrote that “if I could say that you […] 
desired to maintain the unconditional supremacy of the Navy, cost what it may, I should 
be delighted.”156  A great deal of correspondence passed between McKenna and editor of 
the Daily Telegraph Archibald Hurd, whom the First Lord used as a point of contact 
with other journalists, but although McKenna was willing to meet with the editor at the 
Admiralty he still did not allow Hurd to publish his parliamentary speeches as “a naval 
manifesto.”157  James Thursfield became disillusioned with McKenna’s hesitancy, and 
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complained to Fisher that “I never see anyone at the Admiralty now […] it was very 
different when you were here.”158 
 Fisher’s continued influence on the Admiralty after his departure involved more 
than simple letters of introduction, and it did not go unnoticed by his former colleagues.  
Fisher continued to prepare McKenna’s weekly briefings from his home, ensuring that 
the admiral’s strategic vision remained in place.159  He was widely suspected of 
influencing personnel decisions through his relationship with both the King and 
McKenna.160  And to be fair to Fisher’s critics, he did enjoy thinking of himself as a sort 
of on-call problem solver for the Admiralty.  When he was summoned back from a 
holiday on the Continent to meet with the First Lord, he wrote happily to Arnold White: 
“it was a very good thing that I went as I was able to ‘direct the whirlwind and control 
the storm’!  but it does sicken me to cross the trail of these pimps and intriguers and 
unabashed liars still as McKenna truly says I’m bound to do my best for the Navy and so 
I went and saw and conquered!”161 
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 These behind-the-scenes maneuvers were taking place against the backdrop of 
yet more political upheaval.  The year 1910 saw two general elections, the first in 
January and the second in December.  Both centered around an issue not directly related 
to navalism, Lloyd George’s ‘people’s budget’ and the resultant reform of the House of 
Lords, and both saw the diminution of the large Liberal majority from 1906 to near-
equality with the Conservatives in Parliament.  Naval issues played a larger role in the 
January election, which occurred less than a year after the national debate over ‘we want 
eight.’  The Times, the Observer, and the Daily Mail, all Northcliffe papers, placed 
special emphasis on naval funding; Northcliffe encouraged Garvin (who needed little 
encouragement on these matters) to focus on increased battleship construction, and even 
hired the category-defying socialist, nationalist, and supporter of conscription Robert 
Blatchford to pen a series of articles on the damage the Liberal Party was doing to the 
navy.162  These tactics were effective; as McKenna campaigned for re-election in North 
Monmouthshire he was surrounded by crowds shouting for more dreadnoughts,163 while 
Beresford won easily at Portsmouth.164 
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 Supporters of both parties viewed naval agitation rather more cynically in 1910 
than they had in the previous election of 1906.  Fisher believed “the Navy is the Tories’ 
only chance in an Election,”165 but the Tories themselves were campaigning on other 
issues while still relying on the navalist press; Leo Maxse wrote to Garvin that although 
“we can win on Joe [Chamberlain] and on nothing else […] I must say the very 
legitimate alarm aroused as regards the Navy is going to help us as it should.”166  The 
four contingent dreadnoughts from the ‘we want eight’ controversy were even seen as a 
Liberal electioneering ploy.167   
 The split election (274 Liberals and 272 Conservatives were returned to 
Parliament) left neither party satisfied, and it was immediately obvious that the issue of 
the Lloyd George budget was not solved; meanwhile, naval issues retreated to the 
background throughout the summer of 1910.  Navalism and the political sphere did cross 
in isolated incidents.  Captain Robert Arbuthnot was removed from his position after 
criticizing the Liberal Party in a public speech and warning of the imminent threat posed 
by Germany – he had read the evidence in the Daily Mail.168  Later in the year W. T. 
Stead obtained an interview with Lloyd George on naval policy.  He attempted to push 
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the Chancellor of the Exchequer into officially supporting the ‘two keels to one’ strategy 
favored by navalists – the policy that Britain would build two dreadnoughts for every 
single dreadnought constructed by a foreign power.  Although Stead “got him further 
than anybody else has been able to do,” Lloyd George stopped short of endorsing the 
idea – so Stead simply wrote in his article that Lloyd George had pushed for two keels to 
one.  Unfortunately for Stead (and fortunately for international relations), he showed 
Lloyd George a prepublication copy of the interview and the chancellor “struck it out 
much to my regret.”169 
 December 1910 brought a second general election, fought over proposed 
restrictions to the House of Lords’ veto power on legislation stemming from the earlier 
struggle to pass the Lloyd George budget.  King Edward VII had died in May, giving the 
major parties a useful justification to hold another election under the new King George 
V in an attempt to break the January deadlock.  Disappointment again followed, with the 
parties closer than ever before: 272 Liberals and 271 Conservatives.  Although Fisher 
remained concerned that navalist agitation would throw the election to the Tories and 
bring in Beresford as First Lord of the Admiralty, naval policy as a whole did not play a 
major part in either party’s election strategies.170 
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 In fact Beresford, who had been in office for nearly a year with plans to bedevil 
Fisher and any Liberal administration, was having his own troubles in Parliament.  His 
speeches on behalf of the Royal Navy were frequent, enthusiastic, and rambling.  He 
called Stead and Garvin “wild men” on the floor of the House of Commons, but tried to 
mend fences with Arnold White after years of mutual dislike; White thought he was “not 
mentally sound.”171  Winston Churchill referred to him as “one of those orators who 
before they get up, do not know what they are going to say, when they are speaking do 
not know what they are saying, and when they have sat down do not know what they 
have said.”172  His most harmful attack on Fisher came about entirely by accident when 
King George V, no admirer of Fisher’s, suggested that Beresford be promoted Admiral 
of the Fleet before his official retirement in early 1911.  Asquith and McKenna vetoed 
the suggestion, but Garvin strongly supported it in the Observer; as a result the working 
relationship between him and Fisher was severely damaged.173 
 McKenna won reelection in both 1910 contests and remained as First Lord of the 
Admiralty as the Liberal majority dwindled.  The last major change in Admiralty 
leadership before the First World War would come in October 1911.  As a result of the 
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Agadir crisis between France and Germany in Morocco, the Committee of Imperial 
Defence met to discuss war plans, particularly regarding whether Britain could utilize its 
army or navy more effectively in a general European conflict.  First Sea Lord Wilson 
was as ineffective as ever before the committee; he advocated a close blockade in the 
style of the Napoleonic Wars, was seen as “pliant” by his subordinates, and “never 
asserted himself as First Sea Lord.”174  Fisher, who had supported Wilson so strongly 
upon his appointment, complained to his daughter-in-law that his successor “was not a 
Machiavelli, and these lawyers in the Cabinet just walked round him.  When a cunning 
rogue talks at you, you must talk back!  Dear old Wilson only smiled!”175  Wilson’s 
presentation was so disastrous that the CID chose to pursue the War Office strategy 
based on sending elements of the army to France.  Asquith sensed it was time for a 
change, but rather than replacing Wilson he replaced McKenna.  He would swap 
Cabinet-level positions with the Home Secretary, effective immediately.  The new First 
Lord of the Admiralty would be Winston Churchill.176 
 On paper, Churchill was an unexpected choice to lead the Admiralty.  But 
McKenna had been an unexpected choice who had worked out well, and Churchill had 
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previously been offered the position in 1906 before it had gone to McKenna.177  In the 
intervening years he had only become, as Lloyd George observed, “more and more 
absorbed in boilers.”178  The day after accepting the position as first lord, he wrote to 
Fisher to set up a meeting between the two as soon as possible.  Although the two had 
not communicated at length since the fight over the 1909 naval estimates, Churchill 
wanted Fisher back at the Admiralty – initially as First Sea Lord for a second term, 
though this idea was quickly dropped.  Instead, Churchill requested that Fisher act as an 
unofficial advisor: “I shall most sedulously endeavour to carry you with me in my 
administration at the Admiralty and I have good hope that I shall succeed, and that you 
will feel free to be a ready and constant counsellor.”179 
 Fisher’s political allies suggested he take Churchill up on his offer.  As Esher 
wrote to Fisher: “Winston is clever – but he is young.  I think it would be better if he had 
you always at his elbow.”180  Fisher also knew that Churchill was searching for naval 
policy advice wherever he could find it, and he had put out feelers to Beresford to gauge 
the latter’s interest in a similar advisory role.181  Fisher could not allow Beresford to 
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return to the Admiralty in any capacity, and he told Churchill he must choose between 
them: “Winston wants to ride two horses at the same time – Beresford & self – I told 
him to try it – nothing like a nasty fall!”182  So Churchill chose Fisher, due both to 
Fisher’s experience with Admiralty policy and his press connections.  The admiral had 
already “suggest[ed] for your consideration those who I know and can guarantee to serve 
you well.  If you take the advice there given I can ensure absolute and brilliant success in 
your administration – but they all inter-weave with each other so it’s a case of all or 
none!”183  Accepting Fisher’s aid implicitly meant accepting the entire Fisher system, 
including the admiral’s journalistic allies. 
 Initially this was a sacrifice Churchill was willing to make.  Fisher happily wrote 
to the journalist Gerard Fiennes that Churchill’s “association with [Alan] Burgoyne 
[Conservative MP and editor of the Navy League Journal] is all to the good, and if he 
sent for Hurd, that is good also, and if you lunch with him it will be better.”184  But 
Churchill had his limits.  Archibald Hurd had a contentious meeting with the First Lord 
at the Admiralty early in the latter’s tenure – the details have not survived, but Hurd 
apologized to Churchill afterward: “I am exceedingly sorry that my first – and last – visit 
to the Admiralty since your accession to office should have been so unfortunate.  I have 
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been interested in naval affairs for over 20 years & this is my first experience of any 
unpleasantness.”  Churchill had apparently asked Hurd to serve as an informant of sorts; 
Hurd “should have liked to have complied with your request, but on a matter of principle 
I cannot give way […] I cannot join in an inquisition.”185  Churchill’s reply was mildly 
threatening: “The lack of secrecy, which prevails in this country in regard to naval 
matters, & the levity with which disclosures are regarded, appear to me to amount to a 
very considerable national evil, and unless by co-operation between the newspapers & 
the Admiralty some protection can be secured for public interests, legislation will 
undoubtedly become necessary in the near future.”  He also asked Hurd to “see me 
personally in regard to the publication of any matter of which you have reason to be in 
doubt.”186 
 This was not how successful connections between the press and the Admiralty 
were forged.  Churchill was willing to work with Fisher, but not within his system.  He 
favored making use of supportive journalists only for his own ends, as when he asked 
Garvin to deal with inflammatory statements Beresford had been making in Parliament:  
“I don’t intend to reply to Beresford, or to contradict his statements publicly […] I think 
perhaps you will like to deal with the subject.”187  He generally left everyday press 
communication to Fisher, which brought with it two inherent risks.  First, Fisher 
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generally promoted his own theories of naval policy over Churchill’s.  On one occasion 
he wrote to Garvin that “Winston is weak on the 2 keels to 1 […] you and Stead and 
Alan Burgoyne and Fiennes are all right in hammering away at the 2 keels to 1 – as it 
strengthens and backs up Winston in his own camp!”188  Secondly, retirement had not 
mellowed Fisher’s famously temperamental personality.  When Churchill promoted 
longstanding Syndicate member Admiral Sir Reginald Custance to command of the 
naval base at Devonport, Fisher was scathing: “I fear this must be my last 
communication with you in any matter at all.  I am sorry for it but I consider you have 
betrayed the Navy.”189  Fisher expressed his concern that “in the last few weeks 
[Churchill] has begun to wobble again and I have had to tell him some d—d nasty 
things.”190  Yet the latest feud between the two was resolved within weeks; Fisher could 
not bear to be away from the levers of power for long. 
 Even as Fisher continued to influence Admiralty decision making, one major 
navalist group was playing less of a part in Churchill’s Admiralty – serving naval 
officers themselves.  Those who had welcomed Fisher’s departure were disappointed to 
see him return, and as Fisher’s consultations with Churchill were not publicized (and 
officially not happening) they could not even air their grievances in the press.  At one 
point Churchill took the Admiralty yacht to Naples to visit Fisher at his summer home.  
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David Beatty commanded the yacht, and complained about the various detours necessary 
for Churchill to consult with “that old rascal Fisher.”  He warned his wife to “not 
mention in conversation with anyone that Fisher is in close confidence with Winston.  It 
would be most injurious to the Service, if it ever got out, and the Navy would hate it.”191   
 Some elements of the Conservative Party saw this reluctance to work with the 
First Lord as a result of Churchill’s politics.  Walter Long believed “the best men in the 
Navy regard W.C. and all his works with profound suspicion & grave misgiving: they 
look to us [i.e. Conservatives], to see through W.C.’s trickery & be ready to fall upon his 
misdeeds.”192  In reality – and in contrast to the situation even two years previously – it 
was the presence of journalists within the Admiralty’s highest circles that unsettled 
many officers.  Fisher apologetically wrote to naval correspondent John Leyland that he 
would not be able to meet with Admiral William May: “I don’t think it would help you 
as he is a weak spirit as regards journalists & does not realize their great value to the 
Navy.”193  Prince Louis of Battenberg, as Second Sea Lord one of the highest ranking 
figures in the Admiralty, informed Churchill in 1912 that he would no longer be 
allowing reporters to attend the annual maneuvers, as “we have had bitter experiences 
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with them in the past & I hope never to see them allowed on board ship again!  they are 
most mischievous.”194  Gestures like this, while they may have seemed very noble to the 
officers involved, deprived the Royal Navy of what had become an extremely effective 
public relations tool.195 
 The period between 1911 and the beginning of the First World War saw more 
than just the split between press and professional navalists.  The entire system of 
cooperation that had led to so many naval reforms over the previous quarter-century was 
fragmenting.  With both serving officers and Churchill’s Admiralty retreating from their 
journalistic supporters, there was no reason for authors and editors to pen favorable 
articles on naval matters unless they were personally invested in the issue, and while 
some were – Arnold White and Archibald Hurd in particular continued to publish 
navalist works – it was a more difficult sell for editors without the possibility of 
exclusive Admiralty information.  The last opportunity many journalists had to gain 
access to the corridors of power was through Fisher, but he was increasingly unreliable – 
often at odds with Churchill, and increasingly willing to cut out old acquaintances over 
perceived slights.196  
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 As for party politics, navalism became less of a national concern following the 
1909 scare and the January 1910 general election.  This is not to say that navalists had 
lost any of their political influence – in fact the lessening of national agitation was a 
paradoxical navalist victory, as evidence of a political consensus that navalism was 
broadly acceptable.  The yearly estimates were increasing at a record pace.  In 1908, 
before the ‘we want eight’ crisis, they had been £32 million.  They topped £40 million 
for the first time in 1910, and the final pre-war estimates of 1914 came in at a record 
£51.5 million.197  There were more dreadnoughts every year.  By 1914 Britain boasted 
twenty-nine dreadnoughts and battlecruisers afloat, supplemented by a further thirteen 
under construction.198  Each was more expensive than the last; the cost for each 
dreadnought increased by twenty percent and each battlecruiser by twenty-five percent 
between 1909 and the outbreak of war.199  These increases were mitigated for a time by 
                                                 
197 David French, The British Way in Warfare, 1688-2000 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 164; Morris, 
Radicalism Against War, 166; Richard Hough, The Great War at Sea, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1983), 46. Part (albeit a small part) of the expanding naval budget was due to the Royal 
Navy’s increasing popularity.  In 1911 the royal fleet review for George V’s coronation cost £31,000, ten 
times what it had in the 1880s.  From 1912 the estimates included an entire section on Ceremonies and 
Visits. Jan Rüger, “Nation, Empire and Navy: Identity Politics in the United Kingdom 1887 – 1914,” Past 
& Present 185 (November 2004): 164; Jan Rüger, “’The Last Word in Outward Splendour’: the Cult of 
the Navy and the Imperial Age,” in David Stevens and John Reeve, eds.,  The Navy and the Nation: The 
Influence of the Navy on Modern Australia (Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005), 48-49. 
 
198 Lawrence Sondhaus, Naval Warfare 1815-1914 (New York: Routledge, 2001), 205; navalists who felt 
the RN also needed more smaller fleet units such as destroyers, who were dismissed by Fisher as anti-
dreadnought reactionaries, would be vindicated during the First World War. 
 
199 Holger H. Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy 1888-1918 (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1980), 71; Herwig additionally notes that the percentage of the British military budget spent on the 
navy as opposed to the army went from a 54/46 split in 1905 to 64/36 in 1914. 
 
  
312 
 
additional revenue from Lloyd George’s 1909 budget, but by 1913 the navy was 
inexorably adding to the national debt.200  
 What made these unpleasant numbers such a triumph for navalism was that few 
were complaining.  In 1910 the radical Daily News bemoaned the “appetite of this 
monster of armaments,” while the journal Concord called the estimates “a betrayal […] 
of the traditional principles of the Liberal and Labour parties,” claiming they never 
would have passed “were it not for the constitutional crisis.”201  By 1913 only the 
Concord was still lamenting the yearly increases in the estimates, and in a resigned 
manner: “We have to wince now under the hard blow that war ‘scares’ are ‘made’ to 
order by a subsidised Press; that alarmist rumours are cynically edited and put into 
circulation in order to stimulate public opinion to make a clamour for more ships and 
more guns.”202  This was a statement both eloquent and true, but the Concord was 
merely ‘discovering’ a system that had been in place for decades and was an established 
part of the British political landscape.  In 1914 only thirty-five MPs, most of them 
members of the nascent Labour Party, voted against the estimates.  A simultaneous 
Conservative measure to increase the naval budget further – when the estimates were 
higher than they had ever been – won 190 adherents.203   
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 Navalism, particularly directed navalism, was no longer the divisive issue of the 
day for any of the major groups of politicians, professionals or the press.  Yet navalism 
as a concept had become firmly embedded in the framework of all these disparate 
factions.  In 1914 everyone from the First Lord of the Admiralty, to the commander of a 
dreadnought in the Home Fleet, to the editor of The Times had to engage with navalist 
ideas and principles as a matter of course.  Navalism merged into an integral part of 
British nationalism, but as it became larger and more influential as a concept those who 
had brought it to life to solve focused and often technical problems had lost their hold 
over it.  As a movement grows in size its edges inevitably blur, and directing navalism 
toward specific political or professional causes was no longer feasible.  What was 
feasible – and quite successful – will be discussed below. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
 Naval pressure groups had taken their own lessons from the panic of 1909 and 
the resultant turmoil at the Admiralty.  Where Jacky Fisher saw dangerous opposing 
forces and Charles Beresford saw perhaps his last opportunity for redemption, the Navy 
League and the Imperial Maritime League saw opportunity.  This push for recognition 
continued during both 1910 general elections.  The Imperial Maritime League remained 
as partisan as ever, asserting that a vote for any candidate “who comes forward as a 
supporter of the Liberal Government, no matter what his election pledges may be […] 
amount[s] to a vote in favour of a little Navy.”1  It took the split election of January as a 
victory, claiming credit for “contribut[ing] materially towards the semi-destruction of the 
Party which has itself proved so destructive” of national naval superiority.  The IML 
predicted a second election would be rapidly forthcoming (which turned out to be 
correct), and that it would turn on naval issues (which did not); the organization hoped it 
could “give decisive assistance towards the wresting of the reins of office from a Party 
which, from the moment of its accession to power in December 1905, has shown itself 
incapable ever of appreciating […] the duty of safeguarding the National Defences.”2  
During the second election of 1910 the IML continued its electioneering campaign, 
releasing a series of handbills calling for the nation to “turn out the radicals and 
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socialists or, when War comes You will starve”3 and an election manifesto professing 
“every vote given to a Liberal candidate is a vote given for National Starvation in War.”4 
 Essentially, the Imperial Maritime League abandoned both any pretense of 
impartiality and any attempt to reach the general British public á la the Navy League 
after 1910, admitting in 1912 it “cannot […] reach by itself the ears of the masses 
throughout the British Isles.  To achieve that end, an enormous organisation, comprising 
millions of members, and handling revenues of hundreds of thousands a year, will be 
requisite.  There is no such organisation except the Unionist Party.”5  The IML 
continued its crusade against both the Liberal Cabinet – reporting in 1912 that “this 
Government will be known in history as ‘The Betrayers’ and ‘The Starvers of the 
Poor’”6 – and the Navy League, which was denigrated as “an Admiralty Lap-Dog 
destined to receive the official gratitude of a so-called Liberal Party for its quiescence in 
the face of […] that Party’s schemes of political and party economy.”7 
 Yet as the IML’s rhetoric became harsher, its own ability to affect public policy 
became feebler.  By 1911 official publications were rather desperately claiming that a 
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donation of £3000 to the IML would enable Britain to “go forward on her path of 
Empire and fulfil that task which history and Providence seem to have allotted to her.”8  
The Imperial Maritime League had supported the Conservative Party in hopes the latter 
would accept it as an official or semi-official party apparatus, but its leaders were 
disappointed; Arthur Balfour never supported the IML either publicly or privately.9  In 
1912 the extreme Conservative Lord Willoughby de Broke was appointed president of 
the IML.  He assured Leo Maxse that he “only took the Presidency in order to have a 
weapon in our hands to make an attack when necessary on Fisher and Churchill […] I 
should be grateful if you would tell me when to strike.”10  A disillusioned Wyatt and 
Horton-Smith both left the League, and by 1914 it had fewer than 1500 members.  The 
Imperial Maritime League disappeared quietly during the First World War; its last 
contribution to the public discourse was the mass production of a poster accusing 
German soldiers of eating babies on the front lines.11 
 The Navy League, meanwhile, was still facing an internal struggle as to how 
partisan its official actions could be while still remaining acceptable to the voters of both 
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major parties.  It approached the precipice in 1910, editorializing in its official journal, 
The Navy, that “unless the electorate fulfills its duty at the polls in January 1910, it is 
very unlikely that England as a free country will see another parliamentary election.”12  
Yet during the same election the NL called on voters to “drop party for once and vote for 
a supreme fleet,” and the organization’s official takeaway from the split result was a 
noncommittal claim that “one of the great factors in effecting the reduction of the 
Radical majority has been the feeling throughout the country that the Government has 
not done its duty by the Royal Navy.”13  The NL even appointed the socialist navalist 
Robert Blatchford to join its executive committee, which he did only to step down 
quietly months later after an uproar from more traditionalist committee members.14  
When the Navy League published a list of 83 candidates for Parliament who had signed 
the League’s pledge supporting the two-power standard, 77 were Conservatives – but the 
6 Liberals were just enough of a nod towards bipartisanship to keep the Navy League 
from following the Imperial Maritime League down the path toward becoming a purely 
political organization.15 
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 The Navy League also managed to emerge from the wilderness and receive 
official political and professional support for the first time in over a decade.  This could 
be difficult, as the League’s reputation preceded it.  When the former Liberal MP Lord 
Nunburnholme was offered the presidency of the NL’s Yorkshire branch, he wrote to 
then First Lord of the Admiralty McKenna to inquire if he should accept the position.  
McKenna recommended he turn it down, as it would be “unavoidable that unfair 
criticism would be made of the Liberal government” by the League.16  Churchill went 
further and banned any member of the Board of Admiralty from accepting “any 
hospitalities” from the Navy League, as “on several recent occasions speeches have been 
delivered at Navy League dinners […] which have been of a controversial & partisan 
character wholly unsuited to a professedly non-party gathering.”17  But the NL was 
adamant that its speakers “should be entirely non-party in character.”  League general 
secretary P. J. Hannon assured Churchill that “no officer or official of the League has 
ever used on these occasions any criticisms of either the Board of Admiralty or of 
yourself as First Lord.”18  Hannon went so far as to guarantee that the NL would “select 
speakers whom we can trust not to offend in this respect” in the future.19  And the NL 
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scored an important victory when the Board of Education officially allowed, albeit 
implicitly, the formation of League branches in public schools.20 
 Hannon and his colleague Alan Burgoyne, Conservative MP and member of the 
Navy League’s executive council, did secure a valuable ally in their fight for increased 
official recognition – Jacky Fisher.  Though Fisher could no longer guarantee the NL 
access to the highest-ranking members of the Admiralty, he was certainly more useful as 
a friend than an enemy.  On the surface this seemed like a victory for both Fisher and the 
League, and Fisher did aid the League by putting its executive committee in touch with 
the navalist and sailors’ advocate Lionel Yexley, encouraging the League to work with 
him to improve conditions for the lower decks.21  However, the decision was a pragmatic 
one by both parties.  Fisher claimed Burgoyne was “a patriot!” who “was so sympathetic 
and so steadfast […] that I have a tender feeling for him!”22  Yet privately he thought it 
“amusing to find [the Navy League] now discovering that we were not d—d fools […] 
but which of them all is Man enough to own up & take back some of the lying calumny 
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heaped on the poor devil who took the whole thing on his own shoulders?  Such is 
life.”23  He also admitted to using Navy League membership lists to search out new 
navalist contacts.24   
 For his part Burgoyne seems to have maintained contact with Fisher for two 
reasons: first, to establish a relationship with J. L. Garvin and, as he wrote the editor, 
establish “a solid backing from your most influential paper;”25 second, simply because 
Charles Beresford, longtime supporter of the Imperial Maritime League, had 
“successfully alienated my friends in high places from me”26 and the NL needed an 
influential source close to the Admiralty.  Still, the Navy League under Burgoyne did its 
best to be apolitical.  Burgoyne declared to Fisher that he would shutter the League 
rather “than have it a partisan organisation, run to obtain revenge,” and even expressed a 
desire to act as a Conservative supporter of McKenna in Parliament;27 he was happy for 
the NL to be “closely associated with Whitehall in all we do.”28 
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 Yet all these backroom deals and surreptitious agreements, so long essential to 
the propagation of navalist ideas, were ancillary to the Navy League’s true strength after 
1909.  In 1909 The Navy had expressed concern that the NL had been “too aristocratic, 
too far above the level of the crowd,” thus failing “to establish a firm hold upon the 
interests of […] the lower middle and the wage-earning classes.”29  But that same year 
the Navy League’s membership began to expand rapidly, from 20,000 members in 1908 
to 100,000 in 1912 and 125,000 by the outbreak of war in 1914.30  In 1913 the NL called 
for a million members, and for the first time such a number did not seem entirely outside 
the realm of possibility.31 
 Several factors brought about the sudden surge in Navy League membership.  
The great ‘we want eight’ agitation of 1909 likely played a major role, as it was the last 
occasion before the war where naval issues were a national concern and received 
coverage in all major periodicals and dailies; concerned citizens with little prior interest 
in politics would have been far more likely to join the Navy League than its 
extraordinarily partisan competitor.  On a broader scale, the lantern-lectures to children 
so disparaged by the IML were bearing fruit.  The Navy League had been in existence 
for nearly two decades, and had established almost a cottage industry of navalist material 
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to distribute or sell throughout the nation.  The League produced a maritime version of 
the famous pink map of the British Empire, with trade routes and fleet coaling stations 
highlighted, that could be found posted throughout London.32  It distributed history 
textbooks with a naval theme to schools throughout the country and held prize essay 
competitions on sea power for students.33  The Trafalgar Day celebration begun by 
Arnold White remained popular enough that it was expanded into a Trafalgar Fund, 
through which the League raised more than enough to remain solvent even after the 
required outlay on wreaths and flowers each October 21st.34  When Leo Maxse’s 
National Review accused the Navy League of neglecting its duty, long-time League 
member Henry T. C. Knox proudly responded that the NL “thinks it is better employed 
in educating the ignorant masses about the Navy than in getting up Petitions to the 
House of Lords.”35 
 The Navy League was (inadvertently) aided in this public relations mission by 
the Admiralty – not in the corridors of power by Fisher and Churchill, but on a much 
wider institutional level.  Historian Jan Rüger terms this broad-scale community 
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outreach the “cult of the Navy.”36  Taking another approach, this project uses the term 
‘soft navalism,’ as opposed to directed navalism, for the same type of nonpartisan pro-
naval activity.37  The Admiralty had absorbed Fisher’s lessons on the value of 
sympathetic journalism and expanded greatly upon them.  While Fisher gathered a small 
cadre of influential columnists and editors around him, the Admiralty offered credentials 
to 217 correspondents, including 50 from provincial newspapers, at the 1911 fleet 
review.  At a 1909 fleet review on the Thames four million Britons turned out to see 
what the great scare had bought their nation; police had to be called in after 20,000 
enthusiastic Londoners rushed the Dreadnought at its pier.  The Admiralty followed this 
up with a second fleet assembly specifically for journalists, both local and imperial, the 
same year.  The Royal Navy offered children’s programs aboard warships at reviews38 
and sent cruisers on ‘hurrah trips’ around the country on recruitment drives; this was a 
far cry from the 1890s, when enthusiastic captains with no organizational guidance 
cycled around the countryside distributing recruiting pamphlets.39  Even the test 
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mobilization of July 1914, so essential in the Royal Navy’s response to the outbreak of 
war, was conducted only because the Treasury refused to pay for yet another full-scale 
review.40 
 Thus, the navalist organization that had for so long stood apart – the pressure 
group – emerged in the last years of peace as the true success story of the navalist era.  
But what became of the traditional directed navalist relationships between journalists, 
parliamentarians and the Admiralty’s upper echelons?  As with so many other seemingly 
permanent institutions of British life they were destroyed by the First World War, 
essentially at their own hands.  The various governmental investigations into breaches of 
confidentiality going back over a decade frightened the London dailies so sufficiently 
they implemented a voluntary system of self-censorship, the Admiralty, War Office and 
Press Committee – funded by the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association – in 1912.  The 
outbreak of war made voluntary censorship obsolete almost overnight.  Just days after 
Britain declared war came the official Press Bureau, headed by the Conservative 
politician F. E. Smith; its mission was to ensure that “a steady stream of information 
supplied both by the War Office and the Admiralty can be given to the press.”  Next 
came the Defence of the Realm Act, or DORA, banning upon threat of military justice 
any release of information “as is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful 
to the enemy.”  J. L. Garvin of the Observer, J. A. Spender of the Westminster Gazette, 
and John St Loe Strachey of the Spectator, editors all, joined the War Propaganda 
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Bureau; their war efforts would be devoted outward towards neutral nations, not inward 
to the old partisan squabbles.41  Naval correspondents were immediately banned from 
British fleets, and the combined Grand Fleet disappeared into obscurity in Scapa Flow 
for the remainder of the conflict.42 
 The great titans of professional navalism, Charles Beresford and Jacky Fisher, 
found themselves thrust into a political and operational landscape in which their usual 
methods of journalistic cooperation and surreptitious dealings were no longer effective.  
Beresford played a small but notable role in Britain’s decision to enter the war.  In early 
August 1914 Beresford was part of a delegation of far-right Conservatives dispatched to 
bring Conservative Party leader Andrew Bonar Law, who had been meeting with party 
luminaries in the countryside over the matter of Home Rule, back to London.  When 
Beresford set upon Bonar Law “purple with rage and shouting” about naval issues, 
Bonar Law rapidly headed to the capital to more effectively shift his party’s focus 
towards the international situation.43   
 Beresford was involved in a much uglier incident soon afterwards.  The office of 
First Sea Lord had experienced a great deal of upheaval under Churchill.  In the three 
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years since his appointment Admiral of the Fleet Arthur Wilson and Admiral Francis 
Bridgeman had come and gone, and since late 1912 the position had been held by 
Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg.  Battenberg was related to the Royal Family, and 
had lived in Britain since the late 1860s – but he was Austrian by birth, and in the tense 
climate of 1914 a vicious newspaper campaign soon sprang up against him.  Beresford 
was suspected of involvement – he had called Battenberg “a d—d German who had no 
business in the British Navy” in 1906 and his opinion had not improved in the 
intervening years.44  Beresford was accused by the Conservative politician Arthur Lee of 
repeating similar slanders almost immediately upon the British declaration of war, 
leading to a scathing letter from Churchill: “In times of war the spreading of reports 
likely to cause mistrust or despondency is a military offense […] the interests of the 
country do not permit the spreading of such wicked allegations by an officer of your 
rank, even though retired.”45  In response the admiral subjected Lee to “a torrent of 
violent abuse” via telephone, culminating in threats to “make some kind of scene” in 
Parliament.46  In any event Beresford’s plan backfired spectacularly.  Battenberg stepped 
down under great public pressure in October of 1914.  His replacement, called from a 
quiet retirement, was Jacky Fisher.47 
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 But the Jacky Fisher of 1914 was not the Jacky Fisher of 1904 or even of 1910.  
He held grudges dating back decades.  Soon after taking office he attempted, though not 
particularly seriously, to have the Morning Post shut down and its editor H. A. Gwynne 
jailed under the Defence of the Realm Act after Gwynne implied he was senile.48  He 
could still be visionary, and believed the Admiralty should adopt oil-fueled battleships, 
submarine warfare and bombing campaigns.  But he could not push through reforms like 
these on his own during a war, and he found himself “in the position of playing a game 
of chess very badly begun by fools I hated.”49  He was uncomfortable without the 
support of his journalistic allies, and claimed “neither Press or Parliament represent the 
real thought of the People.”50  Fisher and Churchill’s time together at the Admiralty 
generally ranged from unproductive to absurd.  Admiral Sir Henry Oliver, Chief of the 
Admiralty War Staff and Churchill’s secretary, recorded in his memoirs that the massive 
nautical chart in Churchill’s office marking the positions of every British ship at sea was 
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entirely fake – Fisher and Churchill each brought too many “club gossips and editors” to 
see the chart for any actual intelligence to be marked on it.51 
 Fisher and Churchill’s tumultuous partnership at the Admiralty lasted less than 
seven months, during which time Fisher attempted to resign nine times over various 
perceived slights, snubs and Admiralty missteps.52  The ninth resignation, over the 
contentious and eventually unsuccessful Dardanelles campaign in May 1915, stuck.  For 
a brief period Fisher’s career was in limbo as the government debated whether to accept 
his latest departure, while major newspapers including The Times, the Daily Telegraph 
and the Daily Express called for Fisher either to stay or to replace Churchill as First Lord 
of the Admiralty.53  When he submitted a bizarre list of demands he considered 
prerequisite to his remaining in office, including full control over all personnel 
decisions, the government instead accepted his resignation.54  Fisher was rapidly hustled 
off to Scotland, because – as secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence Maurice 
Hankey recorded – he was known to be “intriguing with journalists” and the Cabinet 
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wanted him “away from journalistic influences, as he may do himself and the nation 
great harm by an indiscretion in his present excited state.”55 
 The system of directed navalism Fisher guided to its greatest extent did not long 
survive his departure.  With no naval correspondents aboard the Grand Fleet, the first 
news Britain received of the great clash at Jutland in May 1916 was from German 
reports.  The London dailies, lacking information to the contrary and frustrated with a 
close-lipped Admiralty, declared the battle (which had been a stalemate and would turn 
out to be a strategic British victory) a near-disaster.  This earned the press, in the most 
general sense of the term, the enmity of the Royal Navy for the remainder of the war.56  
Admiral John Jellicoe, commander of the British fleet at Jutland, asked both the Board 
of Admiralty and Fisher’s replacement as First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Jackson, if the press 
could be censored, as their “articles are most hurtful to discipline and morale and 
discouraging to the officers and men of the fleet.”57  When Jellicoe later became First 
Sea Lord himself he was advised by Reginald Bacon, no stranger to the danger of 
journalistic communication, to “put all admirals and generals through a short course of 
being strafed by the Press” so they could “cultivate a callous contempt for them and their 
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deeds.”58   Young officer Douglas King-Harman typified the Royal Navy’s reaction to 
Jutland: “They’re funny people these journalists – they’ve been howling half the war to 
be told the ‘truth’, and when the unfortunate Admiralty tells it, or as much as they knew 
at the time, there was a bigger howl than ever.”59 
 Both Beresford and Fisher avoided the public and professional spotlight for the 
remainder of the war.  Beresford never forgave Fisher or any of Fisher’s allies for what 
he saw as a wholesale betrayal of naval interests via influencing journalists and cutting 
budgets a decade prior.  As late as December 1918 he was planning an article for Leo 
Maxse’s National Review detailing how Fisher “instituted a press bureau at the 
Admiralty for attacking any officers he did not like, and had a system of espionage of a 
most treacherous character throughout the service […] a private in the Army, a 
bluejacket in the Navy, would have been shot for what he did.”60  In 1919 Beresford 
confessed to Archibald Hurd that he still held Fisher, McKenna and Churchill 
responsible for “my gallant dead shipmates.”61  He passed away later that year.  Fisher 
refrained from any writing projects of his own while the war continued, and although he 
continued to support his old navalist allies he had grown cynical; as he wrote to 
Archibald Hurd, “your article is delicious!  but no one reads Articles now-a-days.  
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Criticism is at an end – Parliament is gagged – the Press is frightened – the Public 
apathetic.”62  In 1919 he contributed a series of articles to The Times on his career, 
writing for the public under his own name for perhaps the first time in his life,63 and 
followed this up with his esoteric memoirs; he died in 1920. 
 The traditional navalist era in Britain, consisting of private and generally 
surreptitious relationships between serving naval officers, politicians, and the periodical 
press, essentially ended in August 1914 and had certainly ended by the Armistice.  So 
the final question must be asked: was British navalism before the First World War a 
success?  In a word, yes – but a great deal of nuance is inherent in that brief answer.  
This project has been centered around the twin ideas that (1) navalism, beyond being a 
catch-all term for a variety of official and unofficial movements, meant specific goals 
and specific methodologies for various groups within the British state and (2) directed 
navalism resulted from the often-contentious relationship between three of these groups 
– serving naval officers, politicians, and the press – with navalist pressure groups an 
important secondary category which attempted to maintain contact with all three at 
various points.  Each of these groups found directed navalism, which could not have 
existed without them, both a hindrance and a help at various points between 1884 and 
1914. 
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 The first category, serving naval officers, is the most well-known – but the idea 
persists that only Jacky Fisher and Charles Beresford ever used the press to their 
advantage, a concept dating back to Reginald Bacon’s 1929 biography of Fisher in 
which the author claimed Fisher “was the first of our Admirals to make an intelligent use 
of the Press for the benefit of the Navy.”64  True, Fisher and Beresford were the most 
prolific correspondents with journalists and editors.  But this dissertation has 
demonstrated – if a list will be pardoned – that between 1884 and 1914 the following 
naval officers had direct contact with the British press, either via open letters under their 
own name to newspapers or communication with authors and editors: Astley Cooper 
Key, Frederick Beauchamp Seymour, Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, Anthony Hoskins, 
Thomas Symonds, George Elliot, Jacky Fisher, Charles Beresford, Swinton Holland, 
Dudley de Chair, William White, Richard Vesey Hamilton, Frederick Maxse, Sydney 
Eardley-Wilmot, C. C. Penrose Fitzgerald, G. H. Atkinson-Willes, E. R. Fremantle, John 
Hay, George Steward Bowles, Edward Field, Thomas Le Hunte Ward, Edmond Slade, 
W. H. Henderson, Herbert Richmond, Henry Oliver, Carlyon Bellairs, Charles Ottley, 
Reginald Custance, Cyprian Bridge, Percy Scott, Prince Louis of Battenberg, and John 
Jellicoe.  The following officers had indirect contact with the press through writing to 
their naval colleagues or political superiors about ongoing journalistic communications: 
Frederick Richards, Walter Kerr, George King-Hall, Reginald Bacon, Hedworth 
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Lambton, Bryan Godfrey-Fausset, Gerard Noel, Doveton Sturdee, A. K. Wilson, John 
Hopkins, F. S. Inglefield, William May, Arthur Moore, John de Robeck, Rosslyn 
Wemyss, and Francis Bridgeman.  This list encompasses every First Naval Lord and 
First Sea Lord of the Admiralty between 1879 and 1915 with the exception of Sir Arthur 
Hood (1885-86, 1886-89) and three of the next four Sea Lords to succeed Fisher in 
Jellicoe, Wemyss and Beatty.  Maintaining a network of journalistic contacts was a 
priority at the highest levels of the Admiralty for a nearly-uninterrupted period of thirty-
five years. 
 Were professional navalists able to achieve their goals during this period?  They 
largely supported reforms that were both specific and nonpartisan, and were fairly 
successful in doing so: the “Truth about the Navy” scare of 1884 resulted in a 
supplemental naval estimate, Jacky Fisher’s educational reforms of 1902 modernized the 
system by which young cadets entered the Navy, the Naval Intelligence Division was 
created in 1886 due to Beresford’s agitation.  Yet these reforms, though specific, could 
easily be generalized (a cynic might say ‘spun’) as broad positive developments and sold 
to the press in that manner: more ships than the French, a more egalitarian navy, proper 
war planning.  Professional navalists ran into two issues throughout the period.  The first 
was becoming too specific.  Though Fisher was a master at successfully framing naval 
issues as national concerns, many serving officers were less able to present their pet 
projects as relevant to the country as a whole.  Fisher’s botched effort to publicize 
gyroscopes through the Navy League (a rare public relations misstep), Beresford’s 
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electioneering campaign on the issue of Maltese coal, Percy Scott’s gunnery reforms – 
none of these held much interest to the fabled navalist ‘man in the street.’ 
 The much larger issue for professionals, and one that essentially destroyed the 
effectiveness of professional navalism, was partisanship and the related problem of 
favoritism.  Serving officers could be quite successful at assembling broad press and 
political coalitions.  Beresford was supported simultaneously by Leo Maxse, David 
Lloyd George, and Robert Blatchford, while Fisher maintained excellent relations with 
Arthur Balfour, Reginald McKenna and Winston Churchill at various points during his 
tenure at the Admiralty.  But internal clashes within the Navy spilled over into external 
relations with the press and the government, turning navalist allies into warring factions.  
This was a widespread issue within the Navy, particularly during the Edwardian period 
and after.  J. H. Godfrey, who joined the Royal Navy in 1903, recalled in his memoir 
that “schisms there had been ever since I joined the navy.  Firstly Fisher-Beresford, 
Beresford-Lambton, Beresford-Percy Scott, Jellicoe-Beatty, Beatty-Wemyss.”65  
 However, it must be said that the decade-long feud between Fisher and Beresford 
was by far the most far-reaching and the most damaging to professional navalism.  
Fisher was remarkably apolitical throughout his career, but Beresford was a staunch 
Conservative and brought politics into a personal dispute after 1908.  Fisher’s creation of 
the frankly nepotistic Fishpond system was equally as destructive to naval morale, and 
while his plan to focus solely on younger officers as protégés in theory would have led 
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to a second generation of navalist officers by the 1920s, in practice it resulted in a large 
group of officers who found themselves entirely removed from any role within the 
power structure of the Admiralty.  It is no wonder the Syndicate of Discontent turned to 
outside agitation.   
 Professional navalism was an absolutely necessary driving force behind the 
navalist movement.  The “Truth About the Navy” campaign never would have happened 
if serving officers had not been willing to deal with W. T. Stead’s Pall Mall Gazette.  
But serving officers had won their greatest navalist victories by 1906 and the Fisher 
reforms.  Professional activity following the 1909 ‘we want eight’ scare was almost 
entirely a reflection of personal animosities, and as a result naval officers trusted neither 
the press nor partisan politics by the last years before the war.  In terms of successful 
agitation towards specific objects, professional navalism was the most successful group 
– but they collapsed the earliest as well. 
 What about navalists in the press?  They largely supported reforms that were 
both partisan and designed to appeal to a wide audience.  It must be remembered that it 
was the job of journalists and editors to sell newspapers; as historian Stephen Koss has 
written, “the task of politicians was to keep the political press from going wrong.  That 
of proprietors was to keep it from going bust.”66  While there were true navalist believers 
on Fleet Street, they were generally columnists: Arnold White, Archibald Hurd, James 
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Thursfield.  Editors mostly took up the navalist cause to further their own interests, and 
the audiences they wrote for had to have at least a passing interest in navalism and naval 
issues; there were no navalist agitations in the Manchester Guardian.  W. T. Stead was a 
Radical Liberal but also a pioneer of sensationalist journalism; his “Truth About the 
Navy” campaign was the second in a series of three major alarmist exposés his Pall Mall 
Gazette launched between 1883 and 1885.  Leo Maxse’s National Review was a far 
right-wing Conservative mouthpiece, and Maxse took any excuse to denigrate the 
Liberal government after 1906, hence his willingness to work with Beresford in turning 
personal dispute into a partisan wedge issue. 
 Perhaps the best example is J. L. Garvin of the Observer, who was one of 
Fisher’s most devoted editorial allies.  He was also a realist, and when defense issues 
became a national concern during the late Edwardian period Garvin needed an angle.  
The Times under Charles à Court Repington had the inside track on developments within 
the army; Cecil Spring Rice enlightened Maxse’s National Review and Strachey’s 
Spectator on the inner workings of the Foreign Office.67  The Admiralty’s was the last 
major perspective missing from the London dailies, and Fisher was willing to talk, and 
so the great relationship between he and Garvin was formed.  Their association also 
demonstrated the dangers that could befall high-ranking officers who worked with the 
partisan press.  The Observer was generally acknowledged as the most influential 
Conservative paper after Garvin assumed editorial duties in 1908; but Garvin broke with 
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the party over the Lloyd George budget, and the Observer became increasingly 
marginalized as an organ of Conservative Party opinion – and Fisher’s chances to justify 
Admiralty policy under a Liberal government to an angry Conservative press became 
marginalized along with it.68 
 To guard against similar accusations of partisanship, serving officers attempted 
to work with journalists across the political spectrum.  Fisher in particular established 
relationships with the Liberal Westminster Gazette and Daily News as well as the 
generally Conservative Northcliffe press – and generally stayed away from the extremes 
of both parties, a lesson Beresford never learned.  When operating at peak efficiency the 
navalist press created a self-perpetuating cycle.  Once the Admiralty trusted a paper, that 
paper could expect a steady stream of assistance from Whitehall.  But too often the 
papers themselves were subject to the vagaries of the market, or an editor leaving – the 
great example here being the Pall Mall Gazette, which essentially began directed 
navalism but had little to do with the phenomenon after Stead departed in 1890.  The 
navalist press was extremely successful at driving and supporting naval reforms from the 
1880s through the Fisher reforms, and extremely successful at selling papers through 
partisan agitation thereafter.  This was undoubtedly the better decision for their 
continued national influence and their bottom line, but to naval officers it was a betrayal 
they never forgave. 
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 As for the third major navalist group, politicians, the question of their 
effectiveness is even more dependent on time period.  They supported reforms that were 
both targeted and partisan – but non-threatingly partisan.  The party in power had to 
justify its own naval policy, which was much more difficult for the Liberal government 
after 1906 than it had been for the Conservatives (that Fisher had entered office under 
the Conservatives as an avowed retrencher was conveniently immediately forgotten 
within that party), but it had to be justified to high-ranking experts, not navalist agitators, 
which worked to moderate their views.  There was no Liberal push to disband the Royal 
Navy and no Conservative push to build a hundred ships per year, regardless of what 
each party’s more extreme supporters would have preferred. 
 Another important role played by politicians was that of convenient scapegoat, 
particularly in the early years of the navalist movement.  Navalist officers worked with 
supportive journalists to strengthen the Navy against a government viewed either as too 
stingy (the Liberals to 1889) or too wasteful (the Conservatives from 1902-04), in the 
two-versus-one model that proved so successful – and, importantly, the politicians often 
gave in and supported navalist reforms after a public campaign.  At a time when the 
most active serving navalists were younger officers, the Board of Admiralty was often 
lumped into the broad category of ‘politics’ as an opponent to be rallied against, for 
example with Beresford’s resignation in protest from the Board in 1888.  It was a 
common tactic for newspapers to cite anonymous naval sources as proof that the 
government of the day was too involved with partisan issues and not supportive enough 
of the navy. 
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 This tripartite division began to collapse as professional navalists moved up the 
chain of command.  Beginning with Fisher’s appointment as Second Naval Lord in 
1902, navalist serving officers had to maintain working relationships with their Cabinet-
level political counterparts.  Fisher in particular excelled at this, easily winning over 
such disparate figures as Cawdor, Tweedmouth, McKenna and Churchill with his 
reforming ways.  But he also had publicly to support all decisions made by the 
Admiralty (to be fair, most of them were his), which deprived his journalistic allies of an 
easy target for further agitation.  The result was a rapidly increasing politicization of the 
navalist movement.  Instead of professional-press cooperation against the government, 
the fight became politicians and their press supporters who were currently out of power 
against politicians, naval officers and their press supporters who were in.  After the 
Liberal victory of 1906, Liberal politicians favored a very moderate navalism – 
reassuring their critics that the Empire was sufficiently defended and the Royal Navy’s 
traditions were being upheld while doing their best to clamp down on public agitation.  
Conservative politicians (particularly backbenchers) favored an ever-more radical 
navalism.  It was no longer sufficient to support the Navy; politicians had to demonstrate 
their parliamentary opponents would destroy the Navy unless they were stopped. 
 The three major groups involved with directed navalism – professionals, the 
press, and politicians – all played major roles in creating and sustaining the navalist era.  
Pro-naval journalists were supplied information by serving officers and used it to call for 
naval reforms; well-meaning parliamentarians took their lumps from the navalist press 
before co-opting their message and welcoming navalist officers into the corridors of 
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power at Whitehall.  The navalist era would not have been possible without all three – 
and yet all three experienced their greatest success (or in the case of politicians, their 
most bipartisan period) early in the navalist era.  After the ‘we want eight’ campaign and 
the Beresford Inquiry of 1909 directed navalism was almost entirely subsumed under a 
rising tide of politicization and radicalization, a phenomenon not unknown among other 
political and public movements in the last years before the First World War. 
 The true victor of the navalist era was soft navalism – the wives’ clubs, public 
speeches, primary-school essays, Trafalgar Day wreaths and lantern lectures so much 
maligned by those working in more partisan spheres.  Navalism as a concept and a 
movement was a massive success.  George Orwell joined the Navy League as a seven-
year old; London stores sold everything from dreadnought toys to dreadnought-shaped 
biscuits; men and boys alike sailed homemade warships in the Trafalgar Square 
fountains to celebrate the declaration of war in August 1914.69  This is the navalism so 
often studied, and so often accused – for better or for worse – of playing a major role in 
the worsening of international relations prior to the First World War.  But it never would 
have existed without directed navalism.   
 The Navy League shifted its efforts to public outreach (and watched its 
membership rolls rise) only after attempting to win the favor of the Admiralty, the 
Cabinet and the Press Association and succeeding with none – but it owed its existence 
to those three groups all the same.  Soft navalism grew quietly in the shadows for two 
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decades then exploded into the spotlight as directed navalism consumed itself with 
partisan infighting, yet the second was a necessary precondition for the first.  Navalists 
were not a monolithic entity, and each of the groups examined in this dissertation did 
win major victories early in the navalist era.  After 1909 political and professional 
navalists were severely weakened by internal struggles, while the navalist press moved 
on to what they considered more urgent national issues; even without the coming of war 
it is unlikely the three groups would have ever fully cooperated as they had in the 
Edwardian period.  The final word on the often effective, frequently tumultuous, and 
usually surreptitious relationship between the Royal Navy and the British press must go 
to Jacky Fisher, who left his last public thoughts on the London dailies in his memoirs: 
“History is so written that no end of literary gentlemen will endeavour to confute all I 
am saying by extracts (or, as they will call them, facts) from Contemporary Documents 
and Newspapers.  Well now, to-day, read the Morning Post and Daily News on the same 
incident!  (For myself I prefer the Daily News).”70 
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